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ii 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the development of the fiduciary duty under the Maltese corporate law as 
an example of legal transplantation through the Maltese statutory and judicial approach. 
 
Based on the review of the legal transplantation literature, it assesses the factors that have 
influenced the Maltese statutory and judicial process. Historical, cultural, economic, prestige 
and political factors and familiarity with the law are discussed. 
 
It demonstrates that the Maltese statutory path has been influenced by the Italian legal system 
through the application of mandate law and thereafter by the English legal system with the 
inclusion of indirect influences, which started to prevail from the 1940s, and subsequently with 
the enactment of Article 136A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 in 2003.  However, it also 
indicates that the fiduciary duty in Articles 1124A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 only 
have a Roman influence. 
 
It concludes that, although the statutory regulation of this duty was linear and influenced by 
historical and cultural factors, most of the Maltese judiciary have been inconsistent in applying 
the law and has departed from the factors that influenced the legislators from the 1940s onwards 
by having started to apply the economic and prestige factors. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: themes, approach and structure of the 
thesis 
 The research question 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the development of the fiduciary duty of company 
directors under Maltese corporate law as an example of legal transplantation through the 
Maltese statutory and judicial approach. 
 
It will be seen that legislatures in Malta were always very much influenced by the historical, 
cultural and societal factors, together with their familiarity with the law, from the 1800s. 
However, the majority of the judiciary’s desire from the 1940s was to form a legal system that 
attracts foreign investment, as opposed to creating one driven by sentiment presented through 
the historical, cultural and societal factors, which has led judicial practice to deviate from the 
statutory approach. This judicial deviation has given rise to problems of inconsistency between 
the judgements delivered and statute law; thus leading to judicial nihilism.1 Judicial nihilism, 
therefore, shall be defined as those instances whereby most of the judiciary were not applying 
the law as it was enacted by the legislators but were departing from such definitions of the law 
to apply the law they deemed appropriate. In view of this, it is observed that these diverse 
factors mentioned herein have led to the evolution of the fiduciary duty of company directors 
                                                 
1 As at to date, there exists no literature that define the term judicial nihilism. However, this term was formulated 
on the premise of the definition of nihilism in general, as presented by Joseph William Singer, ‘The Player and 
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory’ 94 Yale L.J. (1984) 
<https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6890&context=ylj> accessed 16 September 
2019. More precisely, the term legal nihilism was formulated over time by various legal scholars, which is defined 
as a negative attitude towards a particular law, as presented by Jahor S. Azarkievič, ‘Legal nihilism as an obstacle 
to the rule of law in Russia’, University of Glasgow, December 2016, who refers to various scholars. Therefore, 
the term judicial nihilism was formulated to demonstrate the majority of the judiciary’s unacceptance of the law 
that was in force at that particular moment in time  
2 
in Malta to change remarkably over these past two hundred years, ultimately no longer deriving 
from the Italian civil legal system, but rather from the application of English common law 
through the process known as legal transplantation. 
 
The persistence of the influence of Roman law throughout the years will also be examined, as 
it is the backbone of both the common and civil law on which the English and Italian legal 
systems are respectively founded, and which have shaped the Maltese legal system. The direct 
influence of the Roman law on the Maltese legal system, without making any reference to the 
Italian and English legal systems, will also be explored due to the remarkable changes which 
came about in 2004. 
 
 Reasons to examine this research question 
An examination of the Maltese legal system with regards to the fiduciary duty of directors 
through an analysis of the concept of legal transplantation is significant for several reasons, 
which can be brigaded under four sub-headings: the consequence of considering the Maltese 
mixed jurisdiction bearing a mixed legal system; the importance of the business sector in the 
Maltese economy; the judicial approach in Malta that deviates significantly from the statutory 
path; and the lack of Maltese literature on legal transplantation in Maltese corporate law. 
 
1.2.1 Malta as a mixed jurisdiction with a mixed legal system 
An examination of the development and interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors under 
the Maltese legal system, through the legal transplantation concept, is an interesting topic of 
analysis because it demonstrates that Malta bears a mixed legal system, as specifically 
3 
described and categorised by various scholars.2 A mixed legal system can be defined and 
considered as legal pluralism wherein ‘laws, methods, techniques, or legal institutions [are] 
drawn from another tradition or foreign system’3 to form one unique legal system. Malta is 
consequently categorised as enjoying a mixed jurisdiction as it enjoys a mixed legal system. It 
has been so categorised by various legal scholars, including Biagio Ando’,4 who says that Malta 
is a mixed jurisdiction because it shows an overlap ‘between the continental legal traditions, 
which lies at the basis of the Maltese legal tradition, with the English one.’5 This same 
definition and explanation is again provided by Palmer.6  
 
In view of this, this study will demonstrate that Malta falls under the category of a mixed 
jurisdiction due to the influences derived from the civil system through the application of the 
Italian legal system and of the common law system through the English legal system. This 
island nation was, in fact, conquered by various invaders who first introduced the Italian 
influence (vide Chapter 3), and although later conquered by the British who introduced their 
                                                 
2 William Tetley, (2000) ‘Mixed Jurisdictions: common law vs civil law (codified and uncodified)’ 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tetley.html > accessed 29 November 2016. Palmer believes that 
‘despite the indisputable diversity of peoples, cultures, languages, climates, religions, economies, and indigenous 
laws existing among them, [these two legal systems] share some characteristics’. He further notes that this 
‘coexistence of different roots is accepted and considered obvious by those who live and work within those legal 
systems’ (Mixed Legal Systems, East and West, Routledge, 2016). The eminent Scottish comparatist Sir Thomas 
Smith also makes reference to similar mixed legal systems, describing them as being ‘basically a civilian system 
that had been under pressure from the Anglo-American common law and has in part been overlaid by that rival 
system of jurisprudence’ (A Mixed Legal System in Transition, Edinburgh Studies in Law, July 2005). Other 
writers, however, believe that an unambiguous definition of mixed jurisdictions has never been provided, although 
they still believe that a mixed jurisdiction is one that shows a mixed legal system: B Ando’, ‘As Slippery as an 
Eel? Comparative Law and Polyjural Systems’, (2015) in Palmer, V.V, Mattar M. Y. and Koppel A (eds.) Mixed 
Legal Systems, East and West. United Kingdom: Ashgate Publication, pp. 3-16; Palmer, V.V (2012) ‘The Mixed 
Jurisdiction in Profile: Three Characteristics’, in Palmer, V.V (ed.) Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third 
Legal Family. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
3 Vernon Valentine Palmer, ‘Mixed Legal Systems…and the Myth of Pure Laws’ [2007] Volume 67 Number 4 
Louisiana Law Review 1205  
<https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6210&context=lalrev> accessed 13 March 
2018 
4 Biagio Ando’, Kevin Aquilina, J, Scerri-Diacono and David Zammit (2012) ‘Malta’, in Palmer V (2nd ed.) Mixed 
Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal Family. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 528-576 
5 Ibid. 
6 Palmer (n 2) pp. 3-16 
4 
own influences, the Italian influence could not be totally disregarded and both influences were 
applied concurrently for a long period of time. These influences have resulted in the statutory 
regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors in Malta being influenced by the civil legal system 
with regards to the applicability of the mandate law, while the scattered provisions enacted in 
the 1960s under the Maltese Commercial Codes have been influenced by the English legal 
system. The statutory application of these two concurrent legal systems continued until 2003, 
where from then on the common law system alone was applied, which led to the enactment of 
the Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995. The judiciary was also influenced by 
these two foreign systems wherein they applied the Italian legal system until the 1940s, but the 
most of the judiciary have thereafter departed ways whereby some judges and magistrates 
started to apply the English legal system from the 1940s whereas other judges and magistrates 
continued to refer to the Italian legal system even after 2003. In addition to such change, the 
direct influence of the Roman law is also observed in the 2004 enactment of Articles 1124 A 
and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870; therefore, the influence of the civil legal system was 
once again predominant. 
 
Accordingly, this study will demonstrate that there are continuous instances where such cordial 
blending of these two different legal systems arises under the Maltese statute law, even if such 
coexistence is not automatically clear from the statute law itself and even though differences 
exist between the civil and common legal systems. In fact, the civil system is based on codified 
laws,7 which can be interpreted differently by different actors without being bound by the rule 
of precedent. By contrast, the common law entails that legal rules are not enacted through 
                                                 
7 J.G. Sauveplanne, ‘Codified and Judge Made Law: The Role of Courts and Legislation in Civil and Common 
Law Systems’ [1981] Volume 45 Number 4 <http://www.dwc.knaw.nl/DL/publications/PU00009908.pdf> 
accessed 13 March 2018 
5 
Codes, but rather lie in precedents, which are created from concrete cases delivered by superior 
Courts.8 
 
1.2.2 The business sector in the Maltese economy 
It is also important to study the fiduciary duty of directors in Malta because the business sector 
fuels the Maltese economy. Although many different sectors compose the Maltese economy, 
including construction, manufacturing and agriculture, there has recently been a shift in the 
pattern, and financial services, information technology and other professional activities have 
continued to grow while agricultural activity has dwindled.9 Such shift has led the legislators 
in Malta to enact more regulatory laws that need to be thoroughly observed due to the business 
nature of these sectors, such as the enactment of and abiding by Article 136 A of the Companies 
Act 1995. These laws eventually boost its economy and the financial services, which have, 
accordingly, led to the financial services sector, including corporate services, to continue to 
thrive in the Maltese economy during the past decade, especially after the financial crisis of 
200810 when the Maltese economy was able to show great resilience. The HSBC Bank Malta’s 
head of global banking and markets, Chris Bond, also openly described such resilience in 
2013.11 Indeed, the effects of the 2008 financial crisis led the corporate and financial sectors to 
become two of the main spheres of activity that power the Maltese economy and they currently 
                                                 
8 Judicial Office, ‘The judicial system of England and Wales: A visitor’s guide’ <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/international-visitors-guide-10a.pdf> accessed 13 March 2018 
9 Finance Malta, ‘The Financial Crisis – A Decade Later’ (2017) 
<https://www.financemalta.org/sections/banking/members-articles/detail/the-financial-crisis-a-decade-later-
2017/>  accessed 13 April 2018 
10 Reference to this financial crisis is deemed appropriate as the 2008 financial crisis was the last biggest financial 
crisis that has hit the world 
11Malta Independent, ‘Maltese economy’s ‘resilience’ in financial crisis understood’ (2013) 
<http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2013-05-29/news/maltese-economys-resilience-in-financial-crisis-
underscored-1711276035> accessed 25 April 2018 
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contribute twelve percent of Malta’s GDP, a figure thought likely to grow with the 
establishment of more financial services companies in Malta.12 The success of the Maltese 
financial services economic growth is also acknowledged by the chairperson of the Malta 
Financial Services Authority who stated asserted in the 2017 financial report that: 
‘the contribution of the financial services sector to the economy showed a 
contribution of over 11% which compares favourably with other finance centres 
such as London and Dublin […] Financial services and insurance continue 
account for over 90% of Foreign Direct Investment into Malta’.13  
 
This study also notes that these different sectors, which ultimately form the business sector, 
can be formed as limited liability companies. Indeed, the importance of this business sector in 
Malta is manifested in the fact that the number of limited liability companies is relatively large 
in comparison to the size of the Maltese islands.14 If the population of Malta (just over four 
hundred thousand people15) is compared to the number of companies thus far formed in Malta, 
the number of limited liability companies is quite high. In fact, by the end of the year 2017, 
there were 84,503 companies,16 with 5,330 formed in 2017 alone. These companies formed in 
2017 are split into 27 public limited liability companies and 5,303 private limited liability 
                                                 
12 Times of Malta, ‘Financial Sector could grow to 15% of GDP – survey’ (2017) 
<https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170919/local/financial-sector-could-grow-to-15-of-gdp-
survey.658392> accessed 25 April 2018  
13 Malta Financial Services Authority, ‘Annual Report 2017’ (2017) 
<https://www.mfsa.com.mt/pages/viewcontent.aspx?id=45> accessed 25 April 2018 
14 The Maltese islands are composed of Malta, Gozo, Comino and other small islands, although only the first two 
are inhabited 
15 Worldometers, ‘Malta Population’ <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/malta-population/> 
accessed 27 April 2018 
16 Malta Financial Services Authority (n 13)  
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companies.17 There are also 46 listed companies, all constituted as public limited liability 
companies, formed until to date.18  
 
This thesis will also examine the statutory application of the fiduciary duty of directors in 
family run businesses, which the majority of them are being directed and held by the same 
person and they are mainly formed as private limited liability companies.19 The majority of the 
companies formed in Malta are indeed family run business,20 something acknowledged by the 
President of the Malta Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise and Business, Frank V Farrugia, who 
asserted that ‘there is literally a family business on every street in Malta […] Often described 
as the soul of the economy, family businesses hold a crucial role in the economic growth of 
any country’.21 Accordingly, this study will present why the directors of such distinctive 
company formations must thoroughly conform to their duties for two main reasons, as other 
directors of other companies. First, if directors take into consideration the interests of 
stakeholders, they will ultimately generate more profits into their own pockets. Second, small 
private companies can still employ a big number of employees and interact with many 
stakeholders, whose interests cannot be undermined due to the first reason already expressed, 
even though at first glance it might seem that these directors of such companies do not need to 
                                                 
17 National Statistics Office Malta <https://nso.gov.mt/en/Pages/NSO-Home.aspx> accessed 26 April 2018. In 
2015, there were 5,487 private limited liability companies and 68 public limited liability companies formed. In 
2016, there were 5,137 private limited liability companies and 77 public limited liability companies formed. Data 
retrieved can also be accessed via email sent to this Office 
18 Malta Stock Exchange plc, ‘Official List’ (2018) 
<https://www.borzamalta.com.mt/download/Official_list/official_list.pdf> accessed 12 December 2018 
19 Malta Financial Services Authority <www.mfsa.com.mt> accessed 6 April 2018  
20Finance Malta, ‘Malta enacts Family Business Legislation’ 
<https://www.financemalta.org/publications/articles-interviews/articles-and-interviews-detail/malta-enacts-
family-business-legislation/> accessed 10 April 2018. Malta was one of the first European Union countries to 
enact the Family Business Act, which regulates family businesses and their succession 
21 Jo Carauana, ‘Challenges, Success and Succession: Family Business in Malta’ (2018) (MaltaChamber) 
<https://www.maltachamber.org.mt/en/challenges-success-and-succession-family-business-in-malta> accessed 
20 September 2018 
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rigorously abide by their fiduciary duty. These companies, which amount to some 98% of the 
businesses in Malta, are categorised as small and medium enterprises,22 and they account for 
more than 82% of the Maltese economy, some 25% higher than any other EU country.23 This 
study will, consequently, also provide an answer why this unique type of company formation 
led to so few res judicata24 judgments to have been filed in Malta, which challenge the statutory 
application and interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors until the present date since this 
duty can only be challenged by one director in the name of the company against another 
director.  
 
1.2.3 The judicial landscape in Malta 
This study will also reveal the inconsistent judicial approach from the swift legal statutory 
change in the area of the fiduciary duty of directors. The reason for this inconsistency can be 
explained by the persistence of the majority of the judiciary in recommending a legal system 
that endorses an economic objective, which brings with it a degree of prestige to the judiciary 
itself, rather than forming a legal system that is influenced by sentiment through the historical, 
cultural and societal factors, together with the familiarity with the law. This approach taken by 
most of the judiciary has led to application of the concept of judicial nihilism, as defined above 
under Section 1.1. 
                                                 
22PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Family Business Strategy 2016, Bridging the strategy gap in Maltese Family 
Businesses’ (2016)  
<https://economy.gov.mt/en/familybusinessact/Family%20Business/Documents/PwC%20Malta%20-
%20Family%20Business%20Survey%202016.pdf> accessed 10 September 2018  
23 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Country Report Malta 2018’ (2018) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester-country-report-malta-en.pdf> accessed 15 
August 2018 
24 This phrase, which is widely used in the Maltese legal system, refers to a judgment that cannot be further 
challenged and appealed and the judgment shall, therefore, be considered as final 
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However, although most of the Maltese judiciary have very much drawn to the economic 
factor, this thesis also suggests that the underdeveloped judicial system, and therefore the 
approach taken by most of the judiciary to still take into consideration the historical, cultural, 
societal and familiarity with the law factors, has regrettably led to the hindrance of fully 
endorsing the economic factor in its entirety.  
 
The Maltese judiciary was able to endorse any factor that it deems appropriate due to the 
various restrictions that will be presented in this section.25 To better understand the background 
of these limitations, reference shall first be made to the fact that the Maltese judiciary needs to 
only attend a law course at the University of Malta and practise as a lawyer for a specific 
number of years in the Maltese Courts.26 Moreover, members of the Maltese judiciary are 
appointed by the President of Malta having first provide their nomination to a committee, which 
scrutinises their eligibility under the Maltese Constitution,27 and their ability to adhere to the 
judicial code of ethics and to be in a position to deliver justice in a timely manner. To be 
appointed a judge, one must have practised as an advocate or a magistrate in Malta for not less 
than twelve years, either continuously or in the aggregate. By contrast, one must serve as an 
advocate for a period of seven years to be eligible for appointment as a magistrate. If the 
committee is satisfied that a person can be appointed to the judiciary, it will then advise the 
Prime Minister who will in return advise the President of Malta. The President of Malta 
ultimately appoints the individual. 
                                                 
25 Kevin Aquilina, ‘Inconsistent judgments’ (2012) 
<https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120720/opinion/Inconsistent-judgements.429319> accessed 16 
August 2018 
26 Vide Articles 96 and 100 of the Constitution of Malta 
<http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8566> accessed 17 August 2018 
27 Ibid.  
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The second limitation is that Maltese judges and magistrates are, regrettably, not fully trained 
in the common law and civil legal traditions, and are also not viewed as experienced in 
researching English and Italian case law. Such limitation can be viewed from the way that they 
have applied the statute law in the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors (vide Chapter 
5).   
 
Another limitation very much tied to the above restriction is that the majority have not studied 
either in the United Kingdom or in Italy, meaning that they are often not in a position to fully 
comprehend the English and Italian legal systems. 
 
Another obstacle is the linguistic barrier. Knowledge of Italian is not a requirement to study 
law in Malta; thus, the majority of the Maltese judiciary often cannot speak it and thus cannot 
fully understand either the Italian legal system or the Maltese res judicata judgments, which 
were delivered in Italian by the Maltese Courts at the beginning of the 19th century, but are still 
valid today. 
 
An additional restriction in this instance is that the law of precedent28 does not hold ground in 
Malta. Consequently, judges and magistrates have decided differently on cases that are similar 
                                                 
28 Paul J Watford, Richard C Chen and Marco Basile, ‘The Law of Judicial Precedent’ (Book Review, Crafting 
Precedent) <https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/543-580_Online.pdf> accessed 2 August 
2018, pp. 543 
11 
in their pleas; therefore, legal-minded people have frequently reached different and sometimes 
even totally opposite conclusions, as will be shown in Chapter 5. 
 
One final limitation is that in Malta judges and magistrates do not have to show a certain degree 
of knowledge in one particular field of law. Instead, they can preside and decide on all cases 
without having any particular knowledge or training.29 
 
1.2.4 Lack of Maltese literature on legal transplantation in corporate law 
The subject of the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors in Malta is furthermore 
interesting to look into because although the current law has been in force for the past sixteen 
years, it has not yet been critically examined by Maltese legal researchers and scholars until to 
date; the one exception is that of Professor Andrew Muscat30 who published one book31 in 2007 
about Maltese company law, including the notion of the fiduciary duty of directors. However, 
he merely presents the current legal codified position of the fiduciary duty of directors (as had 
changed in 2003) and the English position in general and does not delve deeply into the 
historical background that has led to the statutory amendment to this fiduciary duty. Neither 
does he discuss the approach taken by the Maltese Courts when interpreting and applying the 
fiduciary duty to the cases presented before the Courts or the reasons why most of the Maltese 
judiciary have felt the need to depart from the path taken by Maltese statute law. 
                                                 
29 The Constitution of Malta (n 26). The Maltese Constitution provides how the judiciary is appointed and also 
the approach taken when there is a vacant office. The Maltese Constitution does not go into the merits of 
competency; therefore this requisite is not necessary to be appointed part of the judiciary  
30 Certain other Maltese legal writers have co-written short articles on company law in general, and/or on civil 
law in general, but there have not been any business and financial press written in Malta or outside Malta on this 
context with particular reference on Malta   
31 Andrew Muscat, Principles of Maltese Company Law (1st edn, Malta University Press 2007)  
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 Structure of the thesis 
Following this introductory chapter, which will present the general framework of the concept 
of legal transplantation, in Chapter 2 the focus is shifted to the Italian and English legal regimes, 
as they form the backbone of the Maltese legal system. It will present the origin and application 
of the main suppliers (or ‘donors’) of law that have regulated the fiduciary duty of directors, 
thus facilitating an understanding of which specific donors have influenced the Maltese legal 
system. Trust law, agency law, mandate law and fiduciary law will be thoroughly looked into 
and analysed. The weak influences of the European Union and other international organisations 
in their regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors shall also be presented. 
 
Chapter 3 will analyse the effect of legal transplantation throughout the history of the Maltese 
legal system. The reasons that have led legislators to consider certain factors when drafting the 
Maltese law to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors throughout the years will be looked into, 
while the other factors taken into account by the Maltese judiciary will also be considered. In 
general, it will be shown that whereas legislators in Malta have been strongly influenced by 
historical, societal and cultural factors, together with the familiarity with the law, from the 
1800s onwards, prestige and economic effect have been of more interest to the majority of the 
judiciary from the 1940s, who have thus departed from the path taken by statutory 
development. The primary focus will be on the period from the 19th century until the present 
day, as it was not until the 19th century that the first statute law in Malta came into force and 
only then did recorded judgments become available. 
 
The factors that influenced the Maltese statutory process will be reviewed in Chapter 4 by 
examining the statutory provisions enacted in Malta to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors. 
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This Chapter will also present a systematic comparative appraisal of the Maltese, Italian and 
English legal systems. The mandate law will be examined in light of its Italian influences, while 
article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995,32 together with its ancillary provisions, 
Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870,33 will be analysed in light of its English 
and Roman influences. The study will present the various instances of verbatim copying of 
statutes from both the common and civil legal systems, and instances wherein these two legal 
systems have not influenced Maltese statutory provisions. Again, the main period of interest 
for this part of the study will be from the 19th century to the present day. 
 
Chapter 5 will go on to illustrate that the factors analysed in Chapters 1 and 3 have led the 
judicial practice to deviate from the path taken by Maltese statute law, which has resulted in 
problems as Maltese statute law has not been faithfully translated into judicial practice.34 This 
section will involve scrutinising the case law that has become res judicata35 before the Maltese 
Courts. More precisely, it will show that whereas the majority of the judiciary was interested 
in applying the economic and prestige factors, other judges and magistrates still held on to the 
historical, cultural, societal and familiarity with the law factors and did not feel the need to 
look at the economic and prestige factors with importance. As a result, it will demonstrate that 
although certain cases were filed before 2003, the mandate law was applied, together with 
Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 (enacted in 2003) and the fiduciary provisions 
(enacted in 2004). A similarly dissatisfactory approach, albeit one that presents the other side 
                                                 
32 Chapter 386 of the Laws of Malta <http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/LOM.aspx?pageid=27&mode=chrono> 
accessed 10 September 2013  
33 Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta <http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/LOM.aspx?pageid=27&mode=chrono> 
accessed 10 September 2013 
34 For the purposes of this study, judicial practice is limited to the court cases that are res judicata and that were 
decided by the Maltese Courts 
35 This phrase, which is widely used in the Maltese legal system, refers to a judgment that cannot be further 
challenged and appealed and the judgment shall, therefore, be considered as final 
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of the coin, was applied in other judgments wherein although these other cases were filed after 
2003, Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 and the mandate law were applied. These res 
judicata judgments will be split according to the date that they were filed in Court to facilitate 
a better assessment of the discrepancies that arise between the applicability of the statute law 
and judicial practice in Malta, since the filing date determines what law should have been 
applied to that particular case. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 will seek to contribute to the broader debate on legal transplantation with a 
specific focus on the Maltese context. It will scrutinise the patterns observed in the Maltese 
statutory and judicial approaches, identifying, in particular, the gaps between the Maltese and 
the foreign statute laws. It will, thereafter, suggest any amendments that may be necessary to 
be carried out to the statute law and to the judiciary while also examining the rationale that 
might have led to these gaps.   
 
 Research methodology – legal transplantation 
An examination of the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors in Malta can only be 
attempted if one understands the implications and significance of the various factors that form 
the transplanted legal concept, which have structured the path taken by both the Maltese statute 
law and the Maltese judicial practice throughout the past two hundred years. These factors 
demonstrate why the Maltese statute law and most of the Maltese judiciary have taken different 
paths in applying the relevant law with respect to the regulation of the fiduciary duty of 
directors. This examination will draw on the vast literature on legal transplants dealing with 
the various factors that have led to the adoption or rejection of legal transplantation. 
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Before delving into the implications and applications of legal transplantation in Malta, it is first 
important to define the concept of legal transplantation and determine what it represents and 
whether it can be applied in the Maltese context at all. In very broad and basic terms, 
transplantation can be defined as the movement of law from one legal jurisdiction to another, 
which generally occurs via a conscious process of law-making or legal reform.36 Accordingly, 
it can take place by transposition, imposition, reception or intended borrowing.37 While the 
concept of legal transplantation has been implicitly recognised for a very long time,38 this 
concept was first formally formulated by Professor Kahn-Freund in June 1973 during a lecture 
at the London School of Economics.39 
 
Nonetheless, although the definition of legal transplantation is worthy of an analysis in its own 
right, legal scholars seem to be more interested in the success or failure of legal transplantation 
rather than its specific meaning. In fact, the acceptance or otherwise of legal transplantation 
has been the subject of a vast body of literature.40 The success or inadequacy of this process 
can be clearly observed through the extent to which one legal system adapts its own principles 
and procedures in line with those of foreign legal systems, a process known as transplant 
effectiveness. Indeed, transplant effectiveness can be more precisely defined as: ‘the root of 
                                                 
36 Tatiana Kyselova, ‘The Concept of Legal Transplant: Literature Review’ in the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 
University of Oxford [2008] 
37 Chen Lei, ‘Contextualising Legal Transplant: China and Hong Kong’ in Monateri, P.G. (ed.) Methods of 
Comparative Law. (2012) United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 192 
38 Kyselova (n 36) 
39 Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, ‘Legal and Economic Discourses on Legal Transplants: Lost in Translation?’ 
in Semantic Scholars <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4668/1780ec4dcad585c3ff56262b48e241cdc89f.pdf> 
accessed 10 September 2013 
40 Nuno Garoupa and Anthony Ogus, ‘A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants’ The Journal of Legal 
Studies, 35(2), 339-363 
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the transplant effect lies in the relationship between the formal, written source of the law, and 
unwritten conventions, norms and practices inherent in the legal system’.41 
 
From the extensive literature on transplant effectiveness, it can be seen that some writers 
(referred to as culturalists42) have denounced the significance of legal transplantation in the 
field of law and condemned any acceptance of legal transplantation. These culturalists contend 
that the effectiveness of legal transplantation is hindered by the geographical, historical, 
economic, cultural, political, judicial discretion and prestige influences of a particular legal 
system and thus, they reject any notion of the effectiveness of transplantation. They assert that 
the legal transplantation process is, consequently, impeded by the rejection exhibited by the 
legal system when it tries to incorporate a new rule from a foreign legal system. 
 
One of the first writers to express this belief was Montesquieu. He contended that 
transplantation could not take place due to geographical, sociological, economic, cultural and 
political barriers.43 He believed that law changes in response to these factors, which are external 
to the law itself, when that law is transferred from one legal system to another. He therefore 
believed that law is not independent, but must be considered in its particularity44 and in light 
                                                 
41 T.T. Arvind, ‘The Transplant Effect in Harmonisation’ (2010) 59(1) The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 65-88. 
42 Maria Reyes, ‘The challenges of legal transplants in a globalised context: A case study on ‘working’ examples’ 
<http://banrepcultural.org/sites/default/files/colf_reyesgaitan_mariapaula_tesis.pdf> accessed 23 November 
2016 
43 Philip M. Nichols (1997) The Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazakhstani Reception of a Transplanted 
Investment Code< https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1441&context=jil> accessed 23 
November 2016 
44 William Ewald ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (11): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ (1995) 43(4) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 489-510. Ewald also cited Savigny, Hegel, Marx, Jhering and Pound, who also 
embrace Montesquieu’s approach and the particular factors he refers to 
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of these factors. Montesquieu’s theory is later echoed by Seidmans,45 who also expressed a 
view against the effectiveness of legal transplants and also believed that every law is 
intrinsically influenced by the factors affecting a particular legal system. 
 
Another like-minded writer is Pierre Legrand; however, Legrand limits the problem of the 
ineffectiveness of transplantation to only two factors: cultural and historical. He argued that 
transplantation of the law is simply not possible because every law is culturally and historically 
determined.46 He believed that the transplantation problem arises in the interpretation and 
meaning ascribed to a particular rule by an interpreter which are distinctive and unique because 
the interpretation and the specific meaning depend on the particular cultural and historical 
factors influencing the interpreter. Accordingly, the interpretation and application of a rule 
largely depends on who and where the interpreter is.47 As a result of this, Legrand believed that 
only meaningless forms of words can be displaced from one legal system to another because, 
as the original rule crosses boundaries, it will undergo significant changes in light of the 
cultural and historical factors that affect it. His conclusion, therefore, was that legal 
transplantation could never successfully take place.48 
 
Other legal scholars, referred to as transferists, have expressed an opposing view and fully 
embrace and support the effectiveness of legal transplants and assert that legal transplantation 
                                                 
45 Helen Xanthaki, cited in Seidman R., State and Law in the Developing Process: Problem Solving and 
Institutional Change in the Developing World (Macmillan Publishers, Basingstoke, 1994) 44-46 
46 Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’ Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L., (1997) 111-124 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
18 
is not affected by any of the external factors identified by the culturalists. These transferists,49 
fully assent to the useful and optimistic implications of legal transplants in any legal system 
and do not believe that the effectiveness of legal transplantation is hindered by any of the 
factors identified by the culturalists. 
 
One legal writer who considers legal transplants to be a necessity in every legal system is Alan 
Watson.50 He positively emphasises the autonomous nature of the law51 and is a firm believer 
that ‘most changes in most systems are borrowing’52 without being affected by any external 
factor referred to above by the cultarists. He shows his approval for legal transplantation by 
providing three clear examples in his article entitled From Legal Transplants to Legal 
Formants. He begins by asserting that the political, social and religious factors do not affect 
the law when it is transplanted from one legal system to another. First, he shows the 
ineffectiveness of the political factor by referring to Calum Carmichael53 and his analysis of 
the Ten Commandments. Watson believes that the Ten Commandments are reflected in 
subsequent histories without any particular connection to the time in which they were enacted 
and makes specific reference to the fifth Catholic Commandment to honour the parents and its 
inclusion in the Dutch civil code to support his argument. Watson also demonstrated in his 
article that the law may develop distinct from social realities. His second example is that of the 
                                                 
49 Gail Edwards, ‘Legal Transplants and Economics: The World Bank and Third World Economies in the 1980s 
– A Case Study of Jamaica, the Republic of Kenya and the Philippines’ <http://sas-
space.sas.ac.uk/349/1/Gail_Edwards_MA_Thesis.pdf> accessed 3 July 2017  
50 Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (2006) 
<http://www.alanwatson.org/legal_transplants.pdf> accessed 26 November 2016 
51 John W. Cairns, ‘Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants’ 
<http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1049&context=gjicl> accessed 26 November 
2016 
52 Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37(2) Cambridge Law Journal 313-336 
53 Alan Watson, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants’ (1995) 43 (3) The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 469-476 made reference to The Origins of Biblical Law: The Decalogues and the Book of the Covenant 
(1992) of Calum Carmichael  
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creation and development of the Twelve Tables under Roman law, which is still consistently 
interpreted today, even though only limited provisions were enacted in the Twelve Tables. He, 
in fact, argues that, while the plebeians attempted to have the Twelve Tables enacted to have 
their rights protected, in reality it was a great defeat as the Twelve Tables only contained those 
parts of the law that the patricians were willing to share with the plebeians. Moreover, under 
Roman law, only senators could be judges. Watson, therefore, demonstrates that the 
interpretations given to these enacted laws continued to apply even thereafter, distinct from the 
social reality under which this law was first enacted. He, consequently, seeks to demonstrate 
that the interpretations given to the Twelve Tables seem to have continued to be adopted in 
subsequent laws even due to the fact that the Twelve Tables are considered as the foundation 
of any law. Using a third example, Watson also shows that the religious factor is not reflected 
in the enactment and interpretation of the law. He refers to a general example chosen from the 
rabbinic law as set out in the Mishnah and Talmud, which did not provide a specific definition 
of work, and insists that the definition of work has changed throughout the ages and depends 
mainly on the distinct legal system that regulates that work. In addition to the above, Watson 
goes even further in his acceptance of the effectiveness of legal transplantation by reiterating 
that not only rules, but also institutions, concepts and structures can be transplanted.54 
 
Ajani came to endorse Watson’s approach and aimed to support his theory by referring to the 
blurred distinction that exists today between the civil and the common legal systems. He 
mentions two specific examples to sustain his argument as arising under business and tort law, 
                                                 
54 Kyselova (n 36) 
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wherein the Anglo-American principles are increasingly influencing continental scholars and 
judges.55 
 
Nevertheless, the majority of writers fall in the middle of the spectrum, an approach that seems 
to have been endorsed by the Maltese legal system in its regulation of the fiduciary duty of 
directors, as we will see throughout this thesis. These scholars readily accept the importance 
of legal transplantation, but also believe that its effectiveness is subject to the factors referred 
to above with the result that legal transplantation will be applied only within the limitations 
imposed by the factors delineated above. For this reason, one of them, Teubner,56 prefers to 
refer to legal transplantation as a ‘legal irritant’ because in his opinion, while a transplant seems 
to imply the movement of a rule that maintains its original meaning, an irritant refers to a 
particular rule that can change its meaning in alignment with any external influences.57 
 
The regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors in Malta can be easily understood to fall in the 
middle of the spectrum because the effectiveness of legal transplantation has shaped the 
backbone of the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors in the Maltese legal system in light 
of the acceptance or denial of the factors identified above. This study will present the ways in 
which the efficiency of the legal transplantation has affected the regulation of the fiduciary 
duty through the factors that have led to changes exhibited by Maltese statute law and judicial 
practice. It will therefore consider whether, and to what extent, historical, societal, cultural, 
political prestige and economic factors, together with familiarity with the law, have influenced 
                                                 
55 Gianmaria Ajani, ‘By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe’ (1995) 43 
American Journal of Comparative Law 93 
56  Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Differences’ (1998) Modern Law Review 11-32 
57 Ibid. 
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legal development in Malta with regard to the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors, and 
conceptualise the reform of the duty as a particular case of legal transplantation. 
 
From a statutory point of view, the main factor that may have facilitated the effectiveness of 
legal transplantation in the Maltese context is the historical barrier, which is tied with the 
societal and cultural factors. In this regard, it is demonstrated that historical events led the 
Maltese legal system to be subjugated first to the Italian influence and later on to English 
authority. Although the Italian influence affected the Maltese approach until the 1940s, the 
English legal system has ultimately shaped the approach in the way it is currently understood 
in today’s business context, an influence that was solidified through the enactment of Article 
136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 in 2003. Investigation of the historical factor reveals 
that Maltese lawmakers throughout the years have taken a certain degree of comfort in looking 
at a particular foreign legal system, be it Italian or English, following the customs ruling the 
Maltese islands at any given time. This distinct type of legal transplantation is referred to as 
‘imposition’ by Graziadei,58 who believes that the imposition of a legal transplant is the result 
of military conquest or expansion such is the case in Malta, which has been conquered by 
various foreign powers throughout the ages, each of whom have left their unique marks on the 
Maltese legal system. To illustrate this concept of imposition, Graziadei provides four 
examples: the extension of German law to Austria after the Anschluss of 1938; the sovietisation 
of the law in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II; the growth of colonial empires 
round the world; and the spread of Islamic Law during the Middle Ages as a result of military 
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expansion by Islamic rulers. Pistor et al.59 share the same view and provide two further 
examples: the reception of Roman law in Europe, and the European influence that has largely 
been imposed through war. 
 
The historical factor can become evident through the social and cultural approach. The terms 
‘social’ and ‘culture’ encompass the speech, knowledge, beliefs, customs, arts, technologies, 
ideals and rules that govern a particular legal system,60 but whereas the social factor largely 
refers to the change exhibited by the whole society, a cultural change only refers to a revolution 
exhibited by a group of society. Nonetheless, both cover the language, especially the legal 
language, which governs the everyday relationships among people who live in the same 
society. Cohn suggests that the precise cultural contributions of the legal system that is 
transplanting the law provides for the complex evolutionary process of the law.61 In fact, it is 
observed that such cultural factor has influenced the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors 
in Malta, as laws were enacted in Malta in Italian since this language was considered important 
at the time: Italian continued to be unequivocally used by the legislators until the 1940s, at 
which point the English influence began to be accepted in the Maltese culture. Accordingly, 
English and the English legal system were subsequently used when drafting the law. 
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This analysis of the historical factor, together with the societal and cultural factors, shows that 
legislators enact laws in accordance with their familiarity with the law of that foreign legal 
system. Jan Smits also states that ‘the success of legal transplants should take into account the 
extent to which law is tied to its social, economic and cultural environment’.62 These three 
factors have thus shaped and structured the law pertaining to the statutory fiduciary duty of 
directors in Malta in a unique way. 
 
However, judicial practice in Malta and its interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors must 
be considered as a significant factor on its own and distinct from the three factors discussed 
above. The Maltese Courts are a major factor in themselves, and this has given rise to other 
factors that have led to the effectiveness of legal transplantation in the Maltese legal system. 
Smits also believes that the Courts are an influential factor that can grant the successful 
applicability of legal transplantation in a particular legal system.63 Watson similarly 64 believes 
that Courts may exert their own pressures on the effectiveness of legal transplantation: he 
makes specific reference to the influence exerted by Roman jurists, the English judges of the 
Middle Ages and thereafter, and to Continental law professors to support his theory. Hupper65 
goes even further in emphasising the extent of this influence that may be exerted by Courts to 
give full effectiveness to legal transplantation by making specific reference to Wolfgang 
Wiegand’s article The Reception of American Law in Europe,66 which studies the impact on 
the Swiss legal system of Swiss students who pursued their studies in the United States of 
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America and who bring their own influences with them and incorporate them into their work 
in the Swiss Courts. With respect to the Maltese legal system, the Maltese Courts are 
considered to be a factor in their own right because they were highly influenced by the English 
legal system long before such influence was wholly incorporated into statute law (vide 
Chapters 3 and 5). This is because they tend to apply economic and prestige factors rather than 
the historical, societal and cultural factors tied up with the familiarity of the law. As a result, 
the Courts are more interested in the benefits they can reap from the law they apply in their 
judgments, rather than its historical, societal or cultural ties. 
 
The judicial factor is also very much tied to the prestige factor, which has been fiercely debated 
by legal scholars, and is referred to by Miller as the ‘legitimacy-generating transplant’.67 On 
this subject, Miller refers to Alan Watson, who in his opinion is the only author to have delved 
into the notion of why the prestige of a foreign model might motivate a legislator or a judge in 
another country to choose to be guided by that particular legal system. In fact, Watson asserts 
that the prestige of the foreign model is linked with the authority it provides for legislators and 
especially for the judiciary, which will in turn enhance and solidify the good reputation enjoyed 
by the Courts.68 The prestige factor is also discussed at length by Sacco, who provides three 
relevant examples.69 He refers to the prestige carried by Roman law across Europe, to the 
prestige presented by the French Civil Code 1804 and the German doctrine beyond the frontiers 
of the civil law, and lastly to the unique prestige presented by the French and English rules and 
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institutions that penetrated irreversibly into Africa. Esin Orucu70 is also a firm believer in the 
notion that prestige positively triggers the effectiveness of legal transplantation. He believes 
that although the original meaning of the rule might change when that particular rule is 
transplanted, the prestige that that particular rule and its original legal system enjoy will not be 
in any manner undermined; as a consequence, that particular rule will be unquestionably 
accepted under the new legal system. By way of example, Orucu also makes reference to Alan 
Watson’s approach to the example presented in relation to the influence exerted by Roman law, 
whereby parts of such law were used in Scotland and South Africa during the 20th century. 
Accordingly, for the reasons outlined herein, the influence of this prestige factor in the Maltese 
legal system cannot be underestimated, as the majority of the judiciary are very much aware 
that such prestige will eventually lead to more respect for the judiciary and more authority; yet, 
it must also be asserted that they have never openly admitted this fact. 
 
The economic factor is likewise as important as the prestige factor, and is looked upon by the 
majority of the Maltese judiciary with a degree of significance that equals that of prestige, even 
if, again, none of the Maltese judiciary has ever openly discussed the significance of this factor. 
This economic factor is discussed at length by Pistor et al.,71 who conclude that weaknesses in 
corporate governance result in economic deficiency and go on to highlight the importance of 
the economic factor in every legal system. In this regard, they conclude that enacting the right 
law will eventually boost the development of financial markets, but also suggest that these 
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hasty conclusions should be treated with caution. Indeed, if a domestic law imposes a higher 
cost than that imposed by a more favourable jurisdiction; the threat of migration to the more 
favourable jurisdiction will arise.72 This economic importance and the enactment of the right 
law is thus particularly important for small countries like Malta, which are heavily dependent 
on international trade and must therefore attract firms from other jurisdictions and 
multinational corporations to secure increased investment, a higher demand for labour and 
more tax revenue.73 The economic factor therefore influences a country’s financial 
development, which clearly shows its importance. This positive connection between the 
economic factor and growth in the financial market was affirmed by the British Prime Minister 
William Gladstone, who stressed the importance of having a strong financial background and 
development for economic growth in 1858 when he stated that ‘Finance is, as it were, the 
stomach of the country, from which all the other organs take their tone’.74  However, the 
constructive link between the economic and the financial sectors of a legal system was first 
articulated from an economist point of view by Joseph Schumpeter in 1911. He devised the 
theory of creative destruction, which holds that a strong economy needs to allocate resources 
efficiently and use savings systemically.75 This linkage was again widely discussed in the 
1980s, at which time Dornbusch and Reynoso went one step further and asserted that financial 
growth is based on the government’s incentive to invest, that savings must be available, that 
such savings should be used to attract the most lucrative investment opportunities,76 and that 
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‘poor finance leads to inflation and external bottlenecks and they in turn bring about restrictive 
macroeconomic policies and these slow down growth and investment’.77 In view of this, it can 
accordingly be asserted that economic development, democratisation and globalisation78 have 
caused a sharp increase in the number of legal transplants in today’s business context. . This 
economic factor, in fact, has influenced the path taken by Maltese legal system, which through 
the majority of the Maltese judiciary, was influenced by the strong Italian economy during the 
1800s,79 but was inclined to look at the developments taking place in the English legal system 
due to the strong economy that the English legal system was building. This British influence 
led to the formation of the first commercial banks in Malta in 1806; one of these banks was 
named the Anglo-Maltese Bank, and foreign trade in Malta flourished.80 Throughout 1813 and 
1814, however, the Maltese economy was struck by disaster following the introduction of 
custom controls; worse yet, quarantine regulations were imposed by foreign governments 
against Maltese ships because of the plague.81 Despite this, the English colony was again able 
to rebuild the Maltese economy after the Crimean War, which led to investment in the colony’s 
military and naval establishments, and local business in Malta flourished once again due to the 
influx of soldiers and sailors.82 The economy in the Maltese islands continued to be robust and 
grew even stronger during World War II,83 during which time there were British naval bases 
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located in Malta, a situation that also led to important infrastructural changes.84 After World 
War II, Malta suffered several economic blows, particularly as a result of the United 
Kingdom’s decision to decrease and then discontinue its military operations here. Nonetheless, 
the Maltese people were able to strengthen Malta’s shipping and agricultural industries and 
also to attract multinational companies to the country’s shores85 to again build a strong 
economy. However, despite the British having left, the Maltese economy continued (and still 
continues) to look to the English legal system due to the its demonstrated ability to build a 
strong economy over time. London became the largest financial centre in the world,86 
something that reflects the good working order of the English legal system. In fact, in this 
regard, some legal economists trace the superiority of common law to the Posnerian hypothesis 
created by Judge Posner, who contends that the common law provides a more coherent system, 
which leads to a more efficient behaviour, such as the reduction of transaction costs to favour 
market transactions.87 This Maltese approach is further reflected in the theory presented by La 
Porta et al., who show that countries incorporating a common legal system enjoy better 
financial markets than countries incorporating the civil system.88  
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In view of the above analysis, this examination of the economic and prestige factors suggests 
that the prestige factor is very much tied to the economic factor and cannot be separated from 
it. Although the Maltese Courts have never made specific reference to the link between the 
economic and prestige factors, prestige shall always be considered due to its economic impact, 
a point also emphasised by various foreign legal scholars. DeLisle asserts that prestige comes 
from perceptions of efficacy and global importance,89 and Ugo Mattei argues that prestige is 
directly linked to economic efficacy,90 although he fails to offer strong empirical evidence to 
support this argument. Michele Graziadei also makes specific reference to the importance of 
linking prestige and economic significance together under one rule.91 The prestige and 
economic factors are also looked upon as a whole by Cuniberti, who links them through the 
good reputation that the Courts strive to enjoy. The judiciary is therefore attentive to the 
question of what foreign legal system they should apply, because as Cuniberti92 asserts, a good 
judicial reputation brings with it a certain degree of prestige and better economic environment, 
which is in return, therefore, essential for legal transplantation. To further prove his theory, he 
makes explicit reference to Garoupa and Ginsburg, who assert that judges care very much about 
their reputation and have an incentive to enhance it, which is only possible through the growth 
of social and economic assets.93 Cuniberti goes on to admit that enhancing the judiciary’s 
collective reputation may also increase the trust of foreign parties in that particular legal 
system, which in turn leads to order. He specifically refers to the French legal system as a case 
in point.94 The benefit reaped from the economic and prestige factors can be referred to as ‘the 
                                                 
89 Miller (n 78) 
90 Miller makes reference to Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and 
Economic’, 14 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 8 (1994) 
91 Graziadei (n 58) 
92 Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Enhancing Judicial Reputation through Legal Transplants – Estoppel Travels to France’ 
(2012) 60 (2) American Journal of Comparative Law 383. 
93 Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg., Reputation, Information and the Organisation of the Judiciary, available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523954> accessed 10 August 2015 
94 Cuniberti (n 92). Cuniberti made reference to Sacco, Graziadei and Ugo Mattei 
30 
entrepreneurial transplant’,95 as Miller explains. Miller also makes reference to Dezelay and 
Garth,96 who originally proposed this specific type of transplantation. This principle focuses 
on individuals and groups who reap benefits from investing their energy in learning and 
encouraging the local adoption of a foreign legal model. Miller also argues that this type of 
transplant must lead to some type of payoff for the receiving jurisdiction if they are to readily 
accept a foreign rule and adapt it as its own, although this achievement does not need to result 
in a pecuniary gain. In this respect, reference to Dezelay and Garth’s conclusion seems 
adequate who although they make precise reference to the political or economic benefits of 
their investment, they also assert that reputation is also likewise important and should be taken 
into consideration.97 
 
This judicial influence, which is also subject to the economic and prestige factors, together 
with the historical, societal and cultural factors are present in every legal system and all factors 
are ultimately accommodated through the political influence. While there may be instances in 
which the political class takes time to accommodate these judicial influences, the political 
actors ultimately look at the judiciary’s decisions and change the law to combine the statute 
law and judicial law into one complete set of laws.98 This political approach is ultimately very 
accommodating of the judiciary because the political class of any jurisdiction also forms part 
of the elite of a particular society, much like judges, and groups of this kind seem to prefer to 
give more consideration to economic and prestige factors rather than the historical, societal and 
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cultural factors, together with familiarity with the law, even if not readily stated so. Through 
their decisions, politicians can exert authority over the legal system, and their decisions are 
highly esteemed without any further revision as much as the Court judgments.99 This political 
factor can be succinctly described as the externally-dictated transplant, as proposed by 
Miller.100 This political factor is highly influential in the Maltese legal system, and it is shown 
that the English legal system has exerted strong influence over the Maltese legal system. At 
first glance, it might seem that the Italian influences could not have had so much impact on 
Malta, as it was only in 1921 that the first self-government was instituted in the country, but 
the Italian influences have been very strong until the 1940s as will be observed in Chapter 3. 
This first Maltese government shared political power with the British government until 1964, 
the year Malta gained independence.101 For this reason, however, the political approach that 
has arisen in Malta strongly resembles that of the United Kingdom,102 with two main political 
parties, the Conservative party and the Labour party. The campaigning process of each party 
and the ways in which ministers and shadow ministers are chosen is also very similar. Although 
the political factor exerts a great deal of positive influence over the concept of legal 
transplantation, Kahn-Freund, who readily admits the importance of the political factor, 
believes that it can function as a hindrance to the smooth functioning of legal transplantation. 
He makes explicit reference to the English legal system to substantiate his theory. Kahn-Freund 
readily accepted the importance of legal transplantation, and was indeed conscious that the 
British legislation ‘has become open to foreign influences’.103 In fact, Kahn-Freund believed 
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that Montesquieu’s geographical, economic, social and cultural factors had lost ground over 
the two hundred years since Montesquieu’s speech. He was also a firm believer in the idea that 
industrialisation, urbanisation and the development of communications have greatly reduced 
the environmental obstacles to legal transplantation. In his view, effective transplantation in 
the United Kingdom took place due to both international unification and the entry of the United 
Kingdom into the European Communities, and that the often discussed historical, geographical, 
economic, social and cultural factors have lost ground following the creation of this 
international unification among different countries. Kahn-Freund argues that Montesquieu 
could not have envisaged the developments that eventually took place that evidently 
contributed to the change in the legal transplantation approach since Montesquieu lived in 
another period. However, at the same time, Kahn-Freund admits that the political factor 
referred to by Montesquieu had acquired significant importance in the effectiveness of 
transplantation, which hinders the undisturbed process of legal transplantation.104 
Consequently, in his opinion, knowledge of the political background of the donor country can 
help facilitate better understanding and interpretation of that rule in the recipient country.105 
 
Considering the above, it seems appropriate to appreciate that legal transplantation in current 
Western jurisdictions, as in the case of the Maltese legal system, tends to take place among 
countries with similar legal systems, language and legal traditions, mainly as a means to ensure 
harmony.106 Indeed, Ogus107 argues that legal transplantation tends to occur when the 
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transplanted law leads to only a very minor difference between the jurisdictions. Xanthaki108 
also supports the view that only similar jurisdictions can take from each other and supports 
such theory by also referring to other various scholars. However, the unique legal 
transplantation process in Malta with respect to the regulation of the directors’ fiduciary duty 
has taken place subject to the significant factors described above. It can therefore be concluded 
that, as Legrand says, only meaningless words can travel, and these words go on to take the 
distinctive shape of the legal system in question.109 This assertion is important because the 
statutory provisions enacted in Malta do not provide for an exact interpretation under the Italian 
and English legal systems (vide Chapter 4) and specific interpretations have been adopted by 
most of the Maltese judiciary in line with the Maltese business community and its traditions 
(vide Chapter 5). 
 
These traits of the Maltese legal system are also interesting in light of other mannerisms shown 
by other mixed legal systems when faced with the various factors mentioned above. Although 
a comprehensive examination would require a thorough study of its own, it seems that other 
mixed legal systems are also a product of legal transplantation. Orucu argues that every mixed 
legal system is a combination of different laws. He provides a range of examples to support his 
point, referring to Louisiana, Quebec, Algeria, Hong Kong and India, amongst others.110 He 
observes that Louisiana and Quebec have a mix of common and civil legal systems, much like 
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the Maltese system. By contrast, the Algerian legal system contains traits of civil law, religious 
law and tribal law. Hong Kong’s legal system is more inclined towards the incorporation of 
Chinese law and civil law, while the Indian legal system embodies common law, religious law 
and customary law. As with Malta, each mixed legal system seems to readily consent to the 
influences and positive effectiveness of legal transplantation through the various factors 
mentioned above. Louisiana and Quebec were both French colonies and are both influenced by 
the same legal systems, thus illustrating the applicability of the historical, societal and cultural 
factors. Nevertheless, Louisiana legal system has, over time, developed its own laws and 
departed from the French influence to a significant extent,111 which demonstrates that the 
legislators have decided to depart from the historical, societal and cultural factors and to take 
other factors into consideration. Hong Kong also illustrates the effectiveness of the concept of 
legal transplantation through the various factors discussed above. Although part of China, 
Hong Kong’s legal system is subject to the economic and financial impact in its application of 
laws, especially in company law, while Chinese laws tend to be more complicated and more 
difficult to apply on a global level,112 with the result that the economic factor does not seem to 
be at the core for legislators in China. 
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Chapter 2. The sources of the Italian, English, European and 
international systems 
 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the origin and evolution of trust law, agency law, 
fiduciary law and mandate law, all of which have regulated the fiduciary duty of directors under 
two different legal systems: the Italian and English systems. This examination is important, as 
these two systems are the backbone of the Maltese statutory legal system in this particular field. 
Accordingly, assessing the foundations of the different legal regimes that have influenced the 
Italian and English legal systems will illustrate how the Maltese legal system, as analysed in 
detail in Chapter 3, was influenced. 
 
It also examines the lack of regulation, influences and challenges presented by the European 
Union and the different international organisations that Malta forms part of on the regulation 
of the fiduciary duty of directors. 
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 The influence of Roman law on the evolution of the regulation of the fiduciary duty 
of directors 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Roman law is considered to be the backbone of both the civil113 and common114 legal systems. 
It is consequently noted that both legal systems trace their history back to Roman law with 
respect to the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors, as regulated by trust law, agency 
law and fiduciary law under the English legal system on the one hand, and mandate law and 
fiduciary law under the Italian legal system on the other. Accordingly, although the Italian legal 
system is categorised as a civil legal system and is undoubtedly based on Roman law while the 
English legal system is based on equity and common law and may therefore not be readily 
linked to the Roman law influence,115 these different regimes that have regulated the fiduciary 
duty of directors all trace their history back to Roman law, as will be illustrated below.  
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Although Roman law gave rise to the legal regimes that eventually came to regulate the 
fiduciary duty of directors under these two legal systems, each of these regimes was not 
primarily created to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors; rather, each continued to evolve 
distinctively under the Italian and English legal systems and to be eventually applied to the 
regulation of the  fiduciary duty of directors under the customs of each unique legal system. 
 
2.2.2 Trust law 
Trust law was the first body of law to be created under Roman law with respect to the regulation 
of relationships between persons,116 yet it was not referred to as trust law, but rather as 
fideicommissum, a term derived from the Latin word fides, meaning faith.117 It was never 
explicitly used to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors, and was the first form of the Roman 
societas, which was only used in the family context118 for inheritance purposes. 
Fideicommissum was not intended to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors because it was 
limited to certain specific relationships and could only arise in cases in which one person was 
still alive to execute the will of the dead person. Therefore, at the beginning, fideicommissum 
could not find ground in the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors because directors are 
always a live legal or natural person, and fideicommissum was applied only in cases of gifts 
given by the testator to another person after his death under codicils expressed by the testator. 
Any person could receive under fideicommissum, even unmarried persons who were otherwise 
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excluded as heirs or legatees, and childless persons.119 Codicils were originally informal letters 
requesting friends to ensure that certain gifts were received by the person chosen by the testator 
after his death. Consequently, codicils were often made by testators after a will was drawn 
up120 to impose a trust on the heir instituted in the will, but they could also be made by persons 
who had left no will and would place such a trust or trusts upon the intestate successor or 
successors. However, codicils could not appoint nor disinherit an heir. They could be of four 
types: those confirmed by a subsequent will, those confirmed by a previous will, those resulting 
from a clause in a will, or those made by an intestate.121 
 
However, at the same time, it is also noted that fideicommissum is very much similar to the 
relationship between directors and companies because, due to its nature, a relationship arises 
based on the honour and faith between those who were charged with its execution122 and those 
persons who used to appoint these persons. The appointed person had to discharge the fiduciary 
duty to the person that had entrusted them with the execution. In this regard, therefore, trust 
was very much inherent in these relationships, because a person needed to totally entrust 
another person with his will, who was required to ultimately act for the benefit of a third person. 
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2.2.3 Fiduciary law 
Fiduciary law comes from the Latin word fiducia, meaning trust.123 Fiducia used to be 
applicable in everyday relationships, whereby both involved parties were still alive (in contrast 
to fideicommissum); accordingly, at first glance, it is noted that it could have been more easily 
applied in its regulation to the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors than is the case for 
fideicommissum. Moreover, trust was inherent under fiduciary law, as is necessary for the 
relationship between directors and the company, wherein the person trusting another person 
with an object believes that the object will ultimately be returned to its original owner in its 
original form; which trust gives rise to the formulation of the fiduciary duty. 
 
However, this law of fiducia, as defined by Roman law, could only arise in instances wherein 
the owner of an object gave it to another person, and the owner could easily reclaim the object 
whenever he deemed appropriate, although the person who possessed the object had a right to 
expenses.124 There were two sorts of fiducia.125 The first category was fiducia cum amico, 
wherein the object (referred to as res under Roman law), including its dominium, was 
transferred to another person by way of loan; this could either be a loan for use or a loan for 
safe-keeping. In both instances, however, there would be an agreement that the res should be 
returned in due course. There was also the fiducia cum creditore, which consisted of the transfer 
of ownership of the res as security for a debt, with an agreement to retransfer the res when the 
debt was repaid. If it was not, the transferee could keep or sell the res because it would become 
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his property. In addition, this type of relationship implied that there was no need for any formal 
contract for the creation of this special relationship, merely an agreement between two persons. 
Hence, fiducia, under Roman law, only refers to the transposition of an item without 
specifically requiring a contract.126 Consequently, this definition of fiduciary law is distinct to 
the relationship between directors and companies whereby companies depend on shareholders 
for investment, rather than directors, and shareholders can never reclaim back what the 
directors do in the best interests of the company since shareholders invest in the company and 
can only get the profit when it is claimed by the directors. 
 
2.2.4 Mandate law 
Mandate law was created around 125 BCE.127 The rule of mandate originated in the need, 
which arose frequently, to have one person act for another128 under circumstances in which all 
parties involved are alive (as opposed to trust law) and where there is no right to reclaim the 
object entrusted to the person acting on one’s behalf as there usually would be no transfer of 
objects (as opposed to fiduciary law). Consequently, mandate law can from the outset be used 
to regulate the relationship between directors and the company. This theory is further 
elaborated by Lee, who argues that the mandatary is looked upon as the mandator’s 
employee.129 In view of this, therefore a mandate is defined as: 
‘a contract whereby one person [mandator] gives another [mandatarius] a 
commission to do something for him without reward, and the other accepts the 
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commission. It is imperfectly bilateral [whereby an immediate duty on the 
mandatarius on one side and only a contingent duty on the mandator to 
indemnify the mandatarius]’.130 
 
Hence, a mandate can be defined as a gratuitous contract that does not bind a third party.131 
This gratuity element reinforces the trust element, which is the core of the fiduciary duty132 
because a person has to fully trust another person and to firmly believe that the other person 
will ultimately obey the instructions given and fully act for the benefit of the mandator without 
being paid for the performance of the action.133 
 
2.2.5 Agency law 
During the same period as the creation of mandate law, agency law also began to emerge under 
Roman law.134 Some scholars believe that the philosophy of the creation and applicability of 
agency law is interchangeable with mandate law, and ‘mandate contributed in the development 
of agency’.135 This theory is supported due to three striking similarities, which arise between 
mandate law and agency law as will be defined herein. Firstly, both mandate law and agency 
law are based on a relationship between two persons, both alive, and that this relationship can 
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arise out of a contractual relationship that seems to also include an employment relationship. 
Thus  
‘agency implies a contractual relation [that is] established between one person 
termed the principal and a third party by another person termed the agent, who 
acts as intermediary. Mandate is essentially a contract of employment and its 
rules are concerned only with the reciprocal rights and duties of the mandator 
and the mandatarius [mandatary] on the other’.136  
 
Secondly, agency law and mandate law both imply that the mandatary and the agent are 
required to show clearly that they are acting on behalf of another person, as they would 
otherwise be personally liable for any action.137 Thirdly, an agency relationship similarly 
portrays a fiduciary duty based on a trust relationship between two persons, as under mandate 
law, whereby a person (termed the principal) trusts another person (the agent) to carry out an 
act on his behalf, again as in the case of mandate law. If trust were to be absent, a person would 
not feel comfortable giving authority to another person to act in their stead. 
 
However, other legal scholars believe that agency law developed very slowly under Roman 
law, as it was inconceivable that a third party who was not part of the binding contract with the 
principal could sue or be sued by the principal, and vice versa.138 A similar approach seems to 
arise from the definition of agency provided above, which shows that, while mandate law 
demonstrates that a relationship exists between two persons, and therefore between the 
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mandatary and the mandator only, agency law entails a triangular relationship whereby the 
principal enters into a relationship with a third party through the agency’s persuasion. 
Additionally, agency law and mandate law cannot be used interchangeably, since three 
fundamental distinctions can be observed between these two bodies of laws. Firstly, whereas 
the law of mandate implies that it is a gratuitous contract,139 agency law does not.140 Secondly, 
an agent is required to carry out a juristic act, whereas a mandatary does not have to carry out 
such an act, but merely performs the act.141 Thirdly, although both mandate law and agency 
law give rise to the fiduciary duty, they are differently defined (vide Chapter 4). In fact, such 
differing definitions led to the fact that different legal systems preferred to rely on different 
legal sources, such that while the civil legal system opted for mandate law, the English common 
legal system opted for the application of agency law to regulate the relationship between 
directors and the company. Hence, as a result, fundamental differences exist in the relationship 
between directors and companies under these two legal systems. 
 
 The evolution of the fiduciary duty of directors in the Italian Legal System 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Under the civil legal system, unlike the common legal system, the law of mandate was always 
applicable with regards to the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors. Hence, trust law and 
agency law, as applied under the English legal system, never made their way into the Italian 
legal system and have always been considered anomalies, despite the fact that the use of trusts 
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may have an important effect in other various areas involving company law.142 Nevertheless, 
the law of mandate is also founded on the application of the fiduciary duty, which is itself based 
on the principle of trust, as the other legal regimes that form part of the English legal system 
and the importance of various stakeholders’ interests have also gained prominence over time. 
Consequently, fiduciary law has always been considered to form part of the Italian legal 
system, as clearly expressed by the Italian legal writer Renato Rordorf.143 This remains true 
because, even though fiduciary law was not accepted under Italian statute law or case law until 
the 2003 statutory reforms, the direct referencing of mandate law was abrogated and a more 
general approach adopted. 
 
2.3.2 Mandate law 
Specific reference to the law of mandate in its regulation and interpretation of the fiduciary 
duty of directors has been present from the very first enactment of the Italian Commercial Code 
of 1865 until 2003. This Italian Code was influenced by the French Code de Commerce of 
1807. This Commercial Code specified under article 129144  that an anonymous company shall 
be administered by mandataries, who are temporarily elected, and can be either shareholders 
or non-shareholders of the company.145 However, it did not enlist the mandate provisions at the 
time, meaning that reference to the Italian Civil Code 1865 was necessary. 
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The original provisions of the law of mandate under the first Italian Civil Code 1865146 were 
also greatly influenced by the French Code Civil of 1804, and this Napoleonic Code was in 
turn greatly influenced by Roman law.147 Nevertheless, the general approach is to refer to the 
Italian Code as being influenced by this French Code rather than by Roman law, as this French 
Code was the first real codification from the works of Justinian and was consequently easily 
accessible. Accordingly, the French Civil Code was considered the origin of codification.148 
The French Code enacted the mandate provisions beginning with Article 1984149 which provide 
that the mandatary must act in the best interest of the mandator, and so the fiduciary duty seems 
to have been applied only in the best interests of the mandator, with other third parties’ interests 
being ignored. 
 
Nevertheless, this situation wherein commercial matters are regulated by one code, while civil 
matters – including the law of mandate, which could also apply to commercial matters – are 
regulated by another had changed slightly by the time the 1942 Italian Civil Code was enacted 
which grouped both commercial and civil matters under one code. Indeed, the mandate 
provisions are now found under different headings in the same code, which are specifically 
found under Book IV Title III of the Italian Civil Code 1942.150 Yet, such structural changes 
did not alter the fundamental approach to the fiduciary duty of directors, such that the same 
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interpretative approach continued to apply until 2003. Article 2392 of the Italian Civil Code 
1942 with respect to public companies used to state that directors were responsible towards the 
company as its mandataries.151 Moreover, an equivalent principle used to apply with respect to 
private companies whereby, although the Italian Civil Code 1942 did not make explicit 
reference to the mandate provisions, the directors of private companies also had a fiduciary 
duty as in the case of any other director of a public company.152 
 
2.3.3 Fiduciary law 
Some Italian legal scholars have always readily accepted that fiduciary law shall be applicable 
with regard to the analysis and interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors, whereby one of 
these scholars, Guido Alpa, asserts that mandate is a contract based on fiduciary and trust.153 
Alpa’s observation entails that directors must apply their fiduciary duty in their dealings, and 
fiduciary duty was formed by the fiduciary law. Accordingly, fiduciary law must have been 
applicable from the very first regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors and, therefore, from 
the time when directors were regulated by mandate law. 
 
From a statutory or case law perspective, however, fiduciary law has never been readily 
accepted154 even though in 2003, any specific reference to mandate law under statute law with 
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respect to the fiduciary duty of directors was abrogated, and a general approach was sought155 
in the case of public companies.156 Article 2392 of the Civil Code 1942 stipulates that a director 
shall abide by any diligence and duty that arises out of his office, and this provision suggests 
that everybody’s interests are important, not only the interests of the company. This constitutes 
an application of the fiduciary law interpretation as applied under the English legal system 
(vide Section 2.4). Amatucci also prefers not to make any specific reference to mandate law or 
fiduciary law.157 Accordingly, this general approach as presented by Italian legal scholars and 
by the statutory change also means that if reference to foreign legal systems is to be made by 
the Italian Courts when interpreting the fiduciary duty of directors, such an approach cannot be 
contested since the Courts would not be going against the mandate provisions. 
 
At the same time, a more rigorous approach in the interpretation of this fiduciary law seems to 
continue to apply in the case of private companies,158 as Article 2476 of the Italian Civil Code 
1942 stipulates that the directors are responsible to the company for any damages that arise out 
of their breach of duties imposed both by law and by the memorandum and articles of 
association of the company,159 implying that only the interests of the company as a separate 
legal personality from its shareholders shall be taken into consideration by the directors. In 
addition to this, interpretations of the mandate provisions continue to be applied with respect 
to the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors, because no other laws have been enacted in 
                                                 
155 Civil Code <http://www.notarlex.it/testofronte_riforma.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015 
156 Private limited liability companies have never made specific reference to the application of mandate law to 
regulate the fiduciary duty of directors 
157 Carlo Amatucci, Directors’ Duties in Italy, article in Research Handbook on Directors Duties by Adolfo Paolini 
(1st edn, Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 
158 The societa’ a responsabilita’ limitata (S.R.L.) was introduced by the Civil Code of 1942, as shown in the Italy 
Company Law and Regulations Handbook - Strategic Information and Basic by Ibp Usa (1st edn, International 
Business Publication 2015), and it is more limited in its studies than public companies under Italian law 
159 Ibid. 
48 
this area; therefore, the same strict interpretations of the fiduciary duty as arising under mandate 
law continue to apply. 
 
 The evolution of the fiduciary duty of directors in the English legal system 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Through both case law and the works of legal scholars, the English legal system demonstrates 
that the interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors has long been regulated by overlapping 
regimes, until a point at which fiduciary law was solely resorted to. Although this fiduciary 
duty of directors was initially regulated by trust law,160 agency law later began to pave the way. 
Nevertheless, the fiduciary duty of directors was always regulated by fiduciary law from the 
time at which trust law and agency law were prominent. However, fiduciary law began to be 
exclusively resorted to by the nineteenth century for various reasons (as will be outlined 
below),161 and reference to any other law was abrogated with. This analysis shall demonstrate 
that this change in legal regimes was necessary because every particular body of law referred 
to herewith has evolved to apply in a particular business context. 
 
Although case law and legal scholars provide a useful insight into the analysis of the historical 
development of the directors’ fiduciary duty under the English legal system, a statutory 
provision has never been enacted that explicitly describes which specific law from the three 
bodies of law referred to above should govern the fiduciary duty of directors. Therefore, statute 
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law has never unequivocally asserted whether the fiduciary duty of directors shall be governed 
by the special vehicle of trust law, agency law or fiduciary law, or whether these different legal 
regimes can be used interchangeably.162 If statute law had explicitly provided a law governing 
the fiduciary duty of directors, any ambiguous interpretations as to what law should apply 
would have been automatically eliminated. This situation has remained unchanged until today, 
and it is even not remedied by looking at the definition of a director; statute law has never 
indicated whether directors should be considered as mandataries, fiduciaries, agents or trustees. 
Indeed, the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, considered to be the first Act to 
provide a definition of directors, simply states under number III that directors are defined as 
‘all persons having the direction of the undertaking, whether under the name of directors, 
managers, committee of management, or under any other name’.163 This approach has never 
been amended until to date, as can be clearly observed under Section 250 of the English 
Companies Act 2006.164 
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2.4.2 Trust Law 
Trust law165 was the first law to be applied under the English legal system with respect to the 
regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors. It originated from equity law,166 and equity law 
can in turn trace its history back to Roman law.167 Trust law was, however, originally applicable 
only to private law issues under the English legal system, particularly to property law, and was 
never intended to apply to directors and their relationship with the company that they manage. 
In fact, trust law emerged during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when landowners would 
typically leave their property in the hands of an acquaintance in their absence with the 
presumption of getting the property back upon their return, or be vested in the hands of third 
parties upon their death.168 Under such circumstances, a trust relationship between the 
landowner and the person entrusted with this property used to arise either under a contract or 
orally. In this regard, therefore, the origin of the applicability of trust law indicates that a person 
never obliged another person to act on his behalf.169 Trust law was consequently considered 
very similar to the Roman law of fideicommissum in this respect.170 
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Nonetheless, over time, trust law also began to be applied to the relationship between directors 
and companies, whereby it was during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,171 when the 
English Courts firstly applied trust law in the field of corporate law172 as interpreted in the 
judgment Keech v Sandford.173 Although this case did not challenge the fiduciary duty as 
applied to directors, it is still referred to by writers and scholars in the context of company law 
and has had significant influence on the Courts’ subsequent reasoning when faced with the 
analysis of the fiduciary duty of directors,174 and is continuously revisited by the Courts and 
legal scholars when they are faced with the need to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
fiduciary duty of directors. In reality, this case concerns the law of trusts. A child, Keech, had 
inherited the lease on Romford Market near London, and Sanford was appointed to look after 
this property until the child attained the age of majority. However, before the child reached 
majority, the lease expired. The property owner informed Sandford that he did not want the 
child to have the lease renewed, but was content to give Sanford the opportunity of personally 
taking over the lease, which Sanford did. Keech later sued Sanford for the profit that he would 
have been made had the lease been renewed in his name. Lord King LC ordered Sanford to pay 
Keech the profits that Keech had lost due to Sanford’s behaviour. 
 
Trust law was the first law to be applied with respect to the regulation of the fiduciary duty of 
directors for three reasons. First, from a terminological perspective, trust law was applied when 
limited vocabulary was available to judges. Indeed, Sealy contends that: 
                                                 
171 Harris (n 166) 152 
172 Sealy and Worthington (n 169) 
173 [1726] 25 ER 223. This judgment was, however, applied in a trustee-beneficiary case and not in a director-
company scenario. See also Samavati Heshmatollah, ‘The Primary Fiduciary Duty of Directors and Controlling 
Shareholders of the Company’ (Ph.D. University of Birmingham 1994)  38 
174 Brenda Hannigan, Company Law (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 231 
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‘courts used to refer to directors as trustees because of the limited vocabulary 
that was present at that time and courts used to reason that since a director 
accepted a trust relationship therefore they shall be considered as trustees’.175 
 
Second, it was considered appropriate to apply trust law to the regulation of the fiduciary duty 
of directors from the practical formation of companies and their validity at that time.176 Prior 
to the enactment of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844,177 companies were mainly 
unincorporated, such that only a Royal Charter or an Act of Parliament could trigger 
incorporation. This approach, consequently, led to the incorporation of companies being 
considered an expensive luxury.178 Hence, unincorporated companies were the norm, and their 
constitutional document was usually a simple deed of settlement vesting the assets of the 
company in trustees.179 This approach to the formation of companies led to a situation in which 
the English legal system could not apply the law of mandate180 (as under the civil law system) 
or the law of agency to the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors because each applied to 
companies that were not formed by a deed of settlement, as under trust law, but of a contract. 
A contract and a deed of settlement are distinctive because whereas a contract requires 
consideration, a deed of settlement does not.181 
                                                 
175 Sealy and Worthington (n 168); Writeopinions.com, ‘Opinions on Joint Stock Companies Act 1844’ 
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Third, English trust law found application in corporate law because it applied fiduciary duty,182 
particularly the good faith principle, to the relationship between directors and the company.183 
Fiduciary duty is important in company law because it is a duty that is not based on the 
simplicity of morality, which is based on one’s unique way of living,184 but rather on an 
approach that must be ultimately achieved by any person. Fiduciary duty is based on what is 
termed fiduciary loyalty, wherein such loyalty does not necessarily need to be based on loyalty 
as defined in moral terms.185 Consequently, a fiduciary duty can be defined as ‘a contractual 
gap-filler, premised on a hypothetical bargain between the parties’.186 
 
However, any reference to trust law lost ground over time and could not continue to be 
applicable in the evolving business context for five main reasons; two of which are however 
not readily acceptable as they can be disputable and are discussed as the first two reasons. First, 
under trust law, a settlor can act either as the trustee or the beneficiary or both as trustee and 
beneficiary at the same time.187 However, in the case of a company as a legal entity in its own 
right, a shareholder or director can never also act as the company, with the result that the 
ultimate beneficiary (i.e. the company) is always a different person from the one who invests 
as a shareholder, or who manages those assets as a director. In fact, shareholders as legal 
                                                 
Allen, ‘Deed I do if signed and delivered: 400 George Street (QLD) Pty Limited v BG International Limited’ 25(1) 
Bond Law Review 6 
182 John H Langbein, ‘Questioning the Trust-Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest? (Yale Law 
School 2005). Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 495 
183 D. Wright and Brain Creighton, Rights and Duties of Directors (2nd ed, Butterworth and Co. 1998) 9 
184 D. Gordon Smith and Andrew S. Gold, Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law (1st edn, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2018) 187 
185 Ibid., 38 
186 Ibid., 40. This quote was taken from the influential American judgment in Jordan v Duff & Phelps (1987). 
Reference to the American legal system can be considered alongside those to the English legal system, as both 
are based on the same common law principles and the same principles of trust law and agency law 
187 Paul Todd and Sarah Lowrie, Textbook on Trusts (5th edn, Black Stone Press 2000) 47. The only exception in 
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trustees.  
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beneficiaries are only entitled to the dividends in the company when they are declared by the 
directors and when a profit is declared on behalf of the company. In reality, however, the 
shareholders control these directors’ actions, even if such notion might not be clearly dictated 
by the law or by any memorandum and articles of the company, since shareholders enjoy the 
power to elect or change directors at their discretion.188 Consequently, it seems that although 
in principle the company is the ultimate beneficiary, in reality the ultimate beneficiary is the 
shareholder as the shareholder dictates the director’s actions and pushes for a dividend to be 
declared, especially in a ‘one-man’ company. 
 
Second, one might also determine that, although the fiduciary duty used to be applied in the 
case of directors, as a general rule, trust law is based on conscience,189 as opposed to agency 
law,190 mandate law191 and fiduciary law.192 Conscience can be interpreted widely based on 
different morals, theologies, teachings and backgrounds, which will therefore lead to different 
results.193 Consequently, if the same situation is presented before two different directors, even 
if they work in the same environment and they must apply the fiduciary duty, they may still 
easily reach different conclusions since the outcome is based on what they perceive as right or 
                                                 
188 Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson and James Taylor, ‘Law, politics and the governance of English and Scottish 
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190 Elspeth Christie Reid and D.L. Carey, A Mixed Legal System in Transition: T. Smith and the Progress of Scots 
Law (1st edn, Edinburgh University Press, 2005). The authors assert that agency law is not based on conscience, 
but is rather based on the rigid law that one has to abide by  
191 Mandate law has never found a place in English jurisprudence. Nonetheless, it law is not based on conscience, 
but on the applicability of the law, irrespective of one’s conscience  
192 Fiduciary law is not based on conscience because a fiduciary has to always act in the interests of, and for the 
benefit of, a third party, even if that interest is against his own conscience 
<http://impactethics.ca/2015/03/05/fiduciary-duties-limit-physicians-freedom-of-conscience/>accessed 10 May 
2015 
193 Hudson (n 166) 11 
55 
wrong, with the consequence that third parties can be highly prejudiced. However, in reality, 
the specific application of the fiduciary duty does not draw any distinction among trust law, 
agency law or fiduciary law. 
 
Whereas the above two reasons can be controversial among scholars, the other three reasons, 
herein explained, are perhaps less contentious. Accordingly, the third reason why trust law lost 
ground over time in the evolving business context according to some legal scholars, trustees 
and directors were considered as two distinct bodies with different duties.194 Each is required 
to abide by their fiduciary duty, but certain duties may not apply to directors under trust law 
and vice versa, which duties, however, go beyond the fiduciary duty, or more precisely, the 
duty of loyalty. The concept of directors as trustees was challenged in Re: City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co,195 in which Romer J held that trustees and directors are two distinct bodies and 
cannot be considered interchangeable: 
‘..it is sometimes said that directors are trustees. If this means no more than 
those directors in the performance of their duties stand in a fiduciary 
relationship with the company, the statement is true enough. But if the statement 
is meant to be an indication by way of analogy of what those duties are, it 
appears to me to be wholly misleading. I can see but little resemblance between 
the duties of a director and the duties of a trustee of a will or a marriage 
settlement’. 
                                                 
194 Sealy (n 177) asserts that ‘it is argued that considering a director as trustee is wholly wrong for the following 
reasons: 
All cases deal with corporations – therefore there was not only a normal deed of settlement and the oldest 
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Romer J’s thinking was later echoed by Davies,196 who also acknowledges that the trustee and 
the director are two distinct bodies that cannot be considered interchangeable because they hold 
different duties, which nevertheless go beyond the ordinary fiduciary duty. 
 
Fourth, trust law does not impose a duty to act with respect to those assets that are placed in a 
person’s hand; it is only a situation of convenience whereby a person places his assets in the 
hands of another person until the assets are handed back. Consequently, under the strict 
application of trust law, the assets transferred remain the property of the transferor and are not 
legally transferred to another corporation or person. However, in the case of a company, 
shareholders invest their money in the company for the company’s benefit, and as a result, 
shareholders lose their rights over those assets since those assets are transformed and invested, 
even though those same shareholders will eventually reap the benefits. 
 
Fifth, trust law is founded on the deed of trust, which does not enjoy a separate legal 
personality. The principle of separate legal personality is a fundamental concept in the evolving 
discipline of corporate law wherein corporations enjoy a legal personality separate and distinct 
from that of their shareholders and directors.197 Consequently, neither the directors nor the 
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shareholders can be held personally liable for acts performed by the company, unless there has 
been fraudulent or wrongful trading on the part of the directors; in these instances, the directors 
will be held personally liable.198 This separate legal personality principle means that the 
company is personally liable to third parties for any acts it commits and can also be sued and 
sue in its own name. The concept of separate legal personality gained prominence in the United 
Kingdom in the nineteenth century with the Salomon Case.199 It was held that, although the 
company was managed by one person (Salomon), as a director he was not liable for acts done 
by the company. This principle of separate legal personality enjoyed by the company is now 
fundamental in company law. This case concerned Aron Salomon, who used to make leather 
boots and shoes in a large Whitechapel High Street establishment. Over time, his sons 
expressed the desire to join their father’s business; accordingly, their father decided to turn the 
business into a limited liability company. His wife and his five elder children became 
subscribers and the two elder sons were also appointed as directors, but were in fact acting as 
nominees for their father. This structural formation therefore meant that this company was still 
a one-man business. After its formation, the company purchased Salomon’s business of the 
formation of boots for £39,000, an excessive price for its value, which took place on 1st June 
1892. As part of the transfer, Salomon took 20,001 of the company’s 20,007 shares as payment, 
each of which was worth £1. The company also gave Salomon £10,000 in debentures. 
However, soon after the transfer, the market for boots collapsed, principally due to strikes that 
were being held at the time. Under these circumstances, the government of the day, which was 
Salomon’s main customer, decided to split its contracts between more firms to avoid the risk 
of its few suppliers being affected by these strikes. These circumstances inevitably led to 
Salomon’s business failing and the company was put into liquidation. After the interest 
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payments on the debentures were repaid, the company was left with only £1,055 in assets, 
which were claimed by Salomon under his retained debentures. As a result, unsecured creditors 
were left with nothing. The liquidator was of the opinion that Salomon should pay these 
creditors, but Salomon refused. The High Court decided against Salomon, yet the Court of 
Appeal overturned that decision and ordered that Salomon had to pay the unsecured creditors, 
but only on the basis that the company was formed for an illegitimate purpose. Hence, the 
Court of Appeal’s decision made it clear that an incorporated company must be considered a 
legal entity on its own. Lindley LJ said that: 
‘The incorporation of the company cannot be disputed. The company must be 
regarded as a corporation. I do not go so far as to say that the creditors of the 
company could sue him. In my opinion, they can only reach him through the 
company’.200 
The House of Lords overturned part of the Court of Appeal’s decision and held that Salomon 
could not be held personally liable for the company’s creditors, as it had not been sufficiently 
proven that he had defrauded them, with the result that Salomon was not held liable for 
anything. With respect to the separate legal personality enjoyed by the company, however, the 
House of Lords adopted the Court of Appeal’s principle that the company is a legal entity in 
its own right. It was stated that: 
‘the company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum […] the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or 
trustee for them’.201 
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The Salomon case represents a clear example of private limited liability companies, which are 
usually family business companies made up of shareholders who typically also sit on the board 
of directors; yet, these companies still enjoy separate legal personality from their shareholders 
and directors, as has been readily accepted by the Courts.202 This principle can work in favour 
of directors and shareholders, but at the same time works against creditors and other third 
parties who have an interest in the company. The separate legal personality entails that directors 
are required to apply their fiduciary duty in light of the company’s interests and not in the 
interests of the shareholders or other stakeholders. Nevertheless, at the same time, one might 
think that the separate legal personality principle is purely a sham invented and applied in the 
corporate field of law simply to shield directors and shareholders from any actions brought by 
third parties as, in reality, the separate legal personality principle does not apply in its true sense 
because shareholders have enjoyed the right to change directors from the 18th century 
onwards,203 and shareholders and directors can also be the same people. Therefore, 
shareholders seem to have always enjoyed indirect control over the directors by enjoying the 
full power to elect and choose the directors of the company, and so have had indirect controlled 
the actions of the company since directors might decide to act in the name of the shareholders 
to ensure that they are re-elected, even more so when the director and the shareholder are the 
same person. However, following Salomon, the Courts have seemed to strictly apply the 
separate legal personality principle. 
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2.4.3 Agency law 
Trust law was limited in its application in the evolving corporate law and a new body of law 
had to be formulated. Lord Cranworth LC defined an agency relationship in Aberdeen Rlwy. 
Co. v Blaikie Bros.204 as one in which ‘such agents have duties to discharge of a fiduciary 
nature towards their principal’.205 Bowstead and Reynolds also state that ‘an agency could be 
defined as a fiduciary relationship where one is acting on behalf of another subject to the 
consent and instruction by the principal’.206 This agency relationship, which can be created 
either orally or by a written contract, can thus be defined as a relationship in which: 
‘an agent can act only within what is known as the agent’s ‘authority’: the 
principal of an agent is not bound by any legal relationship which the agent 
purports to put the principal into if it was outside the agent’s authority’.207 
 
However, certain other legal scholars such as Fridman208 tend to go one step further and assert 
that an agency relationship requires the agent to act on behalf of the principal to bind a third 
party.209 
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While legal scholars tend to agree on the definition of agency, they also agree that it is difficult 
to provide a precise historical start date210 for the creation of agency law in the common law 
system, but agree that it found its footing with the establishment of new corporate principles 
that ran against trust law, primarily the separate legal personality principle and the way new 
companies were being formed in which the deed of settlement was considered to be obsolete.211 
Consequently, the Courts held that trust law and agency law were different, and came to the 
conclusion that these two bodies of laws apply to different times during the directors’ 
relationships with the company and with third parties, albeit still with the principle of trust 
through the fiduciary duty of directors ingrained in every relationship. This dual, non-
conflicting and non-related relationship enjoyed by directors is perhaps best expressed by Lord 
Selborne in the judgment in Great Eastern Railway Co v Turner,212 in which he held that: 
The directors are the mere trustees or agents of the company – trustees of the 
company’s money and property; agents in the transactions which they enter into 
on behalf of the company’.  
Another distinction between trust law and agency law is in the notion that while trust law is 
founded on the flexibility of equity law, agency law is ingrained in common law.213 
 
Yet, at the same time, it is noted that the interchangeable use of trust law and agency law seems 
to also be acceptable in the field of corporate law for three main reasons. First, although it is 
established as a rule that agency law introduced the principle of the company’s separate legal 
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personality with the consequence that directors are trusted by and responsible towards the 
company, the reality is that shareholders remain at the core of the company’s control over 
directors because they enjoy the right to elect and choose the directors. Accordingly, the 
shareholders’ interests were considered to be the principal interests which needed to be fully 
protected by directors. This specific scenario arises when the director and the shareholder are 
one and the same person, in which the separate legal personality enjoyed by the company is 
blurred and does not apply in everyday transactions. This notion of separate legal personality 
was, therefore, not genuinely abided by under this specific legal regime.214 Second, some legal 
scholars such as Sealy believe that reference to trust law had long been ingrained in the field 
of corporate law when analysing the fiduciary duty of directors with the result that reference to 
trust law could not be ignored.215 Third, because the trust principle (through the fiduciary duty 
enjoyed by directors)216 was as prominent under agency law as under trust law, there are similar 
interpretations of this specific duty under each legal system. The application of the fiduciary 
duty under agency law was first tackled in Armstrong v Jackson,217 in which Lord McCardie 
pointed out that: 
‘The position of principal and agent gives rise to particular and onerous duties 
on the part of the agent, and the high standard of conduct required from him 
springs from the fiduciary relationship between his employer and himself’.218 
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A more recent judgment that also applies the fiduciary duty of directors under agency law is 
Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd.219 Hudson also makes reference to the 
importance of the fiduciary duty as imposed on the directors under agency law.220 However, 
over time, reference to agency law decreased, as in the case of trust law. This was because 
agency law presented an idea of the directors who remained very strongly linked to the 
shareholders, with the result that the fiduciary duty of these directors was owed to shareholders 
rather than to the company. Therefore, the separate legal personality of the company could only 
be effectively adopted if any reference to agency law and trust law was removed. 
 
2.4.4 Fiduciary law 
Fiduciary law had to be created due to the problems created under trust law and agency law. 
Under the English legal system, fiduciary law was created in the 14th century,221 which evolved 
under equity law as trust law. Fiduciary law was applied even during the enforcement of trust 
law and agency law, for two noteworthy reasons. First, it gave rise to the fundamental fiduciary 
duty of directors that is also undoubtedly applied under trust law and agency law,222 as already 
demonstrated above. The principle of trust and confidence that arises between two persons, 
which may include the relationship between directors and the company that they manage,223 as 
under trust law and agency law, is once again prominent. Second, fiduciary law found 
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applicability in instances where the law of trusts224 and the law of agency225 could not be 
applied. In this regard, fiduciary law is defined as the law that: 
‘can accommodate new situations and changes in social morals and norms, yet 
maintain its core values and norms, without which no society can survive, let 
alone flourish’.226 
 
Fiduciary law was therefore resorted to when trust law227 and agency law228 could not fill all 
the gaps that were being created over time.229 One such instance involves the evolution of the 
law with respect to the economic needs that were being created over time,230 such as 
circumstances in which directors were required to take risky actions for the benefit of the 
company.231 
 
However, fiduciary law began to be entirely and solely resorted to under the English legal 
system without any reference to trust law or agency law from the 20th century onwards. It 
became significant when the separation between management and ownership could no longer 
be subdued. In short, the principle of the separate legal personality enjoyed by the company 
                                                 
224 Smith and Gold (n 184) 
225Kershaw (n 176) 
226Tamar Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century’ 91 Boston University Law Review 1289. 
227 Trust law was mainly created for unincorporated companies. Although it was applied to companies whenever 
they were formed, in reality, it was not created to deal with these companies, but was only applied to them out of 
convenience 
228 The definition of agency law involves the shareholder’s supreme control over directors, control that could not 
be exercised anymore with the introduction of the separate legal personality theory. 
229 Deborah A. De Mott, ‘Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation’ (1988) Duke Law Journal 879. 
Vide also Kershaw (n 176) 
230 Kershaw (n 176) 
231 Holger Fleischer, ‘Legal Transplants in European Company Law – The Case of Fiduciary Duties’, ECFR 2005, 
378-397 
<http://heinonline.org.ezproxye.bham.ac.uk/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/ecomflr2&page=37
8&collection=journals> accessed 10 August 2018 
65 
had in principle created the notion that directors are answerable to the company only, and were 
consequently enjoying more trust and less control from the shareholders; this stood in 
opposition to trust law and agency law, under which directors were automatically considered 
to be directly controlled by the shareholders, especially in one-man companies. This separate 
legal personality principle, as defined under fiduciary law, meant that it must also apply with 
the same rigidity in a one-man company in which, although the shareholder and the director 
were the same person, the director still has to act in the best interests of the company. 
Consequently, fiduciary law also indirectly led to the creation of fundamental differences 
between shareholders and directors with respect to ‘competence, expertise and power’.232 
Accordingly, the trust enjoyed by directors under the fiduciary law led to the notion that 
directors are indisputably looked upon as being more experienced than the shareholders who 
appoint them, since shareholders would generally not appoint someone who would work 
against them. In this regard, shareholders are aware that if directors maximise company profits, 
dividends can be declared, meaning that shareholders ultimately benefit. In this respect, it is 
customary in today’s business context, as permitted by the English Companies Act 2006, not 
to draw up an objects clause to ensure that directors can carry out all acts necessary for the 
benefit of the company, but reference to Section 171 cannot be undermined which stipulates 
that if an objects clause is enacted, a director is bound to act within the limits of the objects 
clause. This wide discretion of trust enjoyed by directors,233 together with their significant level 
of expertise, also leads to the notion that a fiduciary can delegate their authority if the company 
can ultimately benefit from such delegation.234 
                                                 
232 Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation (2nd edn, Princeton Unviersity Press 1999) 182. Vide also Ross Touche, 
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Nonetheless, over time, concern seems to have arisen that the directors will use the excuse of 
acting in the best interests of the company to be in a position to take very risky actions. 
Consequently, the enlightened shareholder value (ESV) principle, which was firstly created in 
the 1980s in the United States, was introduced235 and incorporated by the Company Law 
Review Steering Group, or as is widely referred to, CLRSG, in 1999 in the United Kingdom236 
and  introduced in Section 172 (1)237 of the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006, even though 
this Section primarily entails that the best interest of the company shall be the first interest to 
be duly protected. This principle, the term which was invented by Michael Jensen,238 entails 
that the directors must do their job properly, and shall not take part in any opportunistic 
behaviours because they are directly accountable to shareholders.239 Keay believes that this 
principle has proven to be important, as it protects shareholders.  As a result, it seems to apply 
fiduciary duty as defined in agency law. However, other scholars have voiced their opposition 
to the adoption of the ESV principle for three reasons. Firstly, they believe that it focuses on a 
single objective rather than on the best interests of the company as a whole; secondly, it pushes 
directors to focus only on the company’s profits to prove to the shareholders that they are acting 
in their best interest ; and thirdly, directors may encounter difficulty in interacting with other 
stakeholders, as shareholders may become suspicious of such interactions.240 Hence, certain 
legal scholars believe that the ESV principle needs to be applied with reference to the principle 
of corporate social responsibility principle (CSR), which requires that the stakeholders’ 
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interests are also taken into consideration by directors when acting in the best interests of the 
company. Stakeholder interest has been at the forefront of discussions for several years. 
Although the CSR principle is important in itself, Keay is not a full believer in the notion that 
directors should take stakeholders’ interests into consideration when applying their fiduciary 
duty. Although he does not undervalue the stakeholders’ interests, he is of the opinion that the 
other stakeholders are protected by other laws, giving employees as an example and stating 
that they are protected by employment law,241 and therefore do not need to be protected to the 
same extent as shareholders. Keay also recognises that the ESV principle can work against the 
CSR principle, such as when directors decide to cut costs to maximise shareholder profit; in 
this case, they may not be taking the interests of the other stakeholders into consideration, 
because, for example, employees may be made redundant to achieve the savings.242 
Nevertheless, other writers firmly believe that the ESV principle should be construed in light 
of the creation of the CSR principle, in which the interests of every stakeholder are taken into 
account rather than only looking at the shareholders’ interests.243 Friedman244 and Jensen argue 
that taking note of the interests of the stakeholders is important for the long-term benefit of the 
company, which will in turn result in a profit for shareholders.245 Crowther and Aras go one 
step further on this subject by declaring that the application of the CSR principle ultimately 
improves corporate reputation, which in return: 
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‘improves shareholder value [...] inspires confidence in investors [in the case of 
listed companies] which in turn leads to a higher stock price for a company […] 
more influential on legislative and regulatory governmental decision-
making’.246 
Accordingly, they believe that corporate behaviour has an effect not only on stakeholders and 
shareholders, but also on the entire economy of the company.247 
 
Therefore, after analysing the ESV and the CSR principles, it is noted that the broad discretion 
and power enjoyed by directors through the application of their fiduciary duty can only be 
enjoyed within the application of the ESV principle and the CSR principle in today’s 
interpretation of the business context. Stakeholders’ interests have once again begun to gain 
prominence and became equally important as the company’s interests. The simultaneous 
application of both principles also removes the application of the agency law and trust law 
since these two concurrent principles cannot apply under trust law and agency law as 
established herein. Under trust law, directors were directly answerable to the people who 
trusted them with their assets, meaning that the separate legal personality of the company was 
not recognised at all and the interests of other third parties did not play a role. Under agency 
law, as well, the ESV principle alongside the CSR principle, could not find ground, because 
although companies were considered to be a meaningful creation, directors were still directly 
answerable to shareholders and were not in reality answerable to any other stakeholder or to 
the company. 
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The English Courts have also recently started to apply the fiduciary law only without reference 
to any other legal term in decisions such as Shepherds Investments Ltd and Shepherds 
(Financial) Ltd v Andrew Walters.248 The claimant companies claimed damages and an account 
of profits against their former directors for various breaches of their fiduciary duty, including 
the setting up of a competing business, diversion of a business opportunity and misuse of 
confidential information. The defendants had taken the decision to establish a business that 
they knew would be fairly regarded by both claimants as a competitor and had continued to 
take steps to bring that rival business into existence, with the result that the investment products 
offered by the new companies were much similar to the original investment company’s 
products. The Court held the directors to be in breach of their fiduciary duty. 
 
 The evolution of the fiduciary duty of directors in the European Union 
Malta joined the European Union (EU) on 1st May 2004 with the intent of attaining a 
harmonised regulation in its laws that covered as many aspects as possible. Developments that 
have taken place in the EU in the field of company law have influenced Maltese company law 
and shaped it into its present form, and Malta has transposed all the directives that deal with 
company law to date,249 yet the EU has not been a strong influence in the regulation of the 
fiduciary duty of directors due to the reason that will be presented herein. 
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The EU has not yet defined the specific fiduciary duty of directors, even though corporate 
mobility in Europe is constantly increasing and debates about the harmonisation of the 
fiduciary duty of directors are happening.250 This disinterested approach to harmonising the 
regulations governing the fiduciary duty of directors has resonated indirectly but very strongly 
through the years in various papers published by the EU, including a paper published in June 
2006 by the European Corporate Governance Forum251 and the Company Law and Corporate 
Governance Action Plan published in December 2012,252 which both papers argued that the 
fiduciary duty of directors should not be regulated at the EU level. The reason for this lack of 
proper regulation is because the EU is made up of countries with different beliefs and traditions 
having their own unique historical and legal backgrounds; consequently, it has always left each 
member state to regulate this duty according to its own history and beliefs.253 Accordingly, 
unlike other areas of company law, the fiduciary duty of directors has not been the subject of 
an extensive harmonisation programme at the European level.254 Indeed, in this regard, it is 
observed that common law systems such as the English system have rigorously regulated this 
fiduciary duty, but civil legal systems such as the Italian system have not developed this 
fiduciary duty in as much detail. The differences are because each system has either a one-tier 
or a two-tier structure. While common law countries such as the United Kingdom provide for 
broad duties to avoid any type of conflict, in two-tiered systems such as Italy, there is a 
reallocation of decision-making power to the supervisory board, meaning that the fiduciary 
                                                 
250 Carsten Gerner-Beuerle and Edmund-Philipp Schuster, ‘The Evolving Structure of Directors’ Duties in 
Europe’ (2014) 15 European Business Organisation Law Review 191-233 
251 This Forum considered that there was no need to impose any European Union obligation on the boards of 
directors to certify the effectiveness of internal controls; <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ 
ecgforum/statement_internal_control_en.pdf> no 6 accessed 7 June 2014 
252 EU Commission Proposes 2013 Action Plan for Company Law and Corporate Governance, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/doing-business-eu/company-law-and-corporate-
governance_en>15 accessed 7 June 2014 
253 Klaus J Hopt, ‘Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance 
After Enron’ (2007) Law Working Paper N°.05/2002, ECGI <http://bobduncan.dyndns-
blog.com/bobd/downloads/Research/Corporate_Governance/Hopt2007.pdf> 449 accessed 4 March 2014 
254 Gerner-Beuerle and Schuster (n 250) 
71 
duty of directors in these jurisdictions is more rigorously regulated through the supervision of 
other boards rather than through specific statutory regulation. 
 
At the same time, however, the fiduciary duty of directors might seem to have been regulated 
by the EU in an indirect manner in certain instances. The fiduciary duty of directors has been 
indirectly regulated from 2003, and more strongly in July 2016 with the enactment of the 
regulation commonly known as the Market Abuse Regulation.255 In short, the regulation of this 
fiduciary duty of directors was achieved through the regulation of market abuse,256 but this 
Regulation only applies to listed companies. More specific reference to this Regulation shall 
be made again in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Market abuse includes insider trading, the unlawful 
disclosure of inside information and market manipulation, and can only arise in listed 
companies. All of these particular instances indirectly refer to the fiduciary duty of directors 
because they refer to a situation in which a director wrongly makes use of inside information, 
which belong to the company for personal gain or for the gain of other persons. Therefore, this 
Regulation incidentally requires directors to act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company and are under a strict obligation not to carry out any form of market abuse because 
otherwise the best interests of the company are not safeguarded and an effective mechanism to 
protect the company will not be in place. A director cannot honour this fiduciary duty if they 
act against the company, and so it precludes them from engaging in risky behaviour unless they 
are convinced that such behaviour would place the company in a more prosperous position. 
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The EU again indirectly addressed the issue of the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors 
when it published the Company Law and Corporate Governance Action Plan in December 
2012, through its referencing of the importance of transparency.257 However, as with market 
abuse, this paper also tackles these issues with rigidity only with respect to listed companies,258 
largely ignoring small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs), possibly because of their variety 
between member states.259 In Malta, however, the economy relies on the formation and 
functioning of SMEs, as demonstrated in Chapter 1.  
 
 The evolution of the fiduciary duty of directors as presented by the international 
organisations 
Given the rise of international trade over recent years fuelled by technology developments, the 
development of economic integration processes,260 the need to create a global governance,261 
and the need to create an international legal system looked on by other legal systems, thus 
enabling to create a stronger economy262 in that particular country, .the influence of various 
international organisations has become increasingly significant for the legislators and judiciary 
of every legal system. 
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However, although international influences may coincidentally pave the way to the regulation 
of the fiduciary duty of directors in Malta by means of soft law, they are not regarded as an 
effective means of change in a legal system, for three reasons. First, these international 
influences are non-binding; therefore, any country may decide for themselves whether or not 
to adopt them. In fact, although some international organisations display their autonomous 
power, their decisions might be taken into consideration, even if not binding, at the discretion 
of the country. However, it must also observed that some other international organisations 
‘serve as an ad hoc vehicle for a multilateral diplomatic process’263 whereby the guidelines 
issued by these international organisations are influencing the EU’s principles, which, in turn, 
will be imposed on each member state to ultimately create a global economic web.264 Second, 
Malta is not a member of every international organisation, but only of four that regulate 
company law issues in some way:265 the International Organisation of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO266); the International Monetary Fund (IMF);267 the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD268); and the International Finance Corporation. Third, 
while all international organisations speak very loudly about the importance of corporate 
governance for better investor protection and financial resilience, none of these organisations 
specifically addresses the fiduciary duty of directors in the context of company law. 
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 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter has shown that the legal donors of the Italian and English legal 
systems have a common heritage in Roman law and are thus linked. It is also clear that the 
fiduciary duty through the application of trust has always been the core principle in both legal 
systems. Accordingly, each system gives prominence to the trust that exists between two 
persons – in this case, the director and the company – without undermining the interests of 
other interested parties and also the strong belief placed by one person in the other that deceit 
will never take place. Moreover, under each of these systems, directors ought to be fully aware 
that the cost of disloyal behaviour is not limited to a material loss suffered by the directors and 
the company, but to the fact that such behaviour leads to the trust and honour enjoyed by the 
directors in society to be forever tarnished. 
 
However, on a closer inspection, it can also be seen that each legal regime has developed and 
applied its principles in unique ways. The Italian legal system has mainly applied mandate law, 
which is fundamentally different from agency law with respect to its relationship with third 
parties. It is also very different to trust law because the former implies a deed of incorporation 
while the latter does not. By contrast, the English legal system applies trust law in a distinctive 
business context in which companies were mainly unincorporated, whereas agency law was 
triggered following the growing importance of the incorporation of companies and it was only 
through the full application of fiduciary law that the principle of the separate legal personality 
of the company was applied. These noticeable divergences have led to varied interpretations of 
the fiduciary duty of directors, as we will see later. 
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These discrepancies might lead to the assumption that the EU or the relevant international 
organisations might have felt the need to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors, but neither of 
them has ever been able to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors until the present date, mainly 
due to the differences in the legal systems that exist between the countries that form the EU 
and the international organisations. 
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Chapter 3. The development of the fiduciary duty of directors in 
Malta 
 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of the fiduciary duty of directors 
under the Maltese corporate law by identifying the key characteristics and determinant factors 
that have influenced legislators and the judiciary in Malta when applying the Italian and 
English legal systems.  
 
It will demonstrate that the factors identified in Chapter 1, namely the historical, societal, 
cultural and political factors, together with familiarity with the law, prestige and economic 
desire have greatly influenced the statutory and judicial changes exhibited by the Maltese legal 
system throughout the past two hundred years.  
 
It will show how the historical, cultural, societal factors and familiarity with the law have been 
influential both for legislators and for the Maltese judiciary from the very beginning. These 
factors led to the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors being highly influenced by the 
Italian civil legal system since this fiduciary duty was, accordingly, entirely regulated by the 
law of mandate. In this regard, reference will be made to Sir Adrian Dingli, who was the main 
legislator on the Commission that was able to compile, for the first time, the mandate provisions 
under the Maltese legal system. In fact, this Commission was appointed by the British 
Government with the aim of enacting laws suitable for the country. A comprehensive study 
from the nineteenth century onwards, and consequently from the date that Sir Adrian Dingli 
enacted these mandate provisions, shall be presented. This chapter shall also show that these 
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provisions enacted by this Commission remained in force with respect to the regulation of the 
fiduciary duty of directors until the year 2003, and that these provisions have not undergone 
any important amendments until the present date.  
 
However, at the same time, this chapter will also contend that the same factors that influenced 
the Maltese legislators and judiciary to consult the Italian legal system also paved the way for 
them to begin consulting the English legal system from the 1940s onward. This analysis will 
also provide the answers as to why a system of statute law completely based on the English 
legal system could not be fully endorsed by the Maltese legislators until the year 2003, despite 
various different scattered provisions being enacted by Maltese legislators in the 1962 
Commercial Ordinance and the 1995 Companies Act. The present study will also demonstrate 
that, in general, the Maltese judiciary nevertheless began to make reference to the English legal 
system when interpreting the fiduciary duty of directors from the 1940s onward as opposed to 
adopting the more resilient statutory approach, with the result that the majority of the Maltese 
judiciary felt the need, due to the economic and prestige factors, to depart from the statutory 
development.  
 
 The application of mandate law in Malta 
From a statutory point of view, the law of mandate, which traces its history back to Roman 
law, was indisputably applicable to the regulation of the fiduciary directors’ duty in Malta from 
the time of the very first enacted Commercial Ordinance in Malta in 1857 until 2003. This first 
Commercial Ordinance stated that directors were considered as mandataries of the partnership 
78 
as well as of each and every partner, and this approach was affirmed by the Maltese Courts in 
the early judgment Francesco Saverio Musu’ v Vincenzo di Saverio Vella et.269 
 
However, under the 1857 Ordinance, reference to the law of mandate as enacted under the 
French legal system was resorted to because specific provisions of the law of mandate had not 
yet been enacted under the Maltese legal system, since there were no legislators in Malta 
capable of completing such a task, who have tried to enact these provisions but failed. The 
specific mandate provisions were enacted in Malta by a Commission headed by Sir Adrian 
Dingli some thirteen years after the enactment of the Commercial Ordinance 1857. Indeed, 
numerous failed attempts had been made to enact the mandate provisions and the whole of the 
Maltese Civil Code 1870 before the appointment of Dingli’s Commission;270 but only the 
Commission was able to successfully consolidate this Code.271 The British government trusted 
Dingli with this important task because, although it knew that Dingli himself was keen to 
defend Italian,272 the Government also had great respect for Dingli, who had been previously 
appointed to various important and influential positions, first as Crown Counsel in 1854, and 
thereafter as Chief Justice of Malta. He was later appointed to form part of the Commission to 
consolidate the Civil Code in the 1860s.273 He was also popular with those who were devoted 
to defending Italian culture,274 thus clearly highlighting the historical and cultural factors rooted 
in the Maltese legal system at that time. His task was therefore made easier, not only because 
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he was a highly intellectual person, but also because he was highly respected by everyone 
involved.275 
 
Dingli’s Commission divided the Maltese Civil Code 1870 into two parts. He first consolidated 
Ordinance VII of 1868, which dealt with the law of things what is known under English law as 
the law of property. This Ordinance was promulgated on 11th February 1870, and part of it 
included the mandate provisions under Title XVIII,276 the provisions of which were copied 
from the Italian Civil Code 1865.277 He later consolidated Ordinance I of 1873 concerning the 
law of persons, which was promulgated on 22nd January 1874. This entire Civil Code is still 
used today, and only minor amendments have been made to the mandate provisions to keep 
pace with broader changes,278 without changing their interpretation or application.  
 
Accordingly, from a statutory point of view, trust law or agency law as defined under the 
English legal system never made its way into the Maltese legal system with respect to the 
regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors. Although the Maltese statutory company law never 
made any references to trust law, it did take a clear stand with regard to agency law. From the 
enactment of Ordinance XIII in 1857,279 through Act XXX of 1927280 to the Commercial Code 
of 1942,281 agents and directors were considered as two distinct bodies, because they all 
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stipulated that a company shall be managed by agents or directors. Various Maltese judges and 
magistrates, together with several legal scholars, also attempted to differentiate between these 
two bodies of laws by applying them to different corporate scenarios, and one of the pioneers 
in the Maltese legal field, Professor F. Cremona, draws a distinction between these two laws 
by establishing that: 
‘in their internal dealings with the company, directors should be classified as 
mandataries of the company, and that in their dealings with third parties they 
should be considered as agents thereof’.282 
 
Cremona was one of the first writers to write about companies in Malta, and his works are 
highly regarded by the Maltese judiciary and other legal scholars and are cited frequently. 
Cremona’s established principle was later applied by the Maltese Courts in numerous 
judgments.283 Nevertheless, he did not deal with the interpretation of the fiduciary duty of 
directors as construed under mandate law in great detail.284 
 
However, other Maltese legal scholars and the Maltese Courts285 have not drawn any 
distinction between agency law and mandate law, but instead opted to use both laws 
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interchangeably, and even the Maltese legal writer Professor Andrew Muscat establishes that 
‘at law, agency is a species of mandate’.286 However, whenever agency law and mandate law 
are used interchangeably, mandate law as enacted under the Maltese Civil Code 1870 has 
always been applied to interpret the fiduciary duty of directors, suggesting that agency law has 
always been sited within the limits of the mandate law, and not in the way in which agency law 
was applied and interpreted under the English legal system. 
 
3.2.1 Reasons to consult the Italian mandate law 
3.2.1.1 Factors that influenced legislators  
Maltese legislators were strongly influenced by four main factors – historical, cultural, societal 
and a familiarity with the foreign legal system in question. The following sections will review 
them to facilitate a full understanding of the extent of their effectiveness under the Maltese 
legal system. Historical, cultural and societal factors will be grouped under one heading 
whereas familiarity with the law will be dealt under another heading.  
 
3.2.1.1.1 Historical, cultural and societal factors 
Sir Adrian Dingli was surely influenced by the strong linguistic link between Malta and Italy, 
which even existed before Dingli’s time. . One of the main factors that drove him to consult 
the Italian legal system was the strong connection to Italian felt by the Maltese elites, along 
with Dingli’s own personal desire to defend the language. Dingli was hence very much 
influenced by the historical, cultural and societal factors felt by the Maltese islands at that time 
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and he declared himself to be ‘keen to defend Italian and cultural heritage’.287 The prominence 
of Italian in the Maltese islands stems from its first inhabitants who introduced Italian in Malta 
from southern Sicily around 5000 BCE,288 who came to Malta due to famine. Malta was 
subsequently conquered by the Phoenicians around the seventh century BCE, then by the 
Carthaginian Empire in 400 BCE. Although the Carthaginians did not speak Italian themselves, 
it continued to be the most important spoken language in Malta. Malta was subsequently 
conquered by the Roman Empire in 218 BCE and during this time its people were collectively 
referred to as Quirina, considered the noblest tribe of those times. This reinforced the influence 
and importance of Italian in the Maltese Islands since they were considered a Roman tribe, and 
the Maltese were considered full Roman citizens.289 As a result of this affiliation, Italian 
became the sole official language of Malta for political and other significant issues, such as the 
enactment of laws. 290 This Italian influence continued to prosper throughout the Norman 
occupation between 1091 and 1530.291 The Italian influence also maintained its dominance 
during the conquest by the Knights of St John292 and was so strong that it was not even 
undermined by the conquest of Malta by the British Empire in 1800, at which time the Maltese 
Islands fell under the jurisdiction of the British government.293 Although common law should 
have found applicability in the Maltese Islands, since common law applies under the English 
jurisdiction, the Italian influence was so strong in Malta it could not be impaired. This situation 
led to the issue of a Royal Order 1801 by the United Kingdom government stating that ‘English 
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laws and Courts of judicature had no jurisdiction over Malta, and Maltese law in primis, 
institutions were not affected’.294 Consequently, Italian continued to be the sole official 
language in Malta for the cultural and elite group until the 1940s and continued to be used in 
the regulation of political and other significant issues. It continued to be used in the civil 
service, in state schools, in Courts and for the enactment of laws.295 It retained its position until 
the 1940s ‘as the language of thinking and imagination’296 that has ‘penetrated our most 
intimate and delicate sentiments of our hearts’.297 
 
The Italian influence was so strong during the 1800s that the Maltese language was considered 
as the language of the common people298 and not used in the enactment of any laws or the 
regulation of important issues of the country. Consequently, it never exerted any influence on 
politics or other significant ideas that regulated the Maltese islands. In this way, these historical, 
cultural and societal factors have uniquely shaped the Maltese legal system. These three factors 
accordingly show that the full effectiveness of legal transplantation was hindered until the 
1940s by the imposition of the Italian legal system on the Maltese legal system. In fact, 
although during World War II, the Maltese people wanted to dissociate themselves from Italian 
culture and language, Italian is still dominant today in the Maltese Islands; this language is 
taught at schools and the majority of the Maltese people know how to speak and write fluently 
in Italian. In this respect, it is indeed noted that although Italian had ceased to be the official 
language of the Maltese islands by the 1940s and Italian culture was no longer the sole 
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influence in Malta by that time, the language and culture remain very influential in Malta to 
this day. 
 
3.2.1.1.2 Familiarity with the law 
The Commission chaired by Dingli felt it appropriate to consider the Italian civil legal system 
when enacting the mandate provisions as the law that would regulate the fiduciary duty of 
directors for three other reasons; reasons that reveal the Commission’s familiarity with the 
approach of the Italian legal system. 
 
First was that the mandate terminology used by legislators from the first Maltese Commercial 
Ordinance of 1857 implies that a civil legal system was adopted. Indeed, Ordinance No XIII 
of 1857 had already included references to the word mandato in its Italian text when referring 
to the performance required of directors.299 This phrase is present under a civil legal system, 
but absent under the English legal system. Reference to the English legal system would 
consequently have given rise to difficulties. Accordingly, to avoid disturbing the situation in 
which the fiduciary duty of directors was already regulated by a civil legal system that seemed 
to be functioning well, it seemed more appropriate for Dingli’s Commission to follow the civil 
legal system rather than the common system when enacting the mandate provisions and other 
parts of the Maltese Civil Code 1870. Nevertheless, an interesting point to make is that given 
that this Ordinance was entirely based on the French Commercial Code of 1807 rather than on 
the Italian Code 1865, Dingli’s Commission might have looked at the French legal system 
rather than the Italian legal system; however, the direct influence of the Italian legal system 
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could not have taken place by the time of the enactment of the first Maltese Commercial 
Ordinance of 1857, as there had not been any Italian Codes enacted by then, but the Italian 
Civil Code 1865 was enacted by the time Dingli’s commission embarked on its project. 
Moreover, in reality, the French legal system was part of the civil legal system, and greatly 
influenced the Italian legal system. The influence of the civil legal system also determined how 
the provisions governing the fiduciary duty of directors were enacted and regulated. The French 
Commercial Code 1807 did not directly regulate the fiduciary duty of directors, but this duty 
was regulated by the French Civil Code of 1804, which incorporated the mandate provisions.300 
The French Civil Code influenced the Italian Civil Code of 1865, Italy’s first Code as a unified 
state, which also included the mandate provisions.301 Consequently, the first Italian 
Commercial Code, which was enacted in 1865 and which is also based on French law, only 
stipulates that companies shall be administered by directors who shall be considered as 
mandataries and whose duties shall be governed by the Italian Civil Code 1865 mandate 
provisions.302 Accordingly, the Italian Civil Code 1865 dealt with the mandate rules rather than 
the various Italian Commercial Codes that had been enacted throughout the years until the 
1940s. This particular reference to the Italian legal system led to the way the fiduciary duty of 
directors was regulated in Malta as Dingli’s Commission applied the same reasoning. Hence, 
until the enactment of Article 136 A in the Companies Act in 2003, the fiduciary duty of 
directors was regulated by the Maltese Civil Code 1870 through the mandate provisions, rather 
than by any Commercial Ordinances or Codes that had been enacted in Malta throughout the 
years. 
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Another reason which explains why the Commission seems to have been more confident in 
resorting to the Italian legal system is because it is codified, and therefore easier to access. 
Indeed, it seems that Dingli led his Commission to consult only codified laws, something 
Dingli himself acknowledged in his notes, entitled ‘Appunti’,303 that the foreign sources of law 
he consulted were primarily the Roman law, the Code Napoléon, the Austrian Code, and the 
Codes of various Italian states, along with a few references to other authors, namely 
Troplong,304 Pothier305 and Smith.306 He acknowledged that the Italian Civil Code of 1865 was 
consulted with respect to the specific enactment of the mandate provisions under the Maltese 
Civil Code 1870. The English legal system was based on case law with respect to the regulation 
of the duties of directors until 2006. Reference to case law would have been more difficult, 
since it would have been scattered across various judgments that might not have always been 
easy to access. The English legal system only codified the duties of directors, including their 
fiduciary duty, with the Companies Act 2006. 
 
One final reason that might have led Dingli’s Commission, and more importantly Dingli 
himself, to consult the Italian legal system specifically with respect to the regulation of the 
fiduciary duty of directors through the mandate law was that he might have been concerned 
with the application of the law of precedent, which is rigorously applied under the English legal 
system. He may have been concerned that if the precedent principle was to form part of the 
Maltese system, it would be impossible to achieve any remedy in cases of total injustice. In 
fact, one might argue that the law of precedent on which the English legal system is based is 
unfair, as it stipulates that the judge’s decision is binding on other judges and authorities faced 
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with the same or similar factual situations. By contrast, case law under the civil law system is 
considered to be persuasive but not binding. Hence, the civil legal system gives the judiciary 
the opportunity to consult both the enacted law and any available case law on the subject matter, 
but at the same time grants then total freedom to draw their own conclusions. Therefore, a case 
that had been unjustly decided by one judge would not be automatically binding on other judges 
and authorities. Such legislative reasoning seems to hold ground even more given that Dingli 
followed the English legal system with respect to criminal procedure,307 since the English legal 
system seemed more just, equitable and impartial than the civil law system in that particular 
field.308 
 
3.2.1.2 The judicial factor and the influence of prestige and economic factors 
The judicial factor is an influence in itself; however, until the 1940s, it was very much tied to 
the historical, cultural and societal factors, together with the familiarity with the law, and the 
Maltese judiciary only made reference to the Maltese mandate statutory provisions as 
influenced by the Italian system and also delivered these judgments in Italian .until such date. 
Such approach might have arisen because the judiciary might have been of the opinion that it 
could only obtain the prestige it strived for through strict observance of the tight historical links 
to the Italian legal system, since they perceived the Italian legal system and its history to be 
superior to the English legal system; in their minds, the economic factor was, therefore, only a 
subsidiary factor until that time.  
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 The application of fiduciary law in Malta 
Although the law of mandate was the first to be explicitly applied with respect to the regulation 
of the fiduciary duty of directors, the influence of the fiduciary law from the very first enacted 
Commercial Ordinance 1857 in Malta cannot be understated since it has created the concept of 
the fiduciary duty that is to be strictly observed by directors.309 This fiduciary duty was, until 
2003, generally interpreted within the stringent boundaries of the mandate law as much as was 
allowed by the Maltese statutory legal system and by the Maltese judiciary. However, from the 
1940s onwards, certain specific scattered provisions were enacted in the Maltese Commercial 
Ordinance 1962 and the Maltese Companies Act 1995, which explicitly regulated certain 
aspects of this fiduciary duty and superseded the application of the mandate provisions. These 
provisions were directly influenced by the English statutory legal system, specifically by the 
1948 and the 1985 Companies Acts, and could not be fully interpreted within the meaning of 
mandate law. Many Maltese judges and magistrates were thus generally applying the fiduciary 
law as applied under the English legal system, as expressed (for instance) in the judgment 
Emanuel Chircop pro et noe v Carmel sive Charles Busuttil et,310 but still within the limitations 
imposed by mandate law. 
 
This confusing situation involving the attempted simultaneous application of two distinct legal 
systems was only finally settled in 2003, with the enactment of Article 136 A of the Maltese 
Companies Act 1995, in which the fiduciary duty of directors as interpreted by the English 
legal system was referred to comprehensively, without any references to the Italian legal 
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system and the mandate law. This also gave rise to the enactment of a statutory set of rules 
intended to apply only to directors; this can be contrasted with mandate law, which applies to 
any relationship that may exist between two persons, meaning that the application of mandate 
law is therefore not limited only to the relationship between directors and companies. 
 
This Article was supplemented a year later with the general fiduciary provisions in the Maltese 
Civil Code 1870 of Articles 1124 A and B. These two provisions also apply the fiduciary duty, 
but were entirely influenced by the Roman legal system (vide Chapter 4), which suggests that 
legislators in Malta had felt the need to reincorporate the civil legal system. Reference to the 
English legal system could not be made because the English legal system does not provide for 
such a circumstance. The enactment of these two provisions shows the stance taken by the 
Maltese legislators to try and ensure that no one can escape from their responsibilities. These 
provisions were enacted with the specific aim of ensuring that any person who does not hold 
the title of director, but may still affect the management of the company and shall therefore be 
considered a director, can be still held liable if Article 136 A proves to be insufficient to cover 
them. Accordingly, these two Civil Code provisions not only apply to directors, but also to any 
other person who holds a fiduciary position, including any person who might try to shield 
themselves from responsibility by claiming not to hold the title of director. However, these 
provisions only apply as a secondary set of rules to Article 136 A, and should therefore only 
be analysed within their strict application (vide Chapter 4), and so will not be examined in the 
analysis provided in this Chapter. 
 
90 
3.3.1 Reasons to consult English fiduciary law 
3.3.1.1 Factors that influenced legislators  
Maltese legislators continued to be strongly influenced by four main factors – historical, 
cultural, societal and a familiarity with the foreign legal system in question even after the 
1940s.  The following sections will review them to facilitate a full understanding of the extent 
of their effectiveness under the Maltese legal system. Historical, cultural and societal factors 
will be grouped under one heading whereas familiarity with the law will be dealt under another 
heading.  
 
3.3.1.1.1 Historical, cultural and societal factors 
Following the brutal assaults by Benito Mussolini’s Regia Aeronautica and the German 
Luftwaffe during World War II and with Britain as their sole protector, the United Kingdom 
replaced Italy as the dominant influence in the Maltese people’s hearts.311 This was particularly 
evident in 1954, when the Maltese Government appointed a Commission to draft new 
provisions to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors and limited liability companies and this 
Commission decided to take the English developments into consideration.312 The provisions of 
limited liability companies as understood today were drafted for the first time during that 
period.313 
 
                                                 
311Arnold Cassola, ‘Italo-Maltese Relations’ (2012) 5(1) Mediterranean Studies 17; The Daily Chronicles of 
World War II, ‘Mussolini Bombs Malta Island Fortress (Malta, Central Mediterranean · June 11, 1940)’ 
<http://ww2days.com/mussolini-bombs-malta-island-fortress.html> accessed 15 July 2014 
312Neil Wilson and Carolyn Joy, Malta and Gozo (4th edn., Lonely Planet Publications 2010) 25-27; 
Vassallomalta.com, ‘Self-Government and Courage 1921 – 1945’ 
<http://www.vassallomalta.com/Dates/British3.htm> accessed 15 July 2014 
313 The Commercial Partnerships Ordinance, ‘Chapter 168 of the Laws of Malta’ 
<http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8688> accessed 10 July 2014. This 
Ordinance was superseded in 1995 with the enactment of the Companies Act 
91 
Such historical factor consolidated the cultural and societal factors, such that English began to 
replace Italian, and it started to be considered an official language of the Maltese islands, 
together with Maltese, from the 1940s. The Maltese Parliament subsequently officially 
assented to English being made the official language of Malta when it gained its independence 
in 1964 with the enactment of the Constitution of Malta. 
 
3.3.1.1.2 Familiarity with the law 
Maltese legislators also made exclusive reference to the English legal system and its statutory 
enactment of the fiduciary duty of directors for one important legislative reason: legislators 
were becoming more familiar with the English legal system than the Italian legal system at that 
time, as shown by the Commission 1954 mentioned herein which decided to take into 
consideration the English system to enact the new provisions. They considered the English 
system to be more practical, even from an economic perspective. Indeed, the old provisions 
concerning limited liability companies in Malta, which included the implications for the 
fiduciary duty of directors within the interpretations of the law of mandate, were described by 
the Commercial Partnerships Law Reform Commission in 1954 as ‘totally inadequate and, in 
a way, are a serious handicap to the desired development of trade by companies’.314 The 
Commission was appointed by the government to revamp the commercial laws to ensure that 
Malta was regulated by the latest, most up-to-date laws. The Commission felt that the English 
legal system was more suitable for the advanced, sophisticated and complex financial and 
commercial environment that had been created over time,315 a Maltese sentiment fuelled by 
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London attaining the status of an important financial centre316 in the EU.317 The United 
Kingdom has been able to enact laws throughout subsequent years to accommodate the foreign 
exchange business,318 keeping pace with developments within the EU and more broadly. This 
sentiment, echoed by the 1954 Commission, continued to be strong in Malta even with the 
appointment of the 1992 Commission,319 which was appointed to enact the 1995 Companies 
Act, and later, with the specific enactment of Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995. 
 
However, the exclusive regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors could not take place in 
Malta before 2003 due to one main problem. Until then, specific statutory reference to the 
English legislation governing the statutory regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors proved 
to be difficult since this particular field of law was not regulated by any provisions of English 
statute law that could be easily accessed and referred to. Consequently, until 2003, the fiduciary 
duty of directors in Malta continued to be regulated primarily by the Italian civil legal system 
through the law of mandate, except for those scattered provisions in the 1962 Commercial 
Ordinance and the 1995 Companies Act. Nevertheless, as soon as the statutory regulation of 
the fiduciary duty of directors began to be discussed in the United Kingdom, Malta followed 
suit, which led to the enactment of Article 136 A of the Companies Act in 2003. There were 
no parliamentary debates on the matter nor any other prior discussions until its enactment, and 
the government of the day only stated in 2003 that it was time for a specific list of duties of 
directors to be enacted.320  
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3.3.1.2 The judicial factor and the influence of the prestige and economic factors 
The majority of the Maltese judiciary, which judicial factor considered as a factor in itself, felt 
the desire to make reference to the English legal system from the 1940s onwards, mainly due 
to the economic and prestige factors321 represented by the English legal system. Should the 
historical, cultural and societal factors, together with the familiarity with the law have been an 
influential factor for this part of the Maltese judiciary, these judges and magistrates would have 
undoubtedly opted to continue making reference to the Italian legal system rather than taking 
the time to understand another foreign legal system and looking into its unique judgments and 
legal opinions. Hence, most of the Maltese judiciary seems to have started to believe that it was 
only through providing better economic conditions that they could enhance their prestige. 
Historical, cultural and societal factors and their familiarity with the law would not lead to the 
same level of prestige among their peers, as a country would only consult another country if 
such consultation would result in a benefit (such as economic growth and the importance of 
democracy); therefore, the historical aspects of one country would only be a factor of interest 
up to a certain level. In fact, as President Santomero at the Pennsylvania Economic Association 
Annual Conference stated, a good economy ‘is an important goal for a democratic society’.322 
 
This economic and prestige influence can be triggered because the 1812 Maltese Commission 
provided that the Maltese judiciary can only be removed if a resolution was approved by a two-
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thirds majority of the House of Parliament.323 Thus a judge cannot be removed on the basis of 
a judgment that is incorrectly decided, but only if a serious concern arises such as proven 
misbehaviour or proven inability to perform the functions of their office, but no Maltese judge 
has ever been removed from office until to date on such grounds. Therefore, given this security 
of tenure, the judiciary has the freedom to apply those factors that they deem appropriate in 
accordance to their own judgment. Moreover, Professor Kevin Aquilina, one of Malta’s most 
authoritative legal academics, asserts that even if a magistrate or judge was to be removed from 
office, this motion could probably be challenged, and the judge or magistrate in question would 
have to be reinstated,324 suggesting even more that the Maltese judiciary is free to apply the 
factors it deems appropriate. If judges and magistrates are not removed from office, the Maltese 
Constitution provides a mandatory retiring age for the Maltese judiciary, currently set at sixty-
five. 
 
The prestige and economic factors led to this part of the Maltese judiciary to apply the English 
legal system, not only when clear provisions were enacted based on the English legal system, 
but also when they found themselves faced with a lacuna. In fact, this specific application was 
made in the Maltese judgment Giovanni Anastasi noe v Kaptan Serafino Xuereb M.B.E et,325 
in which the Court pointed out that Maltese law on the regulation of companies was still not 
inadequate, and that reference to other legal systems was therefore crucial, particularly to the 
English legal system, partly because, at that time, companies were being formed in a way that 
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was modelled on the English legal system, specifically on the Companies Act 1948. In this 
particular case, the company did not formulate the memorandum and articles of association as 
it should have. Accordingly, reference to the English legal system was able to shed light on the 
interpretation of the meetings of the board of directors and the company’s management. Other 
Maltese judges and magistrates also made continuous reference to English judgments in other 
judgments that they have delivered.326 
 
However, at the same time, there were other judges and magistrates who showed through their 
application and interpretation of statute law that they were still interested in the historical, 
cultural and societal factors, together with the familiarity with the law (vide Chapter 5). These 
judges and magistrates presumably were of the opinion that they could still achieve the desired 
economic and prestige factors through the application of the factors mentioned herein by 
continuing to apply the Italian legal system.  
 
 Conclusion 
The Maltese regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors has been influenced by two different 
legal systems: the Italian legal system and the English legal system. The Maltese legal system 
can, therefore, be regarded as an example of the legal transplantation principle. 
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To begin with, this fiduciary duty was applied within the terms of the mandate law for various 
legislative and judicial reasons. However, certain scattered provisions enacted in the Maltese 
Commercial Ordinance 1962 and the Companies Act 1995 started to change the Maltese legal 
system since they were derived from the English system. This shows that the factors that 
influenced the legislative and judicial Maltese legal system when applying the Italian legal 
system, were being adjusted to apply the English legal system, which influence continued until 
the enactment of Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995. It was also observed that 
the majority of the Maltese judiciary also began to blend the civil legal system and the common 
legal system from the 1940s. 
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Chapter 4. The fiduciary duty of directors under the Maltese 
statutory legal system 
 Introduction 
The underlying purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to examine the Maltese statutory 
provisions that have regulated the fiduciary duty of directors from the nineteenth century until 
now; and second, to assess the extent of the influence exerted by the Italian and English legal 
systems on the Maltese legal system through the manner in which the statutory provisions were 
enacted in Malta. 
 
This analysis will be divided into four parts. First, the definition of a director is closely 
examined to better understand which parties are required to abide by the statutory duties that 
have been enacted over the past two hundred years. Second, it will examine the mandate 
provisions as enacted under the Maltese Civil Code 1870, since mandate law was the first law 
to have regulated the fiduciary duty of directors and reference to Maltese res judicata 
judgments, together with the Italian and English statute law, shall also be made. The third part 
of this study will be based on an examination of Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 
1995 since this specific statutory Article has started to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors 
since 2003 while also making reference to Maltese res judicata judgments and to English 
statute law and judgments. The fourth section will delve into an analysis of Articles 1124 A 
and B as enacted in the Maltese Civil Code 1870 in 2004 to demonstrate that these two 
provisions apply to directors as ancillary to Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995. 
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Although res judicata judgments shall be continuously referred to throughout this chapter, the 
analysis will not deliberate over whether the Maltese Courts have rightly or adequately applied 
the appropriate statute laws; instead, it will simply refer to any interpretations provided by the 
Courts. Accordingly, the judgments do not deal only with cases between directors and 
companies; rather, any judgment that sheds light on the interpretation of a particular aspect of 
this fiduciary duty will be examined. 
 
 History of the definition of a director under the Maltese legal system 
Before examining the statutory fiduciary duty of directors under Maltese law, it is necessary to 
establish who is considered to be a director under this system. Although Maltese statute law 
has never delved into the different categories of directors, the basic categories of directors as 
arising under general corporate principles327 come to mind and the distinction between 
executive and non-executive directors shall therefore automatically be referred to. Executive 
directors are those concerned with the day-to-day management of the company,328 whereas 
non-executive directors are only relied upon when their particular expertise is needed, and are 
usually independent of the company.329 Both types can be further categorised as de jure 
directors, being those formally appointed to the board of directors. 
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Others, while not formally appointed as directors, may still fall under the definition of a director 
due to the influence they exert over the company, such as a manager of the company. These 
people can be considered de facto directors. A de facto director is, accordingly, a person who 
is not formally appointed to the board of directors,330 but who still exerts a certain degree of 
control over the company. 
 
It is also necessary to consider the possible appointment of shadow directors, whose function 
is to give instructions to the board of directors with respect to the management of the 
company.331 The difference between a de facto and a shadow director is that, while a de facto 
director only acts as they deem appropriate in line with their fiduciary duty, a shadow director 
may exert a degree of authority over the board of directors332 but still has to abide by their 
fiduciary duty. They can thus be considered to have a more onerous fiduciary duty than a de 
facto executive director, and may be held more accountable for their actions.333 
 
The Maltese legal system draws no distinction between categories of directors; consequently, 
any person who falls under any category of directors shall be required to abide strictly by the 
fiduciary duty in the same rigorous manner. Until the enactment of the Commercial 
Partnerships Ordinance 1962, the definition of a director was not explicitly stated in Maltese 
statute law, although this definition has always been implied indirectly in Article 62 of 
Ordinance XIII of 1857, the first such Ordinance in Malta. This Article states that the company 
shall be managed by directors, but does not explicitly delineate who shall fall into this category. 
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This approach is copied from the French Commercial Code 1807, which also did not provide 
a definition of a director, but it only provided under Article 31 that a company shall be 
administered by mandataries, either for payment or gratuitously, who shall be elected for a 
definite period of time and who may also be shareholders.334 Accordingly, if a person were to 
be appointed for instance  as a manager or a sales executive, but also performed the function 
of managing the company, such a person would be considered a director and would be obliged 
to abide by the fiduciary duty of directors. Consequently, it transpires that the function of the 
appointed person, rather than their title, is key. To clarify this statutory provision, recourse to 
Maltese judgments would have proven valuable, but the Maltese Courts were not presented 
with any case in which they were obliged to clearly define a director during the period in 
question. 
 
The same approach continued to be observed under Act XXX 1927 and the 1942 Act,335 neither 
of which contained an explicit definition of a director. Statutory provisions still continued to 
place emphasis on the function of the appointed person rather than their title. While this 
approach was copied from the Italian Commercial Code 1865336 and 1882337 rather than from 
the French Commercial Code 1807, these two Codes were themselves also influenced by this 
French Code, with the result that the French and Italian legal systems were consequently based 
on the same principles and reasoning. Once again, recourse to case law would have furthered 
the understanding of who should be considered a director, but this issue never came before the 
                                                 
334 Code de Commerce, <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k56629t/f10.item.zoom> accessed 3 December 2015 
335 Vide Article 155 
336 Vide Article 129 
337 Vide Article 121 
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Courts. Accordingly, the approach taken under the previous Ordinance should be reasonably 
considered to continue to apply. 
 
A minor revolution was nonetheless observed with the enactment of the Commercial 
Partnerships Ordinance 1962, in which an explicit definition of a director was included under 
the statute law for the first time; however, this still did not provide a clear understanding of 
who was deemed to fall under the category of a director, and emphasis on the function of the 
appointed person persisted. This amendment was initiated in May 1954, when the government 
of the day appointed a Commission to enact a new Code to regulate companies. This 
Commission recommended for the first time the inclusion of a broad definition of a director in 
the Commercial Partnerships Ordinance 1962. Accordingly, Article 2 of this Ordinance 
established that a ‘director’ includes ‘any person occupying the position of director by whatever 
name called’. This definition was inspired by Section 124 (4) of the United Kingdom’s 
Companies Act 1948, as also stated by the Commission itself,338 which provides that a ‘director 
and officer shall include any person in accordance with those directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act’. This broad definition makes it even clearer 
that only the function of the appointed person, rather than their title, is important in 
understanding whether or not a person shall be considered a director. As a result, people 
appointed, among others, as managers, sales executives or agents may fall under the definition 
of a director and thus be required to abide by the fiduciary duty attributed to directors if they 
enjoy any decision-making powers with respect to the management of the company. Once 
more, however, this non-exhaustive definition was never challenged before the Maltese Courts. 
                                                 
338 Report published by the Maltese Commission as found at the National Library Valletta, Malta 
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With the enactment of the Companies Act 1995, which superseded the 1962 Ordinance, the 
situation with respect to the statutory definition of a director did not change. Article 2 of the 
1995 Act defines a director as ‘any person occupying the position of director of a company by 
whatever name he may be called carrying out substantially the same functions in relation to the 
direction of the company as those carried out by a director’. Consequently the same approach 
continued to apply whereby any person who manages the company in any manner shall be 
considered a director. Again, this approach was influenced by the English legal system, 
specifically by the Companies Act 1985. This definition remains unamended to date, and again 
has not come before the Courts. 
 
 The statutory fiduciary duty of directors before 2003 
Until 2003, the fiduciary duty of directors was required to be exercised by directors under 
mandate law, meaning that the mandate provisions enacted under the Maltese Civil Code 1870 
were applied. The directors acted as mandataries in the interest of the company, which was 
considered to be the mandator. An indirect reference to the application of the mandate law had 
been in force from the time of the first Commercial Ordinance enacted in Malta, which included 
the word mandato in its Italian text. This Ordinance was influenced by the French Commercial 
Code 1807, which also makes reference to the applicability of the law of mandate under Article 
18.339 
 
                                                 
339 Vide Article 18 
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A clearer reference to the law of mandate in the Maltese Commercial Codes was introduced 
with the enactment of Article 3 of Act XXX 1927,340 which stated that the fiduciary duty of 
directors shall be regulated by the Code itself, by any commercial laws or mercantile customs 
in the absence of the Code, and in the absence of these laws or customs, by the Civil Code 
1870. During this time, however, neither the Commercial Code itself nor the commercial laws 
or mercantile customs regulated the fiduciary duty of directors, but by the time this Act was 
enacted, the Maltese Civil Code 1870 that lays down the mandate provisions had also been 
enacted. Consequently, the law of mandate as enacted under the Maltese Civil Code 1870 
began to be applied. Although Article 3 makes reference to civil law, only the law of mandate 
could be applied in this particular instance, as the law of mandate was the only body of laws 
enacted under the Maltese Civil Code 1870 that could regulate relationships in which one 
person commands another to carry out an act on their behalf. In fact, a mandate has always 
been defined by Maltese statute law (today, under Article 1856 of the Maltese Civil Code 1870) 
as a contract in which a person gives the power to do something for them to another. This 
provision was originally influenced by Article 1737 of the Italian Civil Code 1865,341 which in 
turn was influenced by Article 1984 of the French Civil Code.342 These provisions also shed 
light on the interpretation of the fiduciary duty, which in general terms shows the importance 
of directors as mandataries acting honestly and in the best interests of the company when 
applied to the corporate field of law, even though the statute law does not make any explicit 
reference to the relationship of trust created between these two persons. 
 
                                                 
340 Vide Article 3 
341 Italian Civil Code 1865, <http://www.notaio-busani.it/it-IT/codice-civile-1865.aspx.> accessed 5 December 
2014. The same definition is retained in the Italian Civil Code 1942 under Article 1703 
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The same approach continued to apply with the enactment of the Commercial Code 1942, 
which also included Article 3 of which lays down that in the absence of commercial law and 
custom usages, the fiduciary duty of directors shall be governed by the Maltese Civil Code 
1870. Since commercial law and custom usages were absent in their regulation of the fiduciary 
duty of directors, recourse to the Maltese Civil Code 1870 – specifically, to the law of mandate 
– had to be carried out once more. This particular Commercial Code also enhanced the 
reference to the law of mandate through the explicit introduction of the word ‘mandate’ in the 
English version in Article 156.343 
 
Ancillary reference to the law of mandate when regulating the fiduciary duty of directors 
continued to be resorted to with the enactment of the Commercial Partnerships Ordinance 1962, 
which again included Article 3. Article 3 states that: ‘Commercial partnerships shall be 
governed by this Act:- Provided that where no provision is made in this Act, the usages of trade 
or, in the absence of such usages, the Civil Law shall apply’. Consequently, mandate law, as 
enacted under the Maltese Civil Code 1870, continued to govern the regulation of the fiduciary 
duty of directors. However, with the enactment of this Ordinance, certain English influences 
were also included that regulate the interpretation and application of the fiduciary duty of 
directors. In these particular instances, the English legal system was to be referred to so as to 
facilitate interpretation of these particular provisions, and the law of mandate could not be 
resorted to in these particular regulated instances. Hence, this Ordinance introduced a situation 
in which the general fiduciary duty of directors was to remain regulated by the law of mandate; 
however, if a particular provision influenced by the English legal system was enacted in the 
Ordinance, such as the duty not to let personal interests conflict with those of the company, the 
                                                 
343 Vide Article 156 (1) 
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fiduciary duty in that particular circumstance would be read and construed  only in light of the 
English legal system, and not in light of the mandate law. 
 
The fact that the Italian civil legal system and the English legal system were being applied 
concurrently under the Maltese legal system might have been the reason for the abrogation of 
Article 3 of the Ordinance by the enactment of the Companies Act 1995, which superseded the 
1962 Ordinance. This resulted in a situation in which any explicit reference to the mandate law 
was totally removed.344 Hence, from 1995, any law could theoretically be applied to the 
regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors; however, the law of mandate, intertwined as it was 
with the English legal system, continued to apply until the enactment of Article 136 A in the 
Maltese Companies Act 1995 since as explained above, only the law of mandate, as interpreted 
through the English legal system should there be a loophole, could apply for the relationship 
between two persons wherein one person is acting for another person, which, therefore, could 
only apply to regulate the relationship between a director and the company. 
 
This fiduciary duty is composed of various sub duties. The separate limbs of the duty will now 
be reviewed by referring to the Maltese mandate provisions, to any Maltese res judicata 
judgments and to the Italian and English legal systems to better understand these sub duties as 
interpreted under the Maltese legal system.  
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4.3.1 Duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company 
Any mention of fiduciary duty inevitably brings to mind the good faith principle. A director is 
under an automatic duty to act in good faith and in the best of interests of the company, or he 
would be exposed to an allegation of fraud by the company, which was acting as the 
mandator.345 
 
However, this good faith principle was not explicitly laid down in any Maltese commercial 
Ordinance or Act that was passed to regulate commercial relationships until 2003; nor does it 
arise under the French, Italian or Maltese Civil Codes under the law of mandate. Mandate law 
under Article 1873 of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 only entails that a mandatary is bound to 
carry out the mandate with which they are vested, and does not specify whether a director is 
required to act in good faith when carrying out this mandate. 
 
It is also important to understand whether or not this good faith principle shall be applied by 
directors within the strict interpretation applied to the term ‘company’. That the director is the 
mandatary is never contested under Maltese law, but discrepancies arise with respect to the 
interpretation of the company as the mandator that enjoys a legal personality in its own right, 
which may be subjected to the interpretations imposed on it and to the understanding of the 
separate legal personality principle. Mandate law, as enacted under the Maltese Civil Code 
1870, does not clarify the identity of the mandator, since mandate law applies to any situation 
in which one person is acting on behalf of another. However, this can be resolved through an 
examination of the Maltese commercial ordinances and acts enacted throughout the years. The 
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first Maltese Ordinance, Ordinance XIII of 1857, enacted Article 69 with respect to limited 
liability companies or, as they were then known, anonymous partnerships. The Article states 
that: 
‘Previously to the making of any such enrolment, exhibition, or publication, the 
parties acting as managers of an anonymous partnership shall be liable, both 
personally and in solidum, for their operations to third parties’. 
 
Therefore, this provision presents the concept of the company being considered as the mandator 
that enjoys its own legal personality, such that the directors could no longer be held personally 
liable for any acts done on behalf of the company after its formation; rather, the company itself 
should be liable. This notion of the company being considered the mandator with separate legal 
personality is further enhanced through Article 63 of this Ordinance 1857.346 This approach 
seems to be most suitable because the French Commercial Code 1807, which influenced this 
Maltese Ordinance, explicitly states that an anonymous partnership is formed for a particular 
purpose and personal liability on the shareholders is avoided.347 Consequently, this French 
Commercial Code 1807 emphasises the separate legal personality enjoyed by the company, 
which in turn shows that the company is to be considered the legal mandator. During this 
period, a different approach was nonetheless taken by the Maltese Courts in Francesco Saverio 
Musu’ v Vincenzo Di Saverio Vella,348 in which it was established that the directors were to be 
considered as the mandataries of all the shareholders as a collective body, rather than of the 
company. This judgment did not make any reference to the company as the mandator through 
                                                 
346 Vide Article 63. The word ‘partnership’ in this Code refers to companies because this article was enacted with 
respect to the societe anonime, which were later re-defined as limited liability companies. 
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the application of the separate legal personality principle, but instead considered the 
shareholders as the legitimate mandators. 
 
Act XXX 1927 and the 1942 Act349 did not contest the statutory approach presented above with 
respect to the interpretation of the mandator with separate legal personality, and the same 
reasoning accordingly continued to apply. However, by the time these two acts were passed in 
Malta, the Italian Commercial Code 1865,350 as superseded by the Italian Commercial Code 
1882,351 had been enacted, and that these Codes influenced the Maltese approach. They were 
themselves influenced by the French Commercial Code. Accordingly, the first Maltese 
Commercial Code and these two other Maltese Commercial Codes were ultimately based on 
the same reasoning. Both Italian Codes made specific reference to the separate legal personality 
enjoyed by the company, thus suggesting that the company is interpreted to be the mandator, 
as in the French approach. Nevertheless, the Maltese Courts again challenged the statutory 
approach in Giovanni Anastasi noe v Kaptan Serafino Xuereb M.B.Eet.352 Here, although the 
Courts declared that the directors should be considered as mandataries of the company, it also 
held that the directors are mandataries of all the shareholders as one body. Therefore, when the 
Court made reference to the word ‘company’ at the beginning of its judgment, it was in reality 
(and erroneously) referring to the shareholders, not the company. 
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The statutory reasoning that the company is the legitimate mandator because it enjoys a 
separate legal personality from its shareholders and directors was again not challenged in the 
Commercial Partnerships Ordinance 1962,353 and was even clearly codified in the Ordinance 
itself for the first time. The 1954 Maltese Commission’s report, which led to the drafting of 
this Ordinance, considered that ‘the draft embodies the essential characteristic of commercial 
partnership, namely that it is a “persona” distinct and separate from its members, created by 
operation of law and arising out of a contract’.354 The notion of separate legal personality was 
consequently unequivocally reflected in and inserted under Article 3 (2) of the Act, which states 
that ‘A commercial partnership has a legal personality distinct from its members’. This 
Ordinance was, however, influenced by English developments, specifically by Section 1 of the 
United Kingdom’s Companies Act 1948, 355 and not by the Italian legal system. Accordingly, 
with the enactment of this Maltese Ordinance 1962, mandate law was being applied in 
accordance with the English influence, yet the same principle of the company enjoying a 
separate legal personality continued to be reinforced. The Maltese Courts also seemed to 
reinforce the principle of the separate legal personality by also opting to apply the mandate law 
as influenced by the English system as stated in John Veglio v Catherine Camilleri,356 who 
have departed from the previous approach taken by other Maltese judges and magistrates. The 
Court of Appeal, in fact, stated that a director has to act in the best interest of the company and 
a director shall only be considered as the mandatary of the company, without referring to the 
shareholders or other stakeholders. The same reasoning was again reached by the Maltese 
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Courts in Advocate Doctor Ian Refalo noe et v Albert David Boweck et,357 which also made 
reference to this previous judgment. 
 
The notion that the company shall be considered as the mandator which enjoys a separate legal 
personality from its shareholders and directors358 persisted even with the enactment of the 
Maltese Companies Act 1995 which was once again influenced by the English legal system, 
specifically by the 1985 Act.359 Consequently, mandate law and the separate legal personality 
of the company were again applied as solely influenced by the English legal system. This strict 
interpretation applied to the term ‘company’ was discussed in the Maltese judgment Video-On-
Line Limited v Ian Giles,360 whereby the Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that a director 
shall act solely in the best interest of the company, which enjoys a separate legal personality 
from its shareholder or any other stakeholder. The Court of Appeal even pointed out that this 
principle shall not be contested in any manner.  
 
Nevertheless, although one might believe the separate legal personality to be a very theoretical 
important principle, as also supported by statute law, to shield directors and shareholders from 
any acts of third parties, this principle does not apply in its true sense because shareholders 
have always enjoyed the right to change directors. Therefore, indirectly, shareholders would 
seem to control the directors, as they enjoy full power to choose the directors of the company, 
particularly when the shareholder and the director are the same person. As a general notion, 
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therefore, shareholders also control the acts of the company, as directors may well decide to 
act in the interests of the shareholders to ensure that they are re-elected. 
 
4.3.2 Duty to promote the wellbeing of the company and responsibility for its general 
governance and supervision 
At first glance, this aspect of fiduciary duty does not seem to arise from the Commercial 
Ordinances and Acts enacted in Malta until 2003. The reason for this is that from the very first 
enacted Ordinance of 1857, it was asserted that ‘the managing partners are under no other 
obligation than that of fulfilling the charge received’.361 The directors’ duty consequently 
seemed to be limited to what was expressly laid down in the mandate contract, such that 
directors could not carry out any other act that would promote the wellbeing of the company 
or reflect a general supervisory attitude. This approach was copied from the French 
Commercial Code of 1807, which influenced the Maltese Ordinance in question; Article 32 of 
this Ordinance states that the directors are only responsible for the execution of the mandate 
with which they are trusted. To further support this notion, Article 1987 of the French Civil 
Code stipulates that a given mandate may be special, and is therefore only given for a specific 
purpose. Nevertheless, when one delves further into the mandate provisions, it can be seen that 
this duty to promote the wellbeing of the company and to be responsible for its general 
governance and supervision is indirectly included under the mandate provisions. The same 
Article 1987 of the French Civil Code 1804 also entails that a mandate can be given for a 
general purpose, and that in such a case, the mandatary is responsible for the general 
governance of the mandate and can carry out any ordinary act so as to be in a position to execute 
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the mandate in the best manner possible. This is further specified by Article 1988 of the French 
Civil Code 1804.362 
 
This generic position presented by the 1857 Ordinance was not challenged with the enactment 
of the 1927 Act or in the 1942 Act.363 However, these two provisions were influenced by the 
Italian Commercial Codes 1865364 and 1882,365 even though these Codes were also based on 
the French Commercial Code 1807. One minor difference between these mandate provisions 
as enacted under the French and Italian legal system emerges in that the Italian provisions go 
a little further by also providing that a mandatary is required to act within those limits imposed 
by law; thus implying that the mandatary can only carry out those ordinary acts defined by law. 
The same reasoning as applied above continues to apply, as reinforced with the coming into 
force of the Maltese Civil Code 1870; this Code also provides that the mandate can be a general 
one in which the mandatary can carry out any ordinary act of administration to carry out the 
mandate in the best possible manner,366 as influenced by Article 1741 of the Italian Civil Code 
1865.367 This part of the fiduciary duty was embodied by the Maltese mandate provisions, as 
the Maltese Civil Code 1870 under Article 1865368 provided that the mandatary may, among 
other actions, institute proceedings and enforce judgments in the name of the company. The 
Maltese law of mandate also imposed a limitation on the mandatary, who could not sue or be 
sued when the mandator is in Malta. This provision therefore indicates that the company shall 
always be sued or sue in its own name, as it will always be in the Maltese territories. This latter 
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leniency was however not influenced by the 1865 and 1942 Italian Civil Codes, which did not 
provide for such tolerance. 
 
This Maltese approach described above changed substantially with the enactment of the 1964 
Ordinance369 and the 1995 Act,370 which stipulated that the broad discretion enjoyed by the 
directors shall only be exercised within the limitations imposed by law or by the Ordinance or 
Act itself. These two Commercial Codes provided that the directors may carry out any act 
except those prohibited by law or by the memorandum and articles of association of the 
company. It provided that certain acts shall be exercised by the general meeting only, and the 
memorandum and articles of association of the company provided for an objects clause that 
restricted the directors’ actions. Consequently, this part of the fiduciary duty seems to have 
been limited for the first time under the Commercial Codes. The broad discretion imposed by 
the mandate provisions thus did not automatically continue to apply under these two Maltese 
Commercial Codes. Such a restricted approach goes beyond the Italian Commercial Codes, as 
the Maltese system also included the restrictions that may be imposed by the memorandum and 
articles of association of the company, even if the law might otherwise have allowed such an 
act to be carried out by the directors. At the same time, the 1948371 and 1985372 English 
commercial acts also provided for restrictions on the actions of directors by enlisting an objects 
clause in the memorandum and articles of association. In this way, it is clear that the Italian 
and English interpretations were fully endorsed in the Maltese legal system. 
 
                                                 
369 Vide Article 121 (1) 
370 Vide Article 137 (2) 
371 Vide Article 2 (1) (a) 
372 Vide Article 2 (1) (c) 
114 
After establishing the definition of this duty, it is important to understand to whom this duty is 
owed. As discussed above, the separate legal personality of the company is key under the 
Maltese company law principles, but can only be applied within the stringent interpretation 
presented above. 
 
4.3.3 Duty not to make secret or personal profit without the consent of the company, 
nor make personal gain from confidential company information 
At first glance, this part of the fiduciary duty appears to pertain to one principle; in reality, 
however, it seems to be split into two under the law of mandate, namely into secret gains and 
personal gains. Although neither of these gains is explicitly listed in any commercial ordinance 
or act enacted in Malta until 2003, a distinction between these two seems to have arisen under 
the mandate provisions that regulated the fiduciary duty of directors. Mandate law seems to 
require that secret profits are exclusively prohibited, because the mandatary is bound to enlist 
any profits or gains made to the mandator; at the same time, however, a personal gain or profit 
is not prohibited, as long as the mandatary provides a detailed account of their acts and was 
still acting within the limits of the mandate when he procured such personal profits or gains. 
The reason for this approach is because Article 1993 of the French Civil Code 1804 and Article 
1747 of the Italian Code of 1865 provide that every mandatary shall render an account to the 
mandator and list all that he has received, even if he has received something during the course 
of the execution of the mandate that was not due to the mandator. This approach influenced the 
Maltese legal system, such that Article 1875 of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 provides that the 
mandatary, unless expressly exempted by the mandator, is bound to render an account to the 
mandator of the management of everything received by virtue of the mandate, even if what was 
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received was not due to the mandator. Nevertheless, some legal scholars373 contest the personal 
gain notion, contending that even if this profit or gain was accounted for, the mandatary would 
still be prohibited from making these profits or gains, because if the mandatary were to obtain 
such benefits, they would be breaching the trust relationship that they enjoy with the mandator, 
since the mandatary would also be using their powers for their own benefit. 
 
This interpretation of this duty seems to have been clarified with the enactment of the Maltese 
Commercial Partnerships Ordinance 1962, wherein an indirect limitation of this duty regarding 
the gain of personal profits was introduced; this provision was retained in the Maltese 
Companies Act 1995. Article 127374 of the Ordinance and Article 144375 of the 1995 Act 
prohibit loans to directors. A loan may lead to a personal profit for a particular director and at 
the same time also mean a debt for the company. These two specific provisions were not 
influenced by the Italian legal system, but were instead influenced by the 1948 and 1985 United 
Kingdom’s Acts; sections 190 and 330 of which also envisage this prohibition, respectively. 
This prohibition was specifically included under the English legal system because, in 1945, the 
Cohen Committee considered that it: 
‘is undesirable that directors should borrow from their companies. If the 
director can offer good security, it is no hardship for him to borrow from other 
sources. If he cannot offer good security, it is undesirable that he should obtain 
from the company credit which he would not be able to obtain elsewhere’.376 
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This prohibition was also extensively discussed in Champagne Perrier-Jouet SA v HH Finch 
Ltd,377 which concerned the indebtedness of James Lynch, a director of the defendant company. 
The Court defined a loan as a sum of money lent for a period of time, to be returned in money 
or money’s worth, and decided that a director is prohibited from making any gain or personal 
profit, whatever the circumstances. Nevertheless, there might be instances in which this 
provision cannot be fully enforced if the argument made by the director is that the payment 
made was not a loan but remuneration. This specific problem was discussed in depth in 
Currencies Direct Ltd v Ellis378 where the defendant, who was a shareholder and director of 
the claimant company, received sums in cash and other forms of payment for expenses he had 
incurred. The claimant company sought repayment of around £250,000 after the defendant was 
excluded from the company. However, Ellis argued that he had received the money as 
remuneration. The judge accepted the defendant’s argument and only awarded the claimant 
company around £45,000, which were acknowledged to have been given to the director as a 
loan and not as remuneration. 
 
Another important notion is that this duty seems to be directly addressed to the company, but 
the principle of the separate legal personality of the company can only be applied within certain 
limitations as discussed above. Consequently, as a concluding remark, it is noted that this duty 
shall be observed by directors for the benefit of shareholders and any other stakeholder. 
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4.3.4 Duty not to let personal interests conflict with the interests of the company 
Fiduciary duty also entails that a director of a company must avoid situations in which they 
have a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of 
the company. This duty had never been expressly included in the Maltese legal system until 
the English influences began to make themselves felt because the law of mandate entails only 
that the mandatary is required to execute the mandate; therefore, a mandatary may have a 
personal interest that conflicts with that of the mandator, but cannot be held in breach of this 
duty provided that they act within the parameters of the mandate.  However, at the same time, 
it might also be argued that this duty might seem to have been indirectly provided for from the 
first Maltese Commercial Ordinance under the law of mandate because it requires that the 
director, as mandatary, shall act in good faith and in the best interests of the company; and the 
mandatary could not be said to be acting in good faith if their personal interests were in conflict 
with the interests of the company. 
 
This conflict was resolved with the enactment of Article 128 (1)379 Commercial Partnerships 
Ordinance 1962, which codified this duty. This same duty is retained in the Maltese Companies 
Act 1995 under Article 145.380 Thus, from 1962 onwards, the mandatary was required to ensure 
that they were never in a position to let their personal interests conflict with those of the 
company. This new provision also introduced a new concept in that this provision necessarily 
superseded the law of mandate. As these two statutory provisions were influenced by Section 
199381 of the 1948 Act and Section 317 (1)382 of the 1985 United Kingdom’s Acts and not by 
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the Italian legal system, the English legal system can be seen to have displaced the Italian 
system. The English common law principle of the no-conflict rule, accordingly, also began to 
be applied. It has been applied strictly under English law since the nineteenth century, as can 
be observed from the judgment in Aberdeen Rly Co v Blaikie Bros.383 Blaikie Bros held a 
contract with Aberdeen Railway to make iron chairs at a specified price. Aberdeen Railway 
alleged a conflict of interest, arguing that they were not bound by the contract because, at the 
time of signing, the chairman of its board of directors, Sir Thomas Blaikie, was also the 
managing director of Blaikie Bros. Lord Cranworth LC upheld Aberdeen’s argument with the 
result that the claimant was thus deemed not to be bound by the contract. His Lordship held 
that: 
‘no one, having [a fiduciary duty] to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into 
engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or 
which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to 
protect’.384 
 
The same approach was again taken in the English case of J J Harrison (Properties) Ltd v 
Harrison.385 The defendant acquired property from the claimant company while holding the 
position of director of the claimant company. The defendant failed to inform the company of 
key information that could substantially affect the property’s value, such as that this property 
already had a building permit. The Court found the defendant liable for breach of his fiduciary 
duty. 
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The English judgments go a step further, as they hold that this duty shall be continuously and 
rigorously observed even upon the resignation of the director. Although this specific 
prohibition is not catered for under the Maltese law, the same approach would surely be applied 
by the Maltese Courts, since the Maltese statutory provisions were entirely influenced by the 
English legal system. The very rigid interpretation of this duty was applied in Island Export 
Finance Ltd v Umunna386 in which the claimant company had a contract with the Cameroon 
government to supply it with post boxes. Umunna, managing director of the claimant company, 
worked on the contract but resigned from his position of director following completion and 
subsequently entered into a similar contract in his own name. Island Export claimed damages 
due to this second contract. The Court held that Umunna was required to observe his fiduciary 
duty even after his resignation, and was therefore in breach of this part of the fiduciary duty. 
 
This duty also comes into play when, for instance, a director holds a directorship in two or 
more competing companies. Although the Maltese Courts have never had the opportunity to 
voice their opinion on this specific issue, reference to English judgments can assist in its 
interpretation. Initially, the English Courts did not strictly interpret this duty, with the 
consequence that such a circumstance was not considered to give rise to a conflict of interest 
on part of the directors, as interpreted in London and Mashonaland Exploration Co v New 
Mashonaland Exploration Co,387 Lord Mayo was a director and chairman of the claimant 
company who had never expressly or tacitly agreed not to become a director of a competing 
company. Four months later, another company with the same purpose as the claimant company 
was formed and Lord Mayo also sat on its board of directors. Chitty J dismissed the claimant’s 
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application, deciding that no conflict of interest had arisen. However, given the way the 
statutory provisions are drafted, if this same situation were to arise today, the person in question 
would surely be held in breach of this part of the fiduciary duty. 
 
The duty to avoid conflicts of interest also applies in those instances in which a director is 
appointed as the nominee of a particular shareholder. While this has also never been considered 
under the Maltese legal system, reference to the English approach may once again shed some 
light. In Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Limited v Meyer,388 it was held that a director 
must always ensure that his duty to avoid conflict of interest is never breached, whatever the 
situation. In this case, the claimant wanted to set up a new company, Scottish Textile & 
Manufacturing Co Ltd., to manufacture rayon. At the time, a license was only granted if 
experienced managers were part of the company. The claimant company held the majority of 
shares, and another three members, who were also directors of the claimant company, were 
appointed to the board of directors of the new company. The new company did not flourish, 
and the claimant company, as the major shareholder, decided to transfer this new business to a 
new subsidiary company. In this respect, Lord Denning stated that the nominee directors 
‘probably thought that ‘as nominees’ of the [majority shareholder] their first duty was to the 
[majority shareholder]. In this they were wrong’. 
 
The no-conflict rule, as interpreted under English common law and as codified in the 1962 
Maltese Commercial Ordinance and the 1995 Maltese Companies Act, shall also apply when 
there is an apparent conflict of interest; therefore, the duty shall not only apply in the event of 
                                                 
388 [1959] AC 324 
121 
an outright conflict of interest between the directors and the company, but the director is also 
obliged to consider whether their outside interests are likely to give others the impression that 
there may be a conflict. Again, reference to English judgments sheds light on the interpretation 
and application of this duty in this regard. In the English case Boardman v Phipps389 it was 
held that the term ‘possibly may conflict’ means ‘that the reasonable man looking at the 
relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case would think that there was a real sensible 
possibility of conflict’.390 
 
The significance of this duty is also expressed in the English common law approach to the no-
profit principle. This duty was clearly expressed in Bray v Ford.391 Bray was a governor of 
Yorkshire College, while Ford was the vice-chairman of the governors and the solicitor of the 
college. Bray sent Ford a letter, which was also circulated to others, alleging that Ford had 
breached his fiduciary position as vice-chairman of the college by making a profit as its paid 
solicitor. In this respect, Lord Herschell stated that: 
‘it is an inflexible rule of a court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary position, 
such as the respondent’s, is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled 
to make a profit, he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest 
and duty conflict’.392 
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Due to this prohibition, it means that it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage 
of the property, information or opportunity that has been diverted away from it by its directors. 
Although the mandate provisions do not stipulate the occurrence of such an event as a breach 
of duty, the English influences would lead to an inclusion of this prohibition by the Maltese 
Courts as will be demonstrated hereunder. A leading English judgment that has rigorously 
applied this principle is Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver.393 This case concerned a company, 
Regal, which owned a cinema in Hastings. Its directors wished to acquire two other local 
cinemas to facilitate the sale of the whole undertaking as a going concern. Consequently, these 
directors decided to form a subsidiary company to lease the other two cinemas, but the landlord 
was not willing to grant the subsidiary company a lease unless the directors agreed to take a 
personal guarantee or the paid-up capital of the subsidiary company was £5,000. However, it 
was not possible to raise more than £2,000 and the directors objected to the personal guarantee. 
Accordingly, the original scheme had to be altered. It was later decided that Regal would 
subscribe for 2,000 shares and that the outstanding 3,000 shares would be taken up by the 
directors and their associates. Later on, the whole undertaking was sold by way of takeover and 
the directors made a huge profit. The new owners of Regal appointed a new board of directors 
and the company brought an action against the former directors, claiming that they were 
required to account for the profit they had made on the sale of their shares in the subsidiary 
company. The House of Lords found in favour of Regal. The same approach was reached by 
the Maltese Courts in Victor Grima noe v Anthony Grech.394 Grech, the director of a company, 
enticed its customers to end their relationship with the company and enter into a new 
relationship with him. The Court held that Grech’s behaviour went against his duty, and he was 
therefore in breach. 
                                                 
393 [1942] UKHL 1 
394 09/12/1968 (Court of Appeal) 
123 
 
Once more, this duty seems to be addressed to the company; however, the principle of separate 
legal personality of the company shall only be applied within its own limitations, as analysed 
above. While it is true that these judgments make reference only to the company, the fiduciary 
duty of directors shall also be observed in light of the developments that have taken place in 
recent years (vide Chapter 2) and shall, therefore, be applied by directors in favour of the 
shareholders as a body and of other stakeholders. 
 
4.3.5 Duty not to use any property, information or opportunity of the company for 
personal or anyone else’s benefit or obtain any benefit from their power, except 
with the consent of the company at the general meeting or as permitted by the 
memorandum and articles of the company  
This part of the fiduciary duty is important, as it provides for an alternative approach to the 
other parts of the fiduciary duty detailed above. This is because the other parts may not be 
considered to be in breach if the actions in question were approved by the shareholders or 
provided for in the memorandum and articles of association of the company. 
 
From the very beginning, the law of mandate as arising out of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 has 
dictated only that directors, as mandataries, were under an obligation to act within the limits of 
the mandate. Accordingly, the directors should ask for permission from the company before 
using any property, information or opportunity for their own benefit if such permission was not 
expressly included in the mandate. This general approach was influenced by the French and 
Italian legal system. Nevertheless, should a director act in breach of his fiduciary duty, this 
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breach can be excused by the shareholders or if the memorandum and articles of association of 
the company permits such behaviour. This tolerance was, however, only codified in the 1962 
Maltese Ordinance with the enactment of Article 126 (1)395. This duty was again retained under 
Article 143 (1) of the 1995 Act. However, it is observed that these provisions were influenced 
by neither the Italian nor the English legal systems, and the Maltese legal system opted to apply 
tolerances to the no-conflict and no-profit principles since it possibly deemed this to be 
appropriate in the best interest of the company, especially for third parties that would have 
entered into negotiations with the company. However, one problem that may arise under the 
application of this duty is that the way such leniency was drafted seems not to apply the 
fundamental principle of the company having a legal personality that is separate from its 
shareholders, directors or any other stakeholder. This is because the company’s interests are 
not taken into consideration; rather, the shareholders can approve any of the director’s actions 
during a general meeting or to approve any changes that are deemed appropriate to the 
memorandum and articles of association of the company. Another issue is that if a director is a 
shareholder, the Maltese provisions do not exclude them from voting at that particular general 
meeting; this means that if a director is also the major shareholder or enjoys sympathy from 
the majority of shareholders, then the resolution will pass, which may be detrimental to the 
company. This approach might be interpreted that the influences exerted by the ESV principle 
(vide Chapter 2), and their incorporation into Maltese law long before the English legal system 
had begun to apply it, but this approach may be challenged under the Maltese system due to 
the fact that it had never been explicitly clarified. In fact, the interpretation of this duty was 
never challenged before the Maltese Courts, whose interpretations would have helped to 
resolve this matter. 
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As already noted, the English legal system does not provide for such leniency. However, the 
English Courts have discussed the possibility of such leniency arising. In fact, it may be stated 
that the Maltese legal approach was loosely applied by the English Courts in the English case 
Parker v McKeena.396 Although the importance of the general meeting to approve any act of 
the director was not directly referred to and reference to the company as a separate legal 
personality seems to have been made, albeit without interpretation of the extent to which this 
should be understood, it was demonstrated that any director shall only act if the principal also 
agrees, thus implying that in actual fact the directors were subjected to the shareholders’ 
approval either through a general meeting or if approved through the memorandum and articles 
of association of the company. McKeena was one of four directors of a joint stock bank, the 
National Bank of Ireland. In 1864, resolutions were passed to increase capital by issuing 20,000 
shares at £50 per share, which were to be offered first to existing shareholders in proportion to 
how many shares they already held. Any shares that were not bought would be thereafter sold 
by the directors at a £30 premium. Stock initially took almost 10,000 shares, but later declared 
that he could not take them all and asked the directors to relieve him. The directors took the 
shares and resold them at a profit. However, the Court concluded that an agent cannot make 
any profit without the consent of his principal and therefore decided against the directors. 
 
Some years later, the English Courts were once again faced with this dilemma in Industrial 
Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley,397 in which the same approach demonstrated above 
was again adhered to. Cooley was an architect employed as managing director of the claimant 
company, which formed part of IDC Group Ltd. The Eastern Gas Board had a lucrative project 
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pending to design a depot in Letchworth, and informed Cooley that it wanted to contract with 
him personally rather than with the claimant company. Consequently, Cooley informed the 
claimant’s board of directors that he was feeling unwell, resigned, and later undertook the 
design work on his own account. Nevertheless, Roskill J held him liable for the benefits he 
received and for breach of the duty to avoid conflict of interest without informing his principal. 
Notably, it was held that, although IDC Group Ltd did not stand a chance of getting the contract, 
Cooley still had a strict duty to protect the interests of the company and ought not to have 
allowed his interests to conflict with those of the company, unless the company had given 
consent. Quoting Parker v McKenna,398 Roskill J held that: 
‘no agent in course of his agency, in the matter of his agency, can be allowed 
to make any profit without the knowledge and consent of his principal; that the 
rule is an inflexible rule, and must be applied inexorably by this court, which is 
not entitled, in my judgment, to receive evidence, or suggestion, or argument as 
to whether the principal did not did not suffer any injury’.399 
 
4.3.6 Duty to exercise the powers they were given and not to misuse those powers 
This part of the fiduciary duty stipulates that the directors must act within the limits of the 
mandate, cannot exceed the powers conferred upon them and to also use these powers in light 
of the other parts of the fiduciary duty such that if for instance a director has the power to 
negotiate for and on behalf of the company, they must disclose any interest if there is any. From 
the very beginning, this duty was given great importance. Article 63 of Ordinance XIII of 
1857400 clearly points out that the directors shall only carry out those acts entrusted to them, 
and that the company shall, in its deed of formation or in any other agreement between the 
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directors and the company, clearly point out those acts that can be carried out by the director. 
The 1927 Act and the 1942 Act did not challenge the approach taken under the Ordinance. 
 
However, these Articles must be interpreted in light of the law of mandate, and to Articles 1987 
of the French Civil Code, as it was used to regulate the first Ordinance in Malta. This Article 
states that a mandate can be either special, i.e. enlisting a certain particular act or specific acts 
only, or general, i.e. can include any act. In this regard, reference to Article 1988 shall also be 
made which although  this Article  limits the application of the general mandate by specifying 
that it can only be exercised in terms of the ordinary acts of administration, these acts may also 
lead to the mismanagement of the company, because (for example) the management of a bank 
account is categorised as an ordinary act.401 Consequently, although it is true to say that acts of 
an extraordinary nature are still required to be explicitly included in any such agreement, acts 
of an ordinary nature are still considered to be of the utmost importance, although these are not 
regulated with the same rigour. These two provisions influenced the drafting of Articles 1740402 
and 1741403 of the 1865 Italian Civil Code, which in turn influenced Articles 1862404 and 
1863405 of the mandate provisions arising under the Maltese Civil Code 1870. Sir Adrian 
Dingli, in his notes on the Civil Code,406 also observes that when a mandate is given in general 
terms, it shall only include ordinary acts of administration, while extraordinary acts of 
administration shall be excluded altogether unless expressly included in the memorandum and 
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articles of association of the company or in any other agreement that regulates the relationship 
between directors and the company. 
 
The importance of the directors abiding by such a duty has been demonstrated by the Maltese 
Courts in various judgments. The first was Francesco Saverio Musu’ v Vincenzo Di Saverio 
Vella.407 Some years later, the Maltese Courts were again faced with the interpretation of this 
duty, particularly as it concerns the interpretation of a general mandate, in Giovanni Anastasi 
noe v Kaptan Serafino Xuereb M.B.E et,408 in which the Court applied the definition of the 
general mandate as presented by the statutory provision of the Maltese Civil Code 1870. In 
fact, the Court held that a general mandate implies that directors can only carry out ordinary 
administrative acts, unless the memorandum and articles of association of the company indicate 
otherwise. Thus, in this case, the Courts held that the winding up and liquidation of the 
company was a decision that could only be made by the shareholders and is therefore classified 
as an extraordinary act, unless the memorandum and articles of association specifically allowed 
this decision to be made by the directors. The decision to liquidate was therefore declared null 
in this particular instance, since the directors had made it. Regrettably, the Courts could only 
express their view on the act in question and were not asked to provide an interpretation of 
those ordinary acts that could be carried out by the directors alone. 
 
The importance of acting within the given mandate and to specify any additional duty that may 
be carried out by directors was maintained with the enactment of the 1962 Ordinance and the 
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1995 Act. However, a new approach seems to have been taken in the 1962 Ordinance. Article 
121 (1) of the 1962 Ordinance409 and Article 137 (3) of the 1995 Act410 provided for an 
approach in which, instead of enlisting each specific act that could be carried out by directors, 
the directors could carry out any act unless it was prohibited by law or by the memorandum 
and articles of association of the company. Nevertheless, this new liberal statutory approach 
does not seem to have been widely embraced by the Maltese Courts, which voiced their opinion 
as to the importance of specifically listing any permitted act that may be carried out by the 
directors. This approach was echoed in the Maltese case Catherine, wife of Joseph Galea v 
Milica Micovic noe.411 The claimant alleged that there had been a promise of sale dated 25th 
February 1991, which had been extended by a note dated 31st March 1993. This promise of 
sale was an agreement between the defendant company and Albert Vella, in which the 
defendant company promised to sell and transfer the title of a property to Albert Vella, and he 
was then to transfer it to the claimant. The claimant therefore asked the Maltese Courts to 
oblige the defendant company to enter into a contract with the claimant herself, rather than 
through Albert Vella, so that this transfer of title could take place. The defendant company 
argued that the note of the promise of sale that had been entered into by Vella and the company 
had not been signed by both directors of the company, as required by the memorandum and 
articles of association, and that the promise of sale had thus not been legally extended, meaning 
that the parties were consequently no longer bound by the promise. At first instance, the Court 
accepted the defendant’s argument, going so far as to state that, as he was the defendant 
company’s auditor, Vella should have been aware that the promise of sale and any extension 
thereto must be signed by both directors. . Accordingly, the Court held that the promise of sale 
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had not been validly extended by law as it was not signed by both directors. On appeal, the 
appellate Court restated that any act that could be carried out by the directors was required to 
be explicitly included in the memorandum and articles of association of the defendant 
company. To further emphasise the significance of this part of the fiduciary duty, the Court 
made reference to the Maltese judgment Salvatore Schembri v Salvatore Gauci,412 which fully 
embraced this principle. Reference to Palmer was further made to substantiate the principle, 
who states that ‘the directors of a company are bound by the Articles. Their powers are to be 
derived from the articles and they must observe any restrictions imposed upon them by the 
latter’.413 
 
This clarification leads to the rationale that, whenever a director acts outside the scope of those 
acts entrusted to them, or extends the limitations of such acts, they cannot impugn those acts 
to the company, and the director is consequently personally liable for those acts towards third 
parties. The 1857 Maltese Ordinance did not expressly provide for this personal liability, but it 
seems reasonable to conclude that, since directors are required to carry out only those acts 
within such limitations as are enlisted in their mandate, any act that goes beyond that mandate 
should be personally answered for by the directors. Nevertheless, there is also the principle that 
the company may decide to ratify this act to be bound by it; however, the Maltese Ordinance 
was silent on this ratification process. Reference to the law of mandate was thus necessary. 
Because the Maltese Civil Code 1870 was not yet enacted, reference to the French Civil Code 
1804 was made, which outlines a ratification process under Article 1998. This process can take 
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place either tacitly or expressly. This was embraced by the Maltese Courts, which clearly 
expressed their views about the significant ratification principle in Coleiro v John Ellis.414 
 
The principle of personal liability of directors is also indirectly retained in the 1927 Act. 
However, the ratification principle that the company is required to carry out now arises under 
the Maltese Civil Code 1870 under the mandate provisions, specifically under Article 1880 
(2),415 as influenced by Article 1752416 of the Italian Civil Code 1865, which in turn was 
influenced by the French Civil Code 1804. The ratification principle was once again adopted 
by the Maltese Courts in John La Rosa noe v Carmelo Galea.417 
 
However, a drastic change was observed with the enactment of the 1942 Maltese Companies 
Act, as it introduced for the first time the personal liability of directors whenever they exceed 
their powers.418 At the same time, the ratification principle continued to apply under the law of 
mandate, as provided by the Maltese Civil Code 1870 under Article 1880 (2)419 and as 
influenced by the Italian legal system. 
 
An express provision regulating the personal liability rule of the directors was, however, again 
abrogated with the enactment of the 1962 Ordinance, although the ratification principle was 
retained. However, as the 1954 Commission420 pointed out, the English legal system was 
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referred to when the new company law statutory provisions were enacted, and that the English 
common law approach was therefore resorted to when considering the ratification principle 
rather than the Italian system. Nevertheless, it is noted that the ratification principles under the 
civil and common legal system are analogous and applied with the same rigidity; accordingly; 
both place the same degree of burden on directors. This ratification principle was discussed at 
length by the Maltese Courts in Advocate Doctor Anthony H Farrugia as a special mandatary 
of the minors Fabienne Carbone and Rowan Carbone v Vernie Carbone for and on behalf of 
various companies and Agostino sive Winston Carbone, together with Advocate Dr. Eric 
Mamo, for and on behalf of other companies.421 The claimant alleged that any contract or 
agreement entered into and signed by one of the defendants, Agostino sive Watson Carbone, 
on behalf of various companies should be declared null and void, as the memorandum and 
articles of association of the company did not allow him to enter into such agreements, and the 
agreements were also never ratified by the company. The agreements in question all concerned 
loans and other banking facilities that had been given to various companies by Mid-Med Bank 
Limited, a bank today known as HSBC Bank Malta plc. While the First Hall Civil Court 
decided against the claimant, the Court of Appeal made reference to the Maltese judgment 
Salvatore Schembri v Salvatore Gauci422 in which the Court had held that the directors of a 
company are bound by the company’s memorandum and articles of association. It also made 
reference to statute law, finding that if an act does not fall within the remit of the director’s 
powers, ratification should be carried out in accordance with Article 1880 (2) of the Maltese 
Civil Code 1870 in which as in this particular case, tacit acceptance may arise. Hence, although 
the English influences had begun to make themselves felt, the Italian influences (through the 
application of the mandate provisions) were still being applied by the Maltese Courts. The 
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Court of Appeal, however, went further, by making reference to Professor Andrew Muscat’s 
assertion whereby he argues that it is customary to include a clause to state that the directors 
may carry out any other act deemed necessary to further the company’s objective to ensure that 
ratification shall not be required for every act carried out by a director that goes beyond his 
powers. 
 
The same approach and interpretation taken under the 1962 Ordinance were again retained with 
the coming into force of the 1995 Maltese Companies Act. In the Maltese judgment  Francis 
Busuttil and Sons Limited v Christopher Apap and Reflex Computer Systems (Malta) 
Limited,423 the judges reached the conclusion that ratification shall take place for the company 
to be bound by any act done by a director that is beyond his powers. The Court of Appeal made 
reference to the mandate provisions and also noted that should ratification not take place, the 
director would then be personally bound by that act.  
 
The importance of ratification was again discussed by the Maltese Courts in Deirdre and John 
Cachia v Gaba Diamonds Company Limited.424 The claimants alleged that they had entered 
into a private agreement with the defendant company in 1996. The defendant company had 
been given, under a lease, premises in Msida. The upshot of the action was that the claimants 
alleged that the defendants had terminated the lease without notice, resulting in damages being 
suffered. The defendant company responded that one of the two directors alone did not have 
power to solely sign the private agreement in question; instead, such an agreement had to be 
signed by both as clearly provided by the memorandum and articles of association of the 
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claimant company. The First Hall Civil Court did not make specific reference to the ratification 
principle as regulated by the law of mandate, but still held for the defendant because the lease 
had not been signed by both directors of the defendant company, as was specifically required 
by the memorandum and articles of association of the claimant company. 
 
The importance of tacit ratification was again referred to by the Maltese Courts in Carmen 
Aquilina et v Edgar Ellul.425 In this case, the Maltese Courts held that the English approach to 
tacit ratification was to be adopted, although the same interpretation arises under the law of 
mandate. The Maltese Courts specifically decided that, in the case of a tacit ratification, there 
shall be two prerequisites: firstly, whoever is consenting to such ratification is fully aware of 
what they are doing; secondly, any person involved is aware of all the effects of that act of 
ratification. 
 
There may be other circumstances in which a director acts within the limitations of the mandate, 
but does not explicitly show that they are acting on behalf of the company. In such a case, a 
director is also automatically personally liable. This is not regulated by the statute law of 
mandate, nor by any Maltese Commercial Ordinance or Act. However, Maltese case law has 
dealt with this situation and can therefore be relied on to illuminate the significance of the 
application of this limitation. The first judgment to deal with this notion was in 1914. Before 
then, one might have expected that, if an act fell within the limitations of the mandate, the 
company would be bound by that act even if the director did not expressly show that he was 
acting on behalf of the company, since the director could have been acting within the limits of 
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the mandate. However, in Salvatore Coleiro v John Ellis426 the Maltese Courts made it clear 
that if an express announcement was not made by the director to the third party, the company 
should not be bound by that act, even if that act fell within the limitations of the mandate given. 
The Court held that a mandatary is freed from their obligations only under three circumstances: 
if the mandatary manifests his power of attorney; if the mandatary at least declares that they do 
not want to be personally liable; or when the third party is aware of the mandator’s presence. 
Although fifty-two years passed until the same question was again raised before the Maltese 
Courts, the same principle was again applied whereby in Emmanuele Farrugia v Giovanna 
Lughermo,427 the Court stated once again that if the mandatary does not explicitly show that 
they are acting on behalf of another person, one must presume that they are acting in their own 
name.428 This same principle was again rebutted, as presented in the judgments John Vella noe 
v Anthony Vella et429 and Anthony Caruana et v John Magro et, among others.430 It was held 
in these latter two judgments that when a person contracts in his own name, he cannot then 
subsequently state that he is contracting in the name of another person or in the name of a legal 
person that is separate and distinct from its shareholders. 
 
Once more, the mandator in this case shall be interpreted as including the company, as 
represented by the body of shareholders through the interpretations provided above. 
 
                                                 
426 4/2/1914 (Court of Appeal) Vol. XXI.i.93 
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429 03/12/1999 (Court of Appeal) 
430 06/10/1999 (Court of Appeal) 
136 
 The statutory fiduciary duty of directors after 2003 
After 2003, the statutory fiduciary duty of directors began to be solely regulated by Article 136 
A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995. This Article lists different general duties, all of which 
can be grouped under one duty – the fiduciary duty431 – except for the duty of care, skill and 
diligence. Although the Maltese legislators made no explicit assertions to this effect, this 
provision was influenced by the English legal system for two reasons. Firstly, the wording of 
the Maltese provision is very similar to the sections in the United Kingdom Companies Act 
2006. Secondly, when one considers the timeframe of the enactment of the Maltese provision 
(the Maltese provision passed in 2003, while the English developments with respect to the 
fiduciary duty of directors were taking place in the late 1990s and early 2000s), it can be seen 
that the Maltese provision was highly influenced by the English developments. Nevertheless, 
differing interpretations under these two legal systems arise in certain instances because the 
Maltese  provision was passed and in force before the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006. 
 
The statutory fiduciary duty of directors under the Maltese Companies Act 1995 was endorsed 
in Advocate Doctor Jean C Farrugia noe v Aqua Oasis Limited (C 41157) et,432 in which the 
Maltese Courts held that directors are strictly bound by such duty. The claimant, who held 50% 
of the shares in the defendant company, claimed that the company was being unilaterally 
managed by the other defendant, Dorte Rickert, who held the other 50% of the shares in said 
                                                 
431 David Cabrelli, Presentation for Universita’ Bocconi on the Reform of the Law of Directors’ Duties in UK 
Company Law, The Edinburgh Law School 
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company. The claimant claimed that Rickert was not properly managing the company, and that 
her actions were affecting the claimant as a shareholder. The company was formed with the 
aim of taking over the administration and operation of a dive centre that was to be transferred 
from a Danish company in the name of the claimant. He also claimed that he had financed the 
new defendant company, either personally or through his Danish company. The claimant 
started to suspect that mismanagement was occurring in the new company and asked for a 
shareholders’ meeting, but this was never held, and the claimant was never able to get hold of 
the information that he was requesting. He claimed that Rickert had unilaterally decided, as 
sole director of the defendant company, to re-transfer the dive centre to another company 
without having obtained approval at a shareholders’ meeting. The Courts reached the 
conclusion that the defendant has failed to abide by her duties under Article 136 A of the 
Maltese Companies Act 1995 when the re-transfer of the dive centre to the new company took 
place; thus, she was held to be in breach of her fiduciary duty. 
 
4.4.1 Duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company 
Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 provides, as a first rule, that ‘[a] director of 
a company shall be bound to act honestly and in good faith in the best interests of the company’. 
This is considered the core duty that should be observed by directors,433 and is therefore 
categorised as the most significant part of the fiduciary duty of directors. This part of the duty 
entails that a director must act genuinely and in the best interests of the company. 
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To fully comprehend the interpretation of this duty under the Maltese legal system, reference 
to the English legal system shall be made, since Maltese legislators decided to enact this 
particular duty after considering that it was also very noteworthy in the English legal system, 
as analysed above. In fact, this duty is very similar to that stipulated under the English legal 
system. Section 172 of the United Kingdom’s Companies Act 2006 refers to ‘the duty to 
promote the success of the company’, which can also be referred to as the no-fettering principle. 
The first part of Section 172 very much resembles the Maltese approach, as it lays down that 
‘[a] director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely 
to promote the success of the company’. Consequently, both statutory provisions provide that 
a director must act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. 
 
On closer inspection, however, one can see two differences between the Maltese and English 
provisions. First, from a terminological point of view, the Maltese provision speaks of ‘well-
being’ and the United Kingdom Act of ‘success’. ‘Well-being’does not necessarily include 
success, but rather to efficient operation whereas success implies that such person shall obtain 
a positive result from a particular action, as both terms are defined by the Oxford Dictionary.434   
Second, the English position makes it evident that the subjective element of this duty is placed 
on the director, since the director is required to act in good faith and in the way they believe is 
best; by contrast, the Maltese provision does not explicitly make reference to the subjective 
approach, therefore implying that an objective approach is sought wherein a director must act 
in the way that any reasonable person would act in the same position. This subjective approach 
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was given great prominence by the United Kingdom government during the 1990s and 2000s 
and was considered a crucial element for the specific wording used in this provision.435 Such 
wording was used to codify the long-standing common law position, which also puts emphasis 
on the subjective element enjoyed by the directors and holds that the company directors’ 
decisions cannot be questioned by any court if it is shown that they acted in good faith and in 
the company’s best interests. This common law approach was presented in the English case 
Re: Smith and Fawcett Ltd.436 Smith and Fawcett formed a company together and article 10 of 
the articles of association provided that the directors enjoyed the discretion to opt not to register 
a share transfer. After Fawcett’s death, Smith applied this provision of the company’s articles 
of association and declined to register the share transfer in the name of Fawcett’s heirs. Lord 
Greene MR acknowledged that ‘A director must exercise their discretion bona fide in what 
they consider (not what the court does) is in the best interests of the company and not for a 
collateral purpose’. The same approach was again applied by Parker J in Regentcrest plc v 
Cohen:437 whereby he said that 
‘The question is not whether, viewed objectively by the court, the particular act 
or omission which is challenged was in the interests of the company; still less 
is the question whether the court, had it been in the position of the director at 
the relevant time, might have acted differently. Rather, the question is whether 
the director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the interests of the 
company. The issue is as to the director’s state of mind’.438 
                                                 
435 Explanatory notes prepared by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and published along with the Act, 
which express the Government’s intention that ‘the decision as to what will promote the success of the company, 
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Consequently, it is an established principle that if directors act in good faith and in the best 
interest of the company, they can never be held to be in breach of this duty, even if they make 
a mistake or act unreasonably, so long as the company’s best interests are preserved. 
Nevertheless, due to its subjective application, this duty may be prone to abuse in the sense that 
what one director considers to be in good faith and in the best interest of the company might 
not be considered so by another, with the result that the company’s best interests might not 
always be fully protected. Indeed, Gower and Davies observe that it is difficult to show that 
directors have broken this fiduciary duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company, and that directors are usually found in breach of this fiduciary duty only ‘in egregious 
cases or cases where the directors, obligingly, have left a clear record of the thought processes 
leading up to the challenged decision’.439 The Courts have displayed willingness to interfere 
with the directors’ decision only when it is evidently observed that the best interests of the 
company are not taken into consideration. This strict approach was clearly adopted in the 
English judgment Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd.440 The 
defendant company was set up to manage three flats in London. Mr Palmer and Eaton Bray 
Ltd owned one share each in this company, but had a history of not getting along. The claimant 
company, owned by Gwyer, owned one flat on the ground floor; Mr Palmer and Eaton Bray 
Ltd also owned a flat each. Gwyer nominated his builder to the board of directors of the 
defendant company. An agreement was ultimately reached between Gwyer and Palmer and a 
resolution was passed in favour of the agreement. However, Eaton Bray Ltd sued, arguing that 
the resolution was ineffective as there had been a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good 
faith and in the best interest of the company. The Court accepted the argument presented by 
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Eaton Bray Ltd, and found that the best interests of the company were not protected, since the 
directors had acted in their own best interests rather than those of the company. 
 
The same strict approach was again applied in the English case Re W & M Roith Ltd.441 
However, in this judgment, the Court went even further, holding that it had a duty to interfere 
when the directors, despite not acting with conscious dishonesty, still might not be taking the 
best interests of the company into consideration. In these instances, the Courts may find the 
directors to be in breach of their fiduciary duty since the best interests of the company would 
not be protected. Roith was a director of the defendant company who entered into a service 
contract with his company on the basis that, upon his death, his wife would be entitled to a 
pension. However, the Courts found that Roith had not acted in the best interests of the 
company in this instance, and thus held that the transaction was not binding on the company, 
even though Roith did not act with conscious dishonesty. 
 
As opposed to the English system, the Maltese statutory provision seems to make reference to 
the objective approach when interpreting the good faith principle as regards directors; in reality, 
however, the Maltese Courts’ reluctance to interfere with the directors’ decisions seems to be 
due to their approach of having opted to apply the subjective element, since it was only recently 
that the Maltese Courts began to question directors’ decisions. In view of this, much like under 
the English legal system, the Maltese Courts interfered only when the best interests of the 
company proved not to have been protected to the required extent. The first case to have dealt 
with the application of this fiduciary duty was Emanuel Chircop pro et noe v Carmel sive 
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Charles Busuttil et.442 In this case, the claimant was holder of half of the shares of Continental 
Postform Ltd, while the defendant, Busuttil, held the other half. They were also the only two 
directors of this company. Chircop alleged that Busuttil was in charge of the company’s 
financial position and that he, Chircop, had realised that mismanagement was taking place. 
Regrettably, the defendant did not bring forward an argument and the only defence argument 
was that the claimant’s action should not be proceeded because the company itself should have 
been the claimant. However, although the company was not the claimant itself, the Court still 
held that the claimant’s action shall stand and decided that any director of a particular company 
has a duty to ensure that any other director acts in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company, and that in cases of breach of this fiduciary duty, a director may bring an action 
against another director to protect the company’s interests. 
 
Two years later, the Maltese Courts again unequivocally held in Oreste Cilia pro et noe v 
Daniel Cilia pro et noe et443 that directors are bound to act in good faith and in the best interests 
of the company, and that the Courts are bound to interfere when the company’s interest is not 
protected to the extent that it should be. The claimant, Oreste Cilia, alleged that he was a 
shareholder and a director of the defendant company, Cilia Products Limited. The other two 
directors and shareholders were Daniel and Maurice Cilia, who were joined to the action. 
Oreste Cilia had agreed with the other defendants that he would work fifty hours every two 
weeks for the company, whereas the other defendants were to work eighty hours every two 
weeks for the same company. However, Oreste Cilia later unilaterally decided to start working 
eighty hours every fortnight, a decision to which the other two defendants objected. Oreste 
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Cilia also discovered that the other two defendants were taking sums of money from the 
company’s funds as compensation, and had also given compensation to other employees 
without the approval of the board of directors. The First Hall Civil Court found that a director 
is required to abide by their fiduciary duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company, which enhances the relationship of trust between the directors and the company. The 
Court found that directors must put the company’s interests at the core of every decision they 
take, and upheld the claimant’s argument that he had every right to be present for board of 
directors’ meetings as a duly appointed director to ensure that the best interests of the company 
were protected. 
 
The importance of this fiduciary duty was again discussed by the Maltese Courts a few months 
later in Advocate Doctor Jean C Farrugia noe v Aqua Oasis Limited (C 41157) et.444 In this 
case, the Maltese Courts went one step further in the interpretation of this part of the fiduciary 
duty: they specifically stated that even though the defendant was the only director of the 
defendant company, Aqua Oasis Limited, she still had the duty to act in good faith and in the 
best interests of the company. The Maltese Courts found that the defendant was in breach of 
this duty when she unilaterally and without prior approval of the shareholders decided to 
transfer the business of the dive centre to another company. 
 
The significance of the fiduciary duty of directors to act in good faith and in the best interest 
of the company was discussed again in Architect Raymond Vassallo pro et noe et v Anthony 
Parlato Trigona et.445 In this case, two of the defendants voted during a board of directors’ 
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meeting for a payment to be vested in them. The Court held that the defendants’ behaviour as 
directors was neither in good faith nor the best interests of the company. Despite this, the 
defendants were acquitted because the claimants did not properly file the action. 
 
Again, the same strict interpretation of this fiduciary duty was confirmed in Jane Chircop et v 
Robert Mizzi pro et noe et.446 The claimants alleged that Mizzi and David Mifsud used to work 
as property consultants with the company Sapphire Real Estate Services, which was managed 
by Chircop. Mizzi, Mifsud and the other employees acquired a property and decided to transfer 
it to a second company R&D Developments Limited, which was wholly owned and managed 
by Mizzi and Mifsud, instead of transferring it to Sapphire Real Estate Services. Mizzi and 
Mifsud never registered the other employees as shareholders and directors of the company in 
question. Eventually, R&D Developments Limited transferred its rights to R&S Developments 
Limited, a company incorporated on 10th August 2007 by Mizzi, who was also the sole 
shareholder and director. The Court held that Mizzi and Mifsud had not complied with their 
duty to act in good faith447 when they did not transfer the acquired property to the claimant 
company.  
 
Such duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company is, however, statutorily 
limited in its application under the English legal system, as opposed to the Maltese legal system 
and to the subjective element that is at the core of the interpretation of this duty, under Section 
173 in the Companies Act 2006, which is entitled as the duty to exercise independent judgment. 
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This provision, in fact, entails that directors are bound to act in the best interests of the company 
without feeling any pressure to decide in one manner rather than another, but are nevertheless 
bound to act in accordance with the company’s constitution or any agreement that is in force, 
and not by what they subjectively perceive to be in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company. This exception to this fiduciary duty of directors solidified the English Court’s 
approach, as was discussed at great length in Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, 
Television and Allied Technicians.448 This case concerned two managing directors of a film 
company who applied for a declaration not to be eligible to join the defendant association, as 
they claimed that they were only performing management functions and were therefore not 
bound to join. The defendant association, however, claimed that the two directors were still 
required to be part of its association under a trade union agreement. The Courts decided that 
this part of the fiduciary duty should be observed to protect the company, and not the directors, 
and that their membership was to protect the company and its employees. 
 
This prohibition was again considered by the English Courts, even before the official enactment 
of the statutory provision, in Thorby v Goldberg.449 In this case, the directors agreed to allot 
shares in a particular way within a wider restructuring scheme. However, they failed to abide 
by the scheme and even claimed that such agreement breached the no-fettering rule. As a 
consequence, an action was filed to force them to honour the agreement. The Court decided 
against the directors, declaring that when they had entered into this agreement, they had surely 
taken into consideration the best interests of the company; therefore, the agreement was valid 
and should be honoured by the directors. 
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Again, the strict application of the fiduciary duty of directors to compel them to act in 
accordance with any agreement they might have reached, if it is proven that they have acted in 
the best interest of the company, was applied in Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates plc.450 
This case concerned an agreement entered into between the parties, in which the claimant 
bound itself not to oppose any future applications for planning permissions that the defendant 
might make; in return, the claimant was paid a substantial amount of money. However, the club 
later wanted to rescind this agreement and tried to argue that its board of directors had fettered 
their discretion and not acted in the best interest of the company. The Court found for the 
defendant, asserting that the claimant’s directors had entered into the agreement after having 
assessed the benefits to the company and after having exercised their fiduciary duty properly. 
Accordingly, the club remained bound by the agreement, which was to be honoured. 
 
However, at around the same time, the English Courts made it clear that any agreement reached 
by the directors should still take the best interests of the company into account; otherwise, the 
Courts may still find a particular agreement to be void, as was shown in Kregor v Hollins.451 
Hollins invested a sum of money and agreed to pay remuneration to Kregor to act as his 
nominee director. The Court held that, even though Kregor had been appointed by Hollins, he 
was under strict obligation to act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, not 
in the sole interest of Hollins. The Court thus annulled the agreement reached between the two. 
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Nevertheless, these statutory provisions shall not hinder any director who might prefer to seek 
professional advice to be better guided to fully protect the best interests of the company. Lord 
Goldsmith, then Attorney General, clearly felt that directors should be able to seek any advice 
they wish, without fearing that they are contravening their fiduciary duty to act in good faith 
and in the best interests of the company, or indeed breaching any agreement that might have 
been put in place by the directors and any other third party. He summed up this duty succinctly 
in Parliament by stating that: 
‘the clause does not mean that a director has to form his judgement totally 
independently from anyone or anything. It does not actually mean that the 
director has to be independent himself. He can have an interest in the matter 
[…] It is the exercise of the judgement of a director that must be independent 
in the sense of it being his own judgement […] The duty does not prevent a 
director from relying on the advice or work of others but the final judgement 
must be his responsibility. He clearly cannot be expected to do everything 
himself. Indeed, in certain circumstances directors may be in breach of duty if 
they fail to take appropriate advice – for example, legal advice. As with all 
advice, slavish reliance is not acceptable, and the obtaining of outside advice 
does not absolve directors from exercising their judgement on the basis of such 
advice’.452 
 
Although the Maltese position differs slightly from the English in this aspect, it would seem 
that the same approach would be applied by the Maltese judiciary were the issue to be 
addressed. This is because the English legal system was resorted to when drafting the new 
Article 136 A; accordingly, if the Maltese Courts were to be faced with similar circumstances, 
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it is the English legal system and the approach taken by the English Courts that would surely 
be followed. 
 
However, although the interpretation and limitations of this fiduciary duty with respect to 
directors can be determined to be similar under the two systems, there are some diverging 
interpretations between these systems with respect to the term ‘company’. At first glance, it 
seems that the fiduciary duty as enlisted under Article 136 A (1) of the Maltese Companies Act 
1995 shall only be a duty for the interests of the company, and that any other stakeholder’s 
interest shall be disregarded. It would seem that the Maltese legislators wanted to strictly apply 
the principle of the company’s separate legal personality. Accordingly, the way the fiduciary 
duty is drafted under Article 136 A (1) seems to provide that if directors take any decision 
which is important for the company but not for the shareholders or any other stakeholder, they 
would have still acted correctly and within the parameters of the law. The reason behind this 
approach is because the Maltese legislators did not make any reference to any other 
stakeholder; had they wanted to include any other stakeholder, they would have explicitly 
included them so as to avoid any misinterpretation. Such stringent interpretation was indeed 
applied and followed by the Maltese Courts in Dr Victor Emanuel Ragonesi v Albert Stagno 
Navarra et.453 The defendant, in the name of the company Heritage Estates Limited, obliged 
himself by a promise of sale to transfer and sell a property to Alexander Kazitsine. The full 
amount was paid on the signing of the promise of sale, but this sum of money was to be returned 
to the claimant in the event that the sale could not take place due to any fault impugned to the 
defendant company. The First Hall Civil Court found that the directors of the company were 
required to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company, but also in the best 
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interests of shareholders and creditors, especially when the company might become insolvent. 
However, the Court of Appeal overturned this ruling, finding that the directors of a company 
owe their fiduciary duty to the company only, and not to any creditors or shareholders. At first 
glance, a similar approach can be seen under the English legal system, in which the Law Society 
emphasises the principle that the company is a separate legal entity and believes that the 
interests of the company should be protected above the interests of any other party.454 Section 
170 of the Companies Act 2006 also affirms that the directors owe their fiduciary duty to the 
company. This strict interpretation of the parties to whom this duty is owed was also applied 
in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd,455 in which the Court explained that the creditors’ 
interests should only come into play if the company is insolvent. Section 172 also presents a 
situation that implies that directors shall first take into account the best interests of the 
company, which enjoys a separate legal personality from its shareholders, and only after these 
company interests have been taken into account shall they consider the other interests listed in 
Section 172. This situation thus seems to indirectly imply that in cases of conflicting interests, 
the interests of the company shall primarily always prevail. Such rationale is further enhanced 
because Section 172 also has its origin in the common law fiduciary duty of directors, and shall 
therefore be defined as a duty to act in what directors believe to be the best interests of the 
company.456 
 
Nevertheless, other papers published in the English legal system during the 1990s and the 
2000s started to take into consideration the question of ESV and CSR principles (vide Chapter 
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2). The ESV principle was formulated during the comprehensive review of English company 
law by the Company Law Review Steering Group in 1999. This principle entails that the 
directors of the companies should also act in the collective interest of the shareholders, and in 
the interests of the company.457 This principle is to be applied to all shareholders equally.458 
These changes can be seen in Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, which embodies the 
ESV principle.459 Andrew Keay points out that Section 172 (1) enshrines that the shareholders’ 
interests are primary460 and any other stakeholder cannot enforce this provision against the 
directors because this fiduciary duty is owed to the company and to its members; thus, this 
statutory provision can only be enforced either by the company or by the shareholders through 
a derivative action.461 Ruhmkorf, furthermore, believes that stakeholder interests can only be 
taken into consideration if they will also benefit from such behaviour.462 It thus seems that the 
CSR principle is subordinate to the principle of ESV. The CSR principle mainly refers to the 
importance of directors taking the interests of every stakeholder into consideration when acting 
in the name of the company463 and Pillay believes that Section 172 indirectly provides room 
for the application of the CSR principle.464 Nevertheless, it seems that not all legal scholars 
agree with this approach (vide Chapter 2). These two diverse but complementary principles 
were incorporated into English statute law by Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, which 
provides a non-exhaustive list that must be observed by directors when they are required to 
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make decisions about the best interests of the company. This approach was affirmed by Nourse 
LJ in Brady v Brady,465 in which he held that ‘The interests of a company, as an artificial 
person, cannot be distinguished from the interests of the persons who are interested in it’. In 
this case, two brothers were taking care of the company’s business, which consisted of both 
haulage and drinks businesses. However, a disagreement ensued between the two, who were 
also the major shareholders of the company. The decision was reached that one of them would 
retain the drinks business and the other would retain the haulage business. Restructuring was 
therefore inevitable if these two businesses were to continue to flourish. However, the claimant 
alleged that the granting of financial assistance for the purchase of its own shares was not in 
the best interests of the company. The House of Lords ruled that such financial assistance would 
be for the benefit of the company and also for the benefit of the creditors in the long run. The 
same reasoning was again applied in Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd.466 This 
approach shows that, if the interests of the stakeholders are well-protected, the interests of the 
company will also be automatically protected and flourishing. However, one other problem 
with the list provided in Section 172 is that neither the law nor any related guidance notes 
provide information on what happens if one factor competes with another, and in such a case, 
which should have primacy.467 
 
In Malta, neither the ESV nor the CSR principles were ever explicitly included in any statutory 
provision. However, should the Maltese Courts be faced with the need to interpret the statutory 
provision of Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995, this interpretation will likely be strongly 
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influenced by the amendments to the English legal system for the reasons outlined above.468 
Additionally, these two principles have been introduced in Malta with respect to listed 
companies in June 2006,469 but are still considered only ancillary, since the Companies Act 
1995 shall always prevail over the interpretation and application of these listing rules. These 
two principles have led to a distinction in Malta between listed companies and other companies. 
One reason for this could be that listed companies are made up of different shareholders who 
trade their shares on a continuous basis and of directors who are generally not shareholders. 
Moreover, listed companies may also issue bonds by means of which not only the normal day-
to-day creditors, but also the bondholders who lend their money to the company will be 
protected. Companies that are not listed usually have a structure in which the shareholder role 
and the director role are interchangeable and are usually vested in the same person. Although 
companies that are not listed can still have shareholders who are distinct and separate from the 
directors, these are typically small and medium-sized companies (vide Chapter 1) in which the 
major shareholder and the sole director are usually the same person. Accordingly, the ESV and 
CSR principles are automatically applied by the director, as they would be also indirectly acting 
in their best own interest should the company’s financial position flourish. The Maltese 
mentality, especially the interpretation applied by the Maltese Courts, is also changing in 
favour of the applicability of these two principles in all cases, such that the interests of the 
company and the interests of other stakeholders are to be equally protected, as demonstrated in 
Jane Chircop et v Robert Mizzi pro et noe et470 where the Court reiterated the principle that 
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directors owe their fiduciary duty not only to the company, but also to the shareholders and the 
creditors. 
 
4.4.2 Duty to promote the wellbeing of the company and responsibility for its general 
governance and supervision 
Article 136 A (2) of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 enlists another part of the fiduciary duty 
that must be thoroughly observed by directors, which is to: 
‘promote the well-being of the company and be responsible for: 
(a) the general governance of the company and its proper administration and 
management; and 
(b) the general supervision of its affairs’. 
 
The statutory wording of this duty is straightforward, such that the directors must ensure that 
the company is always in a profitable position and has the least amount of debt possible. 
 
This duty has only been partially discussed by the Maltese Courts. To a certain extent, it was 
dealt with in Advocate Doctor Jean C Farrugia noe v Aqua Oasis Limited (C 41157) et471 and 
in Architect Mariello Spiteri v Registry of Companies et.472 In this latter case the claimant 
claimed that, although he was one of the defendant company’s directors, he did not have any 
access to the company’s accounts and was contesting part of the fine that had been imposed on 
him as one of the directors by the Registry of Companies. He asserted that the company was in 
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reality managed by its two other directors, who were also defendants in this case. However, the 
Registry of Companies contended that all the directors were liable for the late filing of the 
accounts and had an obligation to act jointly as one board of directors. Reference to this specific 
fiduciary duty that binds every director without exception was, consequently, made in the 
Registry’s reply. The Court rejected the claimant’s argument and, while agreeing with the 
Registry of Companies’ argument, ordered him to pay his share of the fine. 
 
This duty seems to be based on Section 172473 of the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006, 
entitled ‘the duty to promote the success of the company’, discussed above. However, one 
distinction between the Maltese and English legal systems is that the Maltese legislators 
decided to enact two distinct but complementary duties: the duty to act in good faith and in the 
best interests of the company, and this particular duty. By contrast, the English legislators only 
enacted the duty as enshrined under Section 172,474 and have consequently linked the good 
faith principle with the duty to promote the well-being of the company. Maltese legislators 
have never provided an answer as to why they adopted such an approach. The reason might be 
that, although the Maltese legislators relied heavily on the English consultation papers and 
debates, the official Maltese provision was enacted before the English one; accordingly, the 
Maltese provision could not be enacted in exactly the same manner as the English provision. 
The Maltese legislators might also have decided to enact two duties because the interpretation 
of the duty to act in good faith and in the interests of the company goes beyond that of general 
governance, since general governance only implies the smooth running of the company and 
not the fiduciary duty to take certain decisions in the best interests of the company. 
                                                 
473 Vide Section 172 
474 Ibid. 
155 
 
After the interpretation of this duty is established, one other difficulty involves interpreting the 
party to whom the directors owe this fiduciary duty. The term ‘company’ seems to be wholly 
limited to the company that enjoys a separate legal personality from both its shareholders and 
any other stakeholder under the Maltese legal system. However, the ESV and the CSR 
principles are today endorsed under the Maltese and English legal systems and the term 
‘company’ shall, therefore, be construed accordingly. 
 
4.4.3 Duty not to make secret or personal profit without the consent of the company, 
nor make personal gain from confidential company information 
Article 136 A (3) (b) of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 provides for directors not to make 
any gain, including any profit, from their position. This Maltese provision may be regarded as 
being formulated with reference to Section 176475 of the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006, 
which provides for the duty not to accept benefits from third parties. However, the English 
statutory provision is more liberal than the common law approach or the Maltese Article for 
two reasons. Firstly, the English common law approach and the Maltese provision do not 
differentiate as to whether those profits or gains are generated through the company or a third 
party, whereas the English provision only limits the acceptance of such gains or profits if they 
are earned through a third party that is not the company. Secondly, whereas the common law 
approach and the Maltese provision include any profit and any misuse of information, 
irrespective of any conflicts of interest that might arise between the directors and the company, 
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Section 176 only comes into play when such conflicts of interests between these two divergent 
parties emerge. 
 
Nevertheless, the common ground between each approach seems to be that immaterial benefits 
such as Christmas gifts are always classified as gifts (even though neither the Maltese nor the 
English legal systems have ever given its explicit opinion on this notion)476 and are therefore 
prohibited if they arise in the manner outlined above. 
 
To better understand this duty, it is necessary to split it into two parts: the making of profit or 
gain; and the misuse of information. With regards to the first, the common law approach of the 
no-profit rule shall apply. This prohibits any director from gaining any secret information or 
personal profit that may be derived from holding the position of director. The English Courts 
have been applying this rule with a certain degree of rigidity for many years, as is illustrated 
Bray v Ford,477 discussed above. 
 
This duty was, however, circumvented under the common law approach, as under the Maltese 
statute law, in that the company’s consent is considered vital if a director is to be permitted to 
profit or gain from his professional position; as we saw in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver.478 
This principle applies in English law even if the directors act without malice to gain such profit. 
The English Courts therefore decided that a director may make profits, as long as the company 
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is aware of it and gives its consent. In Regal, the House of Lords found the former directors 
liable for the damages incurred by the companies, because even though the directors had acted 
in good faith, they had also used their position and knowledge as directors to turn a profit 
without the consent of the group of companies. Lord Russell of Killowen stated that: 
‘The rule of equity which insists on those, who by use of a fiduciary position 
make a profit, being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends on fraud, 
or absence of bona fides; or upon such questions or considerations as whether 
the profit would or should otherwise have gone to the claimant, or whether the 
profiteer was under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for the claimant, or 
whether he took a risk or acted as he did for the benefit of the claimant, or 
whether the claimant has been damaged or benefited by his action. The liability 
arises from the mere fact of a profit having, in the stated circumstances, been 
made. The profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned, cannot escape the 
risk of being called upon to account’.479 
 
Nevertheless, this part of the fiduciary duty does not seem to prohibit a director from being 
paid by the company, or by another person, so long as the company consents to such gain, since 
directors would otherwise never be paid for their work. However, one major problem with such 
consent is that the company is managed by directors, meaning that the company cannot in any 
real sense make its own decisions. Accordingly, the directors themselves make decisions about 
their own personal gain while showing that they are making decisions on behalf of the company 
that they manage. Nevertheless, at the same time, it must be noted that the definition of the 
company is nowadays interpreted in light of the ESV and CSR principles, and so shareholder 
approval will be sought. Taking the stakeholders’ interests into account is also important, as it 
will ultimately result in a profit for the shareholders. Another problem that arises under this 
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duty is that the Maltese Courts have never been asked to interpret this fiduciary duty. In view 
of all this, recourse to the English statute and case law is practicable in this instance to 
understand this duty. 
 
As to the second part of the prohibition, which tackles the misuse of information, the Maltese 
approach seems to be that gain through the use of such confidential information, even with the 
company’s consent, should never take place. One perfect example of misuse of information is 
when insider dealing takes place when a director misuses the company’s information for their 
own personal benefit. This statute provision seems to reflect the English common law 
approach, but not that of the English statutory provisions. Accordingly, recourse to the common 
law approach through case law shall once more be made to shed light on the best and most 
accurate interpretation of this duty. In Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley480 
(vide Section 4.3.5) the Court held that the defendant was accountable to the company because 
he had based his own personal decision on misuse of information obtained while he was the 
managing director of the claimant company. 
 
A recent case that again clearly dealt with this part of the fiduciary duty is the English judgment 
Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby.481 The claimant brought this action against the defendant for 
misappropriation of funds. The defendant was a former director of the claimant company, 
which alleged that the defendant had made a secret profit at its own expense through the misuse 
of information. The defendant had indeed received payment from a third party, Balfour Beatty, 
which was directed to a British Virgin Island Company under his sole control, for opportunities 
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he had diverted from the claimant company to his personal company. In view of this, the Court 
held the defendant accountable for the claimant company’s loss, and the defendant was made 
to repay the profit. In addition to the above, it is observed that nowadays, this prohibition is 
also rigorously regulated by the Market Abuse regime (vide Chapter 2). 
 
However, these two English cases do not provide the answer as to whether a gain or a profit 
through the misuse of information can be acceptable if the company consents to it. Nonetheless, 
it could be argued that such an approach is not acceptable even if the company gives its consent, 
as whenever there is misuse of information, the relationship of trust enjoyed between the 
director and the company is breached.  
 
As a result, it must be noted that the difference between the first and second part of this 
fiduciary duty is that if directors gain secret or personal profits by making use of their position, 
but do not indirectly steal anything that belongs to the company, such behaviour may be 
somehow accepted; however, if the director steals information that solely belongs to the 
company, such behaviour is unacceptable and categorized as improper. This strict 
interpretation seems to also be accepted by the Maltese statutory provision, because if the 
consent of the company would have been enough to ratify such a situation, this provision would 
have been enacted differently. 
 
Moreover, this duty continued to be complemented under the Maltese legal system with Article 
127 of the Ordinance 1962, and was later replicated as Article 144 of the Maltese Act 1995, 
which provides for the prohibition of loans to directors, which article has already been analysed 
above. 
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4.4.4 Duty not to let personal interests conflict with the interests of the company 
This fiduciary duty arises both under Articles 145 and 136 A (c) of the Maltese Companies Act 
1995, which lays down that a director shall ensure that his personal interests do not conflict in 
any manner with the interests of the company and is thus not competing with the company. 
Due to the fact that two provisions were enacted by legislators in Malta to regulate the same 
part of fiduciary duty, this does beg the question as to why the Maltese legislators felt the need 
to enact another statutory provision when this duty seems to have already been provided for by 
statute. However, closer inspection shows a crucial difference between these two statutory 
provisions in that Article 136 A (c) is more general and not only limited to contracts, unlike 
Article 145. Consequently, Article 136 A (c) can also cover other situations that might arise in 
virtue of the director’s position. 
 
Nevertheless, both provisions shall be interpreted as including any prohibition of directors 
competing with the company; therefore, both positive and negative competition is prohibited 
outright. It will thus include those instances in which the director does not act at all in 
circumstances in which they should have acted. In such instances, therefore, directors would 
be considered to be in a position of indirectly competing with the company. One example might 
be when a director, having employed a member of their family at the company, learns that this 
family member is not up to standard, and yet keeps them on. 
 
The Maltese Courts had the opportunity to deal with the interpretation of this part of the 
fiduciary duty defined under Article 136 A (c) in Advocate Doctor Jean C Farrugia noe v Aqua 
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Oasis Limited et,482 (vide Section 4.4). In this case, the Court held that Rickert had acted in 
breach of her fiduciary duty not to compete with the company Aqua Oasis Ltd from the date 
when the board of directors decided to transfer the diving operations to another centre. 
 
As with the other parts of the fiduciary duty as arising under Article 136 A, this duty was also 
very much influenced by the English legal system, precisely by the common law. In fact, 
Muscat483 notes that this duty was incorporated under Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies 
Act 1995 due to the long-standing approach taken by the English Courts and their successful 
interpretation using the equitable no-conflict rule, as demonstrated in Aberdeen Railway Co v 
Blaikie Bros484 (vide Section 4.3.4), together with the interpretation and application of this duty 
as defined herein. 
 
The same strict interpretation of this duty was also recently considered in the United Kingdom 
in Crown Dilmun v Sutton.485 The claimant, together with Dilmun Investments Ltd, was part 
of the Bahrain International Bank group of companies. The defendant, a director in both 
companies, had been able to make them both into successful ventures. However, the group of 
companies ran into difficulties and instructed the claimant and Dilmun Investments Ltd to sell 
their investment properties as soon as possible. During this process, a good opportunity arose 
to purchase and develop the Craven Cottage Football Stadium; however, the defendant decided 
to divert that opportunity to Fulham River Projects Ltd, a company which he and his wife 
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owned almost half, instead to the other two companies he was managing. As a result, the 
claimant successfully brought an action for damages against the defendant. 
 
This common law approach was fortified through Section 175 of the United Kingdom’s 
Companies Act, entitled ‘duty to avoid conflicts of interest’. The importance of this statutory 
provision was also dealt with by the English Courts, as exemplified in Shepherds Investments 
Ltd and Shepherds (Financial) Ltd v Andrew Walters.486 The defendants were all former 
directors or senior employees of the claimant, an investment fund that traded in individual life 
insurance policies. The defendants, while still in the employ of the claimant company and 
without its authorisation, began to discuss the creation of a new investment fund to compete in 
the traded life policy market. The defendants opted to focus on a slightly different section of 
the market than the claimant and had carried out the required research and made important 
contacts. In view of this evidence, the Court concluded that this duty should be interpreted to 
hold that a director cannot in any manner either directly or indirectly compete with the 
company. The defendants were consequently held liable for their actions. 
 
At first glance, it seems that this English statutory provision provides for two situations in 
which conflicts of interest cannot arise, as opposed to the Maltese statutory provision, which 
is more generic. The English provision provides that such a duty is not infringed in situations 
that are not reasonably seen as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest. One problem with 
such an exemption, however, is that a subjective element is applied when assessing whether or 
not a particular case falls under the prohibition in question. Nevertheless, at the same time, the 
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term ‘reasonable’ leads to an objective approach. The English provision also provides that this 
fiduciary duty will not be breached by the director if the matter has been authorised by the 
company. In this respect, the English provision is also able to recognise the significant 
differences between a private and a public company: the constitution of a private company 
shall not in any manner invalidate such authorisation, whereas in the case of a public company, 
such authorisation shall be specifically laid down in the company’s constitution. Again, this 
exemption does not seem to fit with the principles of corporate law, because the company is 
managed by directors, and this exemption allows them to make decisions for their own benefit 
on behalf of the company. Again, this exemption may be challenged in today’s field of 
corporate law, since the ESV and CSR principles have become common considerations and 
have changed the classic conception of a company. 
 
This fiduciary duty to avoid any conflict of interest was also supplemented under the English 
statute law with the enactment of Section 177487 of the Companies Act 2006, which provides 
for the situation in which directors are required to declare their interests in any proposed 
contracts or arrangements with the company. This section also provides that both direct and 
indirect interests488 shall be disclosed, such as when a remuneration package for a particular 
director is decided. This duty is enshrined under the Maltese legal system under Article 145.489 
 
Nevertheless, the English statute law has gone one step further than the Maltese legal system 
in regulating this fiduciary duty, as it has enhanced the importance of this duty through the 
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enacting of Section 170 (2).490 This section states that the duty to avoid conflicts continues to 
apply to a director even after his retirement from office as regards the exploitation of any 
property, information or opportunity of which he became aware at a time when he was a 
director. This specific interpretation is not explicitly expressed under any Maltese provision 
that regulates the fiduciary duty of directors; however, if the Maltese Courts were to be faced 
with such a situation, it is likely that the same approach and interpretation as the English legal 
system will be adopted because the interests of the company must always be protected. 
 
The final issue is to whom the parties bound by this fiduciary duty are answerable. The term 
‘company’ is nowadays interpreted in terms of the ESV and CSR principles and not looked 
upon as a separate legal entity on its own, particularly in the case of a one-man company where 
the separate legal personality of the company and the ESV principle very much overlap. The 
CSR principle is also taken into consideration as regards the long-term profit that would be 
enjoyed by the company (vide Chapter 2). 
 
4.4.5 Duty not to use any property, information or opportunity of the company for 
personal or anyone else’s benefit or obtain any benefit from their power, except 
with the consent of the company at the general meeting or as permitted by the 
memorandum and articles of the company  
This duty was included under Article 143491 of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 and again 
included under Article 136 A (3) (d).492 At first glance, it can be seen that the Maltese 
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legislators decided to enact this specific duty under Article 136 A to ensure that any relevant 
circumstance not covered by other parts of the fiduciary duty or related statutory provisions 
will still be regulated. Indeed, the two provisions differ in the sense that, while Article 143 is 
limited to competition, Article 136 A is more generic which also includes other circumstances 
in which direct or indirect competition might be difficult to prove. Another major difference 
between the two is that Article 136 A provides for authorisation to also be sought under the 
memorandum and articles of the company and not only at a general meeting. 
 
 However, at the same time, these provisions are similar in two aspects. Firstly, both allow 
consent to be given at a general meeting of the company. While the Maltese legislators wanted 
to emphasise the importance of shareholder consent, since they are the ultimate beneficiaries 
of the company, this may be difficult to achieve. In a large company with a lot of shareholders, 
it might be impractical to obtain consent from the majority of the shareholders. By contrast, in 
a small company, the major shareholder is usually also the director, or even more so, companies 
that are single member companies. Secondly, both provisions were enacted to account for the 
no-conflict and no-profit rules, as also discussed above. 
 
Although this fiduciary duty is very much important to be thoroughly observed by directors, it 
was only partially addressed by the Maltese Courts in Mark Hogg noe v Terra Sana Ltd et.493 
In this case, the claimant, one of the shareholders of Terra Sana Ltd filed this action because 
he believed that the management of the defendant company was not acting in accordance with 
its fiduciary duty as detailed under this statutory provision. He alleged that a certain amount of 
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money was being invested by the defendant company, but that the shareholders were never 
fully informed of the circumstances and were never asked for approval. The defendants 
counter-argued that they had submitted documents to the shareholders detailing where the 
money was being invested. The Court held that, although it was true that the defendants had 
presented some documentation to the shareholders, this documentation only referred to one 
year and the defendants had used other documentation containing the company’s information 
for their own benefit. The defendants were therefore in breach of this particular provision. 
 
Due to the limited interpretation of this duty under the Maltese legal system, reference to the 
English legal system seems practical for the reasons outlined above. This duty as formulated 
under Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 very much reflects Section 175494 of 
the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006, which also provides for authorisation when there is 
or appears to be a conflict of interest between the directors and the company, albeit with one 
difference. While the Maltese provision does not limit such authorisation to the company’s 
constitution but also gives such a right to the general meeting, the English position is limited 
to the company’s constitution. Although a company’s constitution may easily be amended 
through a general meeting, the Maltese approach is slightly easier to implement, as 
authorisation is automatically provided for in the general meeting rather than first requiring an 
amendment to the constitution before authorisation can be obtained. 
 
Once more, should it be examined to whom the directors owe this fiduciary duty, it is observed 
that this duty favours the company as defined through the ESV and CSR principles. Even more 
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so due to the fact that the Maltese law places great significance on the shareholder consent, 
because any changes to the memorandum and articles of association can only be approved by 
the shareholders at a general meeting, and consent can also only be attained at a general 
meeting. 
 
4.4.6 Duty to exercise the powers they were given and not to misuse those powers 
The diverse parts of the fiduciary duty are also restricted by the duty to act within the powers 
conferred upon them, as provided for under Article 136 A (3) (e) of the Maltese Companies 
Act 1995, as also discussed in the Maltese judgment Enemalta Corporation v Vella Group 
Limited and John Mary Vella.495  
 
This statute provision, once again, is very similar to Section 171496 of the United Kingdom 
Companies Act 2006, which also provides for a restriction on the directors to the extent of any 
action that may be taken by a director in the best interests of the company. When directors act 
beyond the scope of the powers conferred on them, the company must carry out ratification if 
the directors are not to be personally liable for those acts. The English statutory provision has 
codified the long-standing common law approach. In this respect, Lord Hodge recently 
affirmed that: 
‘I am supported in my opinion by Lord Glennie in West Coast Capital (Lios) 
Ltd Petr [2008] CSOH 72, (at para 21) in which he expressed the view that 
Section 171 of the 2006 Act did little more than set out the pre-existing law on 
the subject. I also derive some support from leading company law textbooks 
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such as Gore-Browne on Companies (at para 15 [8A]) and Palmer’s Company 
Law, which (at para 8.2309) suggests that older cases remain relevant to the 
interpretation of the statutory duties since the codified duties are generally 
formulated in a way that quite faithfully reflects the older case law. The 
statutory formulations do not, by a side wind, alter the law of agency or prevent 
ratification of the unauthorised acts of a director’.497 
 
The problem of directors acting beyond their powers has long been a much debated issue in the 
English legal system; even the common law approach has faced such challenges. An example 
of such infringement was analysed by the English Courts in Punt v Symons & Co Ltd.498 In this 
case, the articles of association gave the governing director the power to appoint and remove 
the other directors, and his power was subsequently executed by his executors when he died. 
Unsurprisingly, friction arose between the executors and the directors and the directors decided 
to rescind the articles of association by means of a special resolution. To ensure that an 
affirmative outcome could be reached on this resolution, the directors issued new shares to five 
additional members. The executors requested an injunction to prohibit the company from 
holding the meeting, which was granted by the Court, which decided that the issuing of these 
new shares constituted an abuse of power by the directors, as it was clear that these new shares 
had been issued to control the minor shareholders. This judgment was followed in Piercy v 
Mills & Co Ltd.499 In this case, the directors had issued shares with the object of creating a 
sufficient majority to enable them to resist the election of three additional directors, whose 
appointment would have put the two existing directors in a minority position. Peterson J held 
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that the directors were not entitled to use their power to issue shares merely for the purpose of 
maintaining their and their friends’ control over the affairs of the company, or merely for the 
purpose of defeating the wishes of the majority of shareholders. A similar approach was again 
applied in the judgment Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd,500 in which the directors of a company faced 
with a takeover proposal established a trust and allocated sufficient shares to the trustees to 
defeat the takeover. Buckley J held that, as the power to issue shares was a fiduciary one, it 
could not be exercised for an improper purpose. This decision was stricter than that in Punt 
because, in the latter judgment, the Courts decided that they would have accepted the issue of 
shares if it were for a purpose that would have resulted in a benefit to the company. Another 
English judgment that came to a comparable conclusion is Lee Panavision Ltd v Lee Lighting 
Ltd.501 The claimant company acquired an option to purchase the defendant company in 1988. 
At that time, the claimant and defendant entered into a management agreement such that the 
claimant was to run the defendant’s business and nominate its directors. This agreement 
expired when the option to purchase the defendant’s shares expired. The claimant did not want 
to purchase the shares, but still wanted to manage the defendant, and a second management 
agreement was signed for the original directors to be removed and new directors appointed by 
the defendant. However, the defendant later did not want to be bound by this second agreement. 
The Court of Appeal found in favour of the defendant, asserting that the outgoing directors 
could not enter into such an agreement since this was beyond their powers, because the 
incoming directors would have no say in the matter. 
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One question that arises from the abovementioned judgments is that of how to fully understand 
whether or not directors have acted beyond the scope of their powers. In Teck Corp Ltd v 
Millar,502 the English Courts clarified the notion that a look at the company’s interests is 
required to fully understand whether the directors have acted beyond their powers. It was held 
that, if an issue of shares was carried out for the benefit of the company, it must be accepted. 
The case involved a takeover in which the directors of the target company issued shares to 
another company with a view to defeating the takeover. The claimant brought proceedings 
against the directors to prevent the issue of these new shares and Berger J ruled that ‘the 
impropriety lies in the directors’ purpose. If their purpose is not to serve the company’s interest, 
then it is an improper purpose’.503 
 
Although one might think that directors act beyond their power for a pecuniary gain, the 
English Courts clarified the notion that even if there is no pecuniary gain or the directors do 
not directly benefit from any pecuniary gain there might be circumstances of directors acting 
beyond their powers if the interests of the company are not taken into consideration. In Howard 
Smith Ltd v Ampol Ltd,504 it was held that, even if the directors do not personally gain, they 
may still be in breach of their duties by having acted beyond their powers if the company’s 
interests were not properly protected. This case also concerned the power of directors to issue 
new shares. The directors did not want the company to be taken over and therefore issued new 
shares; hence, in this instance, even though the directors would not have personally gained 
from such a move, the purpose of the share issue was solely to dilute the majority voting power. 
                                                 
502 (1972), 33 DLR (3d) 288 (BCSC) 
503 Michael St. Patrick Baxter, ‘The Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of a Target Company in resisting an 
Unsolicited Bid’, 63 Ottawa Law Review/Revue de droit d'Ottawa 20 (1)  
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The Court held that these directors acted for an improper purpose. A similar approach was 
applied in Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood505 which concerned the power of 
directors to deal with corporate assets. The directors of the claimant company had transferred 
company funds, amounting to around £200,000, to Citygate Insurance Brokers Ltd, another 
company in the group and the parent company, to enable it to pay a creditor. It was held that 
the directors had acted for an improper purpose, and whether the company’s interest was 
adequately protected was key in determining whether the directors had acted for an improper 
purpose. 
 
The problem defined under this fiduciary duty has been to a certain extent resolved under the 
English law following the introduction of the 2006 Companies Act, which contains the 
stipulation that an objects clause does not need to be enacted in the memorandum and articles 
of association. Directors are therefore not limited in any manner, and are to act in what they 
solely believe is the best interests of the company. Regrettably, this English initiative was not 
followed by Maltese statute law; as a consequence, the principle of ratification remains fairly 
significant under the Maltese legal system, even though a fairly wide objects clause is usually 
listed in the memorandum and articles of association of the company when the company is first 
registered with the Registry of Companies; the wider the power of the director, the more 
difficult it is to understand whether or not the director’s actions were improper. 
 
There may also be other instances where directors do not act beyond their powers, but simply 
act in their own personal name. In such circumstances, whenever a director acts in his own 
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name, he will be personally liable, that such contracts must be performed by the director in his 
personal capacity and not by the company. The Maltese Courts have, however, not been faced 
with such a situation since 2003. 
 
After establishing the interpretation of this fiduciary duty as applied to directors, it is also 
significant to observe that directors shall correctly use their powers not only as proposed by 
the company and in the best interest of the company, but also as dictated by any shareholder 
and stakeholder; thus implying that the ESV and CSR principles shall apply in this respect once 
again, as already analysed above.  
 
 Directors’ statutory fiduciary duty as applied under Articles 1124 A and B of the 
Maltese Civil Code 1870 and as interpreted by the Courts 
Articles 1124 A and B, as influenced by Roman law, were introduced under the Maltese Civil 
Code 1870 in 2004 to cover any type of fiduciary relationship, and are therefore not limited to 
the relationship between directors and companies. Article 1124 A specifies that fiduciary 
obligations may arise by virtue of a contract or even by assumption of office. This means that 
whenever a person is appointed to act for the benefit of the company but does not exclusively 
hold the title of director, that individual must still be bound by the strict interpretation and 
application of the fiduciary duty, which is defined in a very similar way to the other statutory 
provisions so far analysed. Accordingly, these two provisions as arising under the Maltese Civil 
Code 1870 would regulate chief executive officers, chief financial officer or general managers, 
by way of example, since they would be considered as de facto directors.  
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The Maltese Courts recently had the opportunity to interpret this duty in the context of 
companies in Anthony Caruana and Sons Limited et v Christopher Caruana.506 The claimant 
company filed the action because it felt aggrieved by the defendant’s behaviour. It alleged that 
the defendant had been employed by the claimant company as a general manager between 2003 
and 2006, under an employment contract. As a general manager, the defendant had the 
responsibility to sell and carry out marketing activities for a variety of products that were 
imported by the claimant company. The company also asserted that the defendant was also 
responsible for the other employees. Consequently, the claimant company believed that 
although the defendant did not hold the exclusive title of a director, and Article 136 A of the 
Maltese Companies Act 1995 could not apply, he was still bound by Article 1124 A of the 
Maltese Civil Code 1870 and was accordingly bound by the strict observance of fiduciary duty. 
The defendant rebutted the claimant’s claims on the basis that he had terminated his 
employment in 2004, and since Article 1124 A was introduced in 2004 but only came into force 
from 1st January 2005, the provision could not apply. The Court made reference to Article 
1124 A and stated that any person who is considered to be a fiduciary is under strict obligation 
to ensure that any information received by his position shall be retained confidential, and that 
also has a duty to act in the best interest of the person who had appointed them. The Court 
made reference to the English judgment of University of Nottingham v Fishel507 and was of the 
opinion, even if not correctly applied, that the concept of fiduciary obligations had been 
introduced into the Maltese legal system due to English influences. This English case 
concluded that an employment relationship is not a fiduciary one and that the fiduciary duty 
shall therefore not apply. Additional reference was made to earlier Maltese judgments that 
established that an employee may compete with the employer after terminating the contract. 
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Accordingly, the First Hall Civil Court dismissed the claimant’s case. However, the claimant 
company felt aggrieved and appealed. The Court of Appeal made reference to various Maltese 
judgments and legal scholars when determining that Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil 
Code 1870 had not introduced a new concept into the Maltese legal system, but rather clarified 
the situation; the defendant was, therefore, bound by the fiduciary duty, and the earlier finding 
was overturned. 
 
The same strict interpretation of this fiduciary duty was reached a few months later in Vascas 
Enterprises Limited v Adrian Ellul.508 The claimant company alleged that the defendant had 
been employed by them as a manager, and that his contract of employment was dated 18th June, 
2008. It alleged that after terminating his employment in 2010, the defendant made use of 
confidential information about the claimant company to open his own personal business. The 
Court made specific reference to the English judgment Ranson v Customer Systems plc,509 
which dealt with a similar scenario. In that case, the English courts drew a distinction between 
a fiduciary duty and the duty of fidelity. The Court pointed out that every employment contract 
is based on the duty of fidelity, which implies that an employee shall act in the best interest of 
the employer during the term of his employment, but that this does not prohibit the employee 
from looking at other opportunities that might be beneficial to him. The Courts also pointed 
out that the fiduciary duty is more onerous, as it means that directors, or anyone who is 
considered to be a fiduciary, must act in the best interests of the company without reservation 
or limitation. The Maltese Courts once again made reference to University of Nottingham v 
Fishel510 and to Helmet Integrated Systems Ltd v Tunnard,511 which made the same point that 
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an employment contract is not based on the fiduciary duty; however, it also made reference to 
Anthony Caruana and Sons Limited v Christopher Caruana and also to Professor Joseph A. 
Micallef, both of which suggest that a manager should not be regarded as an ordinary employee, 
but he shall be looked at as having an additional fiduciary duty much like any other director. 
The Court, as in the earlier Maltese judgment, made reference to Article 1124 A of the Civil 
Code 1870 and stated that this Article has only crystallised the Maltese position which has been 
in existence from the enactment of the Roman law: this Article asserts that the fiduciary duty 
may arise out of contract, out of the law itself, or due to the position held by the person. 
Accordingly, the Court decided that any employee, including a manager, is required to observe 
the fiduciary duty in a manner as strict as any other director. Nevertheless, in this particular 
case, the Maltese Courts decided that the defendant did not breach his fiduciary duty because 
he did not act while in employment, and therefore dismissed the claimant’s claim. 
 
However, it is imperative to remember that with respect to the relationship between directors 
and company, these two provisions act as ancillary to Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies 
Act 1995, something confirmed by the Maltese Courts in Amadeo Balzan v Central Holidays 
(Travel and Tourism Ltd) and Alexandra Balzan Ruggier et.512 The claimant was one of the 
three shareholders of the defendant company, Central Holidays (Travel and Tourism Limited), 
and the other two shareholders were the other two defendants. The claimant had also been a 
director of the defendant company until the other two shareholders voted him out. He alleged 
that these actions were taken against him because he and one of the defendants, Alexandra, had 
been married, but had commenced separation proceedings. The claimant stated that the 
defendant company had been in operation since the 1980s and that he had always held the 
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position of director. The company in question was a family business, but in 1991, after he 
married Alexandra, the claimant’s father suggested that since the claimant had always been the 
sole mind behind the company, it should be fully transferred to him. However, due to legal 
restrictions at that time, the claimant decided to subscribe shares both in the name of his wife 
and also in the name of his wife’s father. Reference to Article 136 A of the Companies Act 
1995 and to Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 was made by the claimant. 
The Court held that, whereas Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 should be considered 
the lex specialis, Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 constituted lex 
generalis. In light of this, the Maltese Courts stated that the two sets of Articles could not be 
tied together. The Court also rejected the claimant’s pleas on the basis that he was no longer a 
director of the company and was therefore not in a legal position to bring an action under 
Article 136 A. 
 
 Conclusion 
The Maltese legal system, through its application of the statutory mandate provisions, greatly 
influenced the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors until 2003. Provisions of the Italian 
civil legal system were copied more or less verbatim to form the Maltese statutory mandate 
provisions, and only two very minor differences existed between the Italian and the Maltese 
legal systems. Under the Maltese provisions, the statutory application of the mandate 
provisions differ from their Italian counterpart in two instances whereby the mandatary has 
certain restrictions when to sue and be sued when the mandator is present in the country but 
the mandatary can act directly against a third party that they personally contract with. The other 
difference between the Maltese and Italian mandate provisions is with respect to the 
interpretation provided to the term ‘company’ as widely interpreted by some of the Maltese 
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judiciary to also include shareholders and to not restrict such term to the strict interpretation of 
the separate legal personality enjoyed by the company. However, by the time of the enactment 
of the 1962 Maltese Ordinance, the influence of the English legal system had begun to make 
its presence felt, and new concepts began to be introduced into the Maltese legal system. 
Certain specific provisions such as the duty not to let personal interest conflict with the interests 
of the company were written into the Maltese Ordinance time and were required to be strictly 
observed by the directors. These provisions, as influenced by the English system, led to a 
revolution as they had to be applied instead of the general mandate provisions. From that 
moment onwards, the Maltese legal system began to blend the Italian and English legal systems 
and apply them at the same time, depending on which part of the fiduciary duty was being 
debated. 
 
2003 was a major milestone for the Maltese statutory legal system, as it was at this point that 
the decision was made to resort only to the English legal system. However, because the Maltese 
legislators had decided to enact the formal statute law before the final statutory English 
provisions were enacted, different interpretations apply in various instances. One such example 
is where the English statutory legal system included a provision stating that even after 
retirement from office, a director is still bound by certain duties, an inclusion considered to be 
very important for protecting the company that was managed by that individual, and which will 
surely be included through interpretation into the Maltese legal system.  
 
Again, the principle of protecting the company’s financial position as much as possible was so 
important for the Maltese legislators that 2004 marked another major milestone due to the 
introduction of the general fiduciary concept in the Maltese Civil Code 1870. From then on, 
178 
any individual who exerts a certain degree of financial control over a company is required to 
observe the same onerous fiduciary duty as any other person who explicitly holds the title of 
director. 
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Chapter 5. The Maltese Courts and their conflicting 
interpretations of the fiduciary duty of directors 
 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the approach taken by the Maltese Courts when 
interpreting and applying the different statute laws enacted throughout these past 200 years in 
cases concerning the fiduciary duty of directors of limited liability companies. It analyses each 
res judicata judgment that has dealt with the issue and a summary of the judgment is also 
presented. Regrettably, it is only through such descriptive interpretations that one can fully 
appreciate and comprehend the problems presented by the Maltese judiciary. 
 
It will demonstrate that the Maltese Courts have not always applied the correct statute law at 
that particular moment in time. It will, accordingly, be presented that certain judges and 
magistrates applied the law correctly, but others who also form part of the judiciary, 
unfortunately, misapplied the law, with the result that it would have made a difference who the 
judge was appointed to a particular case whose actions and decision affected the involved 
parties, sometimes in an unlucky manner.  
 
To fully understand the conflicting interpretations provided by the Maltese Courts, the cases 
that will be referred to hereunder will be duly divided according to the date when they were 
firstly filed before the Maltese Courts because that date shall determine which statute law 
should have been applied, and not when the judgment was delivered by the said Courts.  
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Nevertheless, this study will firstly outline the Maltese Court system, by making emphasis on 
the Court sections that directly decide on issues relating to the interpretation and application of 
the fiduciary duty of directors, to fully understand in which Court an aggrieved person has the 
duty to file an action for it to be decided upon and not be dismissed. A concise summary of the 
statutory development of the fiduciary duty of directors under the Maltese legal system shall 
thereafter be provided to appreciate which law the judiciary should have applied at that 
particular moment in time.  
 
The analyses presented in this chapter, however, has three limitations. First, it does not take 
into consideration cases, which were not res judicata as at the time of writing, because one can 
only analyse a judgment after the final decision has been reached and not merely on any proofs 
that the parties may have brought forward. Second, this study does not include unreported cases 
since these cases are unknown to any third party and cannot be analysed. Third, only judgments 
that specifically deal with the directors’ fiduciary duty are examined. 
 
 The Maltese judicial system 
The judicial system in Malta was created by Maitland and his Royal Commission of 1812.513 
This Commission created different categories of Courts, which are still around today. The 
judicial system is regulated by Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta, entitled the Code of 
Organisation and Civil Procedure.514 It is composed of the Constitutional Court, the Court of 
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Appeal, the Superior Courts and Inferior Courts.515 The Inferior Courts are sat on by 
magistrates whereas judges sit in the Superior Courts, with the result that a person can appeal 
from a decision delivered by a magistrate to the Superior Courts, whereby judges have the 
ultimate word and whose judgment cannot be further appealed with the result that there is only 
the possibility for one time appeal. The Maltese judicial system is also composed of various 
Boards and Tribunals which are established by the Minister of Justice for a specific purpose, 
and which may also be led by advocates rather than judges and magistrates. 
 
However, as noted above, for the purpose of this analysis, only a historical overview of the 
Commercial Court will be examined, together with today’s composition and function of the 
First Hall Civil Court, of the Court of Magistrates in its Superior Jurisdiction, of the Court of 
Appeal and the Small Claims Tribunal.516 Consequently, this analysis shall only be limited to 
those courts that are faced with the interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors. 
 
5.2.1 The Court of Appeal 
The Civil Court of Appeal hears appeals on cases from the First Hall Civil Court and by the 
Court of Magistrates. The composition of the Civil Court, however, differs according to where 
the case was first filed. If the appeal was filed from the First Hall Civil Court, the Court of 
Appeal is composed of three judges. If the appeal originates from the Court of Magistrates in 
its inferior jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal is composed of only one judge. 
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The decisions reached by the Court of Appeal cannot be further appealed and are consequently 
considered as definite and conclusive.  
 
5.2.2 The First Hall Civil Court 
This Court is presided over by one judge. The First Hall Civil Court hears all cases of a civil 
and commercial nature, which exceed the jurisdiction of the Court of Magistrates. The main 
distinction between the two Courts is that all claims where the disputed sum is more than 
€11,646.87 or where the claim cannot be quantified must be filed and tried by the First Hall 
Civil Court. Accordingly, if a particular action is filed before the Court of Magistrates, the 
penalty awarded cannot exceed the indicated sum herein. The First Hall Civil Court also hears 
all cases that deal with constitutional matters, which are regulated by the European Convention 
on Human Rights and by the Maltese Constitution. 
 
This Court is, however, defined differently in Gozo, which is the sister island of Malta and the 
only other inhabited island of the Maltese archipelago517 which has its own judicial system in 
certain aspects. In Gozo, in fact, the First Hall Civil Court is not present, but the Court of 
Magistrates (Gozo) in its Superior Jurisdiction enjoys the same jurisdiction, powers and 
functions as exercised by the First Hall of the Civil Court in Malta, with the exception that it 
cannot hear cases in which a breach of fundamental human rights is alleged. 
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5.2.3 The Commercial Court 
This Court used to hear cases of a commercial nature only with appeals to lie with the Court of 
Appeal, which description of this Court is provided above. It was, however, disestablished in 
1995 and superseded by the First Hall Civil Court. 
 
5.2.4 The Small Claims Tribunal  
This Tribunal was established in 1995 and shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all 
money claims of an amount not exceeding five thousand euro (€5,000), including those in 
relation to the interpretation and application of the fiduciary duty of directors.518  
 
 The applicable law to directors 
Before the enactment of Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 and its ancillary fiduciary 
law provisions in the Maltese Civil Code 1870, mandate law and any other specific provision 
enacted in the Commercial Ordinances or Acts was applicable to interpret the fiduciary duty of 
directors (vide Chapter 4). However, the Maltese Courts, sometimes, felt compelled to also 
refer to the English approach and English judgments when there was an issue not properly 
covered by mandate law or even to further interpret and apply mandate law appropriately. 
Although mandate law and its ancillary fiduciary law differs from the fiduciary law as 
interpreted under the English legal system, recourse to the English law was common for two 
reasons. First, because Maltese lawyers are aware that: 
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‘English company law has formed the backbone of Maltese company law for 
almost half a century, instilling in the process a forma mentis amongst Maltese 
professionals and lawmakers that is ingrained in English company law 
concepts’.519 
 
Secondly, because: 
‘legislative developments in the United Kingdom are, in part, driven by the 
British government’s desire to maintain London’s status as a pre-eminent 
financial centre. To a considerable extent, therefore, the United Kingdom has 
been, and will continue to be, perceived in Malta as an attractive model in 
matters of company law’.520 
 
With the enactment of Article 136 A of the Companies Act in 2003 and its ancillary fiduciary 
provisions in 2004 in the Maltese Civil Code 1870, any reference to mandate law should have 
become obsolete and the Maltese Courts were bound to refer and apply the new laws. Yet, the 
Maltese Courts sometimes challenged these new provisions and have occasionally applied the 
wrong interpretations by referring to mandate law after 2003. 
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5.3.1 Cases filed before 2003 
5.3.1.1 Applicability of mandate law or any other provision enacted in the Commercial 
Ordinances or Acts that supersedes the law of mandate 
The first judgment in which mandate law was correctly applied dates back to the 19th century 
which is Francesco Saverio Musu’ v Vincenzo di Saverio Vella et.521 In this case, the Maltese 
Commercial Court resorted to mandate law and declared that the directors of the company shall 
be considered mandataries of that company. This judgment also established that according to 
the Maltese doctrine and jurisprudence, these administrators, as directors, have to be considered 
mandataries of the company and also of each and every shareholder. 
 
The same correct interpretation was applied in Victor Grima noe v Anthony Grech,522 in which 
mandate law was again applied when interpreting the fiduciary duty of directors. The defendant 
was the director of a company and enticed customers to end their relationship with the company 
to enter into a new relationship with him. In view of this, the Court of Appeal noted that Grech’s 
behaviour went against his fiduciary duty towards the company, and he was, therefore, liable 
for the damages suffered by the claimant company.  
 
Another judgment that simply applied the law of mandate when interpreting the application of 
the fiduciary duty of directors is Salvatore Schembri v Salvatore Gauci.523 Gauci was appearing 
as a director of the defendant company and signed a promise of sale for and on behalf of the 
company with the claimant on 17 November 1978. The Commercial Court held that Gauci had 
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an obligation to ensure that the conditions of the memorandum and articles of association of 
the company were abided by, one of which was that any document that binds the company had 
to be signed by both two directors. However, the promise of sale was not signed by both 
directors. Accordingly, the Commercial Court held that Gauci, as the director and mandatary 
of the defendant company, did not ensure that any document is signed by the two directors. 
The Commercial Court, furthermore, decided that the company did not ratify this promise of 
sale and he was, therefore, personally liable for the promise of sale entered into with the 
claimant. 
 
In John Veglio v Catherine Camilleri,524 the law of mandate was again correctly applied when 
interpreting the fiduciary duty of directors. As a result, the Court of Appeal stated two 
important factors: firstly, that a director has to act in the best interest of the company and when 
doing so they are not acting in their own name; and secondly that a director shall be considered 
as the mandatary of the company. The defendant had worked for a company of which the 
claimant was a director. However, the defendant had her employment terminated and decided 
to seek a precautionary warrant against the claimant personally as a guarantee for payment of 
wages that were due to her. The claimant successfully issued proceedings for the annulment of 
the warrant, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal, having agreed with the First 
Hall Civil Court’s approach, also observed that it was a well-known principle that a director 
has to act for the benefits of the company and any contract in the name of the company with 
third parties does not bind the director personally. The Court also observed that in certain 
exceptional circumstances only a director has to be personally liable when they breach their 
fiduciary duty. 
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One further Maltese judgment that made reference to mandate law when interpreting the 
fiduciary duty of directors is Advocate Doctor Ian Refalo noe et v Albert David Boweck et.525 
The First Hall Civil Court, citing Veglio v Camilleri,526 held that a director shall be considered 
as the mandatary of the company, implying, once again, that mandate law shall apply to the 
interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors. 
 
Another judgment that made reference to the law of mandate and to the previous case when 
interpreting the fiduciary duty of directors is Advocate Doctor Anthony H Farrugia as a special 
mandatary of the minors Fabienne Carbone and Rowan Carbone v Vernie Carbone for and on 
behalf of various companies and Agostino sive Winston Carbone, together with Advocate Dr. 
Eric Mamo, for and on behalf of other companies 527 In this case, filed before the First Hall 
Civil Court in 1990, the claimants asked the Court to declare various contracts null as he alleged 
the defendant Agostino sive Winston Carbone could not have appeared on these contracts on 
behalf of the various defendant companies as he had no right to do so. These contracts were 
taken out for loans and other bank facilities from the Mid-Med Bank Limited. The bank, which 
was also joined as a defendant, objected to the claimant’s pleas and pointed out that even if 
Winston Carbone acted beyond his powers, such behaviour would not lead to the nullity of the 
contracts, but rather there would be a direct relationship between the shareholders and the 
company, even though the companies hold a separate legal person in their own right, which is 
distinct from that of its shareholders. The First Hall Civil Court accepted the Bank’s argument, 
and the claimant appealed. The Court of Appeal went into the details of the defendant 
                                                 
525 18/03/1983 (First Hall Civil Court) 
526 22/01/1973 (Court of Appeal) 
527 30/05/2001 (Court of Appeal) Cit. Nru. 82/1990/1 
188 
companies to illustrate that the First Hall Civil Court rightly reached its decision in accepting 
the Bank’s reasoning. It found out that F&R Holdings Ltd was registered on 28th October, 1977. 
The two shareholders and directors were Inez Scicluna and Raymond Agius, but it transpired 
from the annual return dated 27th December 1977 that the shares were transferred to their minor 
children, who were the claimants. Winston Carbone was appointed director on the 26th May, 
1978 instead of the other two directors and an amendment to the memorandum and articles of 
association of the company was made to reflect this change. Reference to Article 55 of the 
articles of the company was made which specified that any deed must be signed or executed 
by the managing director or by any other director or by any person delegated by the board of 
directors. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal noted that Winston Carbone had the right and duty 
to act on behalf of the company as its director and to sign contracts. With respect to the other 
defendant company, Everest Contractors Limited, the Court of Appeal noted that it was 
registered on 6th February, 1985 and Winston Carbone, together with his wife Vernie Carbone, 
were appointed as directors instead of the former directors on 10th September, 1985. Another 
defendant company was The Orangery Limited, which was registered on 30th September, 1983 
and the claimants were the shareholders with the defendant Winston Carbone, being also the 
sole director. The Court of Appeal, therefore, noted that he had a right to represent these 
companies as well. The last defendant company was Overseas Trading Company Limited, later 
on known as Burlington Holdings Limited, and was registered on 31st May, 1972. The original 
shareholders were Walter and Mary Cassar, but their shares were later on transferred to F&R 
Holdings Ltd, above referred, and to Winston Carbone. Walter and Mary Cassar also resigned 
as directors and Winston Carbone was appointed in their stead. 
 
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal made reference to the English legal system, which 
distinguishes between acts entered into which are beyond the objects clause of the company 
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and those other acts which are not beyond the objects clause but directors define this objects 
clause in general terms. In the first instance, the contract is always null, but in the second 
instance, the contract may be ratified by the company. The Court pointed out that one has to 
look at mandate law to fully understand the ratification process when the mandatary goes 
beyond the powers conferred. Again, the Court of Appeal made reference to the mandate 
provision as enacted in the Maltese Civil Code 1870 that a mandator is not bound by anything 
done by the mandatary beyond their powers, unless such act is expressly or tacitly ratified by 
the mandator. The Court, therefore, rejected the appeal and upheld the First Hall Civil Court’s 
decision, as Winston Carbone was a director of all the defendant companies and had acted 
within the powers conferred upon him by the memorandum and articles of association of those 
companies. 
 
Another judgment that applied the law of mandate because it was filed before 2003, and in 
which any reference to the English legal system would have been deemed inappropriate, was 
Catherine, wife of Joseph Galea v Milica Micovic as a director of the company B. Tagliaferro 
& Sons Ltd.528 The claimant alleged that a promise of sale dated 25th February, 1991, which 
was later extended by a note dated 31st March, 1993, was signed between the claimant and the 
defendant. The defendant thus obliged itself to sell and transfer the temporary lease that still 
had to run on a property together with a third undivided share of the common parts of which 
the said property formed part, to the claimant. The claimant alleged that the defendant company 
had been reluctant to comply and the Court was asked for an order of specific performance. 
The defendant argued that the note for extension of the promise of sale was not signed by two 
directors of the company, as was required by the memorandum and articles of association. The 
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claimant tried to rebut this by citing the English doctrine of ostensible authority, which provides 
that if an outsider deals in good faith with the company, that individual has a right to enforce 
the contract irrespective of any limitations that may have been imposed on the director, and 
made reference to the English judgment Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties 
(Magal) Ltd.529 The First Hall Civil Court dismissed the claimant’s argument on the basis that 
the claimant’s father was the defendant company’s auditor and he should have informed the 
claimant that the extension was not properly signed. Thus the promise of sale expired. In doing 
so, the Court cited Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd.530 and also repeated that if a third party 
knew or ought to have known of any limitations imposed on directors, then the contract would 
be null and cannot be enforced against the company. 
 
This case was appealed, but the judgement was upheld by the Court of Appeal but this Court 
also specifically dismissed any reference to the English legal system made by the First Hall 
Civil Court and opted to only apply the law of mandate as enacted under the Maltese Civil 
Code 1870. As a result, the decision reached by the Court of Appeal was purely based on the 
Maltese law and Maltese res judicata judgments. The Court noted that the promise of sale was 
signed in 1991 and was extended in 1993, and any reference to the 1995 Act and its influences 
of the English legal system would have, consequently, been irrelevant. To fully demonstrate 
that only mandate law was to apply in this particular case, the Court also made reference to 
Advocate Doctor Ian Refalo noe v Albert David Boweck and Cremona and the argument that 
the directors are mandataries in their dealings with the company and are agents when they are 
dealing on behalf of the company with third parties. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal pointed 
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out that any director had to act within the limits imposed upon them by the memorandum and 
articles of association of the company. Brief reference was made to the changes brought about 
by the 1995 Act, which states that any limitations on the powers of the board of directors cannot 
be relied on against third parties, if the third party would have acted in good faith with the 
company. However the Court of Appeal also pointed out that these changes were not in force 
at the material time and could not, therefore, be applied or referred to. 
 
A further case that correctly applied the law of mandate was Video-On-Line Limited v Ian 
Giles.531 In this case, the Court of Appeal only made reference to mandate law and did not 
mention any English judgments or make any references to the fiduciary character enjoyed by 
the directors. The claimant argued that the claimant company and another company, Global 
Services Limited, signed an agreement dated 22nd October 1999 which dealt with electronic 
infrastructure, but that payment was outstanding. The same agreement also indicated that the 
person responsible for the works for and on behalf of Global Services Limited was Ian Giles, 
the defendant. Giles, however, argued that he was not the legitimate party, but the company 
party to the agreement was the legitimate party. He also pointed out that the company party to 
the agreement and represented by him was never constituted in accordance with Maltese law. 
The Court of Magistrates in its civil jurisdiction felt that it did not need to delve much into the 
circumstances and readily accepted the defendant’s argument on the basis that the agreement 
was between two companies and Ian Giles was not the legitimate party. The claimant appealed 
and on appeal, it was held that since the company was not constituted in accordance with 
Maltese law, Giles personally should be bound by the agreement and not the company. The 
Court remarked that it was indisputable that a director of a company is considered as the 
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mandatary of that company with respect to the interactions with the company itself while a 
director is considered to be the representative of the company with regards to the third party 
dealings, again making reference to Advocate Doctor Anthony H Farrugia as a special 
mandatary of the minors Fabienne Carbone and Rowan Carbone v Vernie Carbone for and on 
behalf of various companies and Agostino sive Winston Carbone, together with Advocate Dr. 
Eric Mamo, for and on behalf of other companies. It also pointed out that these company law 
principles can only apply when the company is legally constituted. It, therefore, overturned the 
first decision and allowed the claimant’s appeal, with the result that the defendant was found 
personally liable for the execution of the contract. 
 
Another Maltese judgment that correctly applied the law of the time was Francis Busuttil and 
Sons Limited v Christopher Apap and Reflex Computer Systems (Malta) Limited.532 In this case, 
The Court of Appeal resorted to the statute law when the action was filed and not when the 
action was adjudicated. The Court made reference to mandate law and applied the fiduciary 
duty of directors within the limits of interpretation of such mandate law. The claimant company 
filed the action on 14th February 1997, and alleged that the defendants had to install computer 
software on the premises of the claimant company, but the defendants did not abide by the 
contract, failed to carry out the works within the specified time limits and also carried out 
defective work, resulting in damage. The defendants argued that the claimant company was in 
fact making use of the software installed, and more time was needed than agreed because the 
claimant company was always changing the required specifications. The defendant company 
also claimed that the defendant, Christopher Apap, should be personally responsible for the 
works and not the company itself. The First Hall Civil Court decided that Apap was not the 
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legitimate party to this action and only found the defendant company in breach of the contract. 
The claimant appealed because Apap was not found personally liable for the execution of the 
contract, together with the defendant company. The Court of Appeal held that any company, 
as a mandator, needs to expressly or tacitly accept and ratify the operations of its directors who 
act as its mandatary for such operations to be fully complied by the company when the directors 
act beyond the powers conferred to them. However, in this case, the Court was convinced that 
the defendant company expressly showed that it had ratified Apap’s actions who was acting as 
the defendant company’s director. Accordingly, the Court also came to the conclusion that the 
defendant company was fully responsible for the damages suffered by the claimant, and Apap 
could not be held personally liable for any damages suffered by the claimant company. In 
reaching its decision to award damages to the claimant company, the Court of Appeal agreed 
with the First Hall Civil Court’s observations, and pointed out that the works undertaken by 
the defendant company were not up to standard and had many defects. 
 
The applicability of mandate law within the limits of the English influences, as introduced in 
the 1995 Maltese Act, was again correctly resorted to in Deirdre and John Cachia v Gaba 
Diamonds Company Limited.533 The claimants filed the action on 29th October, 1998, in which 
they alleged that they entered into a private agreement dated 17th June, 1996 with the defendant 
company. The defendant company was given under a title of lease premises and a garage. The 
claimants alleged that the defendant terminated the lease without notice, which resulted in loss 
suffered by the claimants. The defendant company tried to rebut the claim and responded that 
Cremona, as one of the two directors of the defendant company, did not have power to solely 
sign the private agreement in question, which had to be signed by both directors, as clearly 
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provided for by the memorandum and articles of association. The defendant also argued that it 
had every right to terminate immediately this lease agreement as and when desired. The First 
Hall Civil Court, although it did not make any specific reference to the law of mandate, applied 
the principle of ratification for when an action is not correctly entered into by the directors of 
the company in accordance with its memorandum and articles of association. The Court, 
therefore, said that when directors act beyond the powers conferred upon them, the company 
must ratify those acts to be bound by it as the directors would otherwise be liable for those acts. 
As a result, the Court rejected the claim on the basis that the lease was not signed by both 
directors as required by the memorandum and articles of association. The Court also made 
reference to Article 1233 of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 to substantiate its argument, which 
states that any lease entered into for a period of more than two years shall be signed by all the 
involved parties to be considered a valid agreement. This lease agreement was, therefore, 
invalid. The claimants appealed and on appeal, the Court of Appeal, overturned the earlier 
decision and held that, although it is an established principle that the memorandum and articles 
of association is public and can be easily accessible by third parties, the law also provides for 
the principle that when a third party is morally and legally convinced that the act entered into 
is not against the company’s powers, any technical impediment by the directors must not lead 
to prejudice against the third party. The Court pointed out that a director, as a mandatary of the 
company, had an obligation to act within the limits of the mandate given. However, the Court 
also said that the third party protection, as influenced by the English legal system, introduced 
by the 1995 Act had to be applied in this case since this was an action filed after that time. The 
Court pointed out that a third party does not have the duty to ask for any mandate that is signed 
between the company and its directors, making reference to the English judgment Royal British 
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Bank v Turquand534 and to the Maltese judgment in Borg v Camilleri,535 which itself made 
reference to the Turquand principle. The Court of Appeal, consequently, accepted the 
claimants’ claim for damages and found the defendant company liable.  
 
5.3.1.2 Applicability of the English legal system when an uncertainty is present 
Although the law of mandate should have been applied in its entirety, the Maltese Courts felt, 
in one particular instance, to observe that the Maltese legal system may resort to the English 
legal system whenever a particular circumstance is not covered by Maltese law presents itself 
and the law of mandate cannot, accordingly, be adequately applied to interpret the fiduciary 
duty of directors. 
 
This approach was applied in Giovanni Anastasi noe v Kaptan Serafino Xuereb M.B.E and 
Construction Limited,536 in which the Maltese Commercial Court declared that the directors 
should be considered as mandataries. The claimant alleged that he entered into a contract with 
the defendant company, Construction Limited, for the manufacture and sale of furniture by a 
contract dated 23rd April 1950. Construction Limited was composed of Strickland and Xuereb, 
who were appointed as directors, together with the claimant also appointed as director. The 
claimant was also the director of Malta Industrial Arts Limited. The defendants unilaterally 
decided on 14th May 1951, to close the factory but the claimant was not present to this Board 
meeting. The claimant was informed of the meeting just few hours before it was due to start, 
but he could not attend and was not informed of the agenda. Due to the decision taken by the 
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other two directors, the claimant alleged that he could not exercise his rights as a director and, 
therefore, asked the Commercial Court to declare the decision taken by the defendants as null. 
The Commercial Court pointed out that the Maltese law was still very much weak in the field 
of company law, and reference to the English legal system seems appropriate in such 
circumstance. In this regard, the presiding judge observed that companies being formed in 
Malta were modelled on the United Kingdom’s Companies Act 1948, and in cases of 
uncertainties, reference to the English legal system was therefore appropriate. Since in this 
particular case the presiding judge observed that the articles of association of the company were 
not formulated, reference to the English legal system had to be made, especially with respect 
to the regulation of the management of the company. Accordingly, the Commercial Court drew 
a distinction between a general meeting and a board of directors’ meeting, and declared that 
the agenda shall be given in full detail only with respect to a general meeting, as also provided 
for by the English and Italian legal systems. This was an action challenging a decision taken 
by the board of directors in which the English legal system does not provide that a detailed 
agenda shall be provided for such meetings, unless the articles of association do not indicate 
otherwise. The Maltese Commercial Court however also felt it appropriate to make reference 
to mandate law and said that the directors of the company shall be considered mandataries. 
Nevertheless, the Commercial Court did not take a final decision as it was of the opinion that 
it was up to the shareholders to decide what should happen of the company, and not the Courts. 
 
5.3.1.3 Applicability of Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995, together with the 
law of mandate 
For cases filed before 2003, the Maltese Courts should have applied the law of mandate and 
any other provision that was specifically enacted in the Commercial Ordinances or Acts. 
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Accordingly, any reference to Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 and its ancillary 
fiduciary provisions should be considered irrelevant because the 2003 and 2004 provisions 
were not in force at the time of the filing and a person can only be judged on the law at the time 
of the filing of the case and not afterwards. If after the filing of the action, the breach starts to 
be considered as legal or more penalties are added it should not affect the outcome. 
 
The Maltese Courts have, however, sometimes confused the correct application of the Maltese 
law, by having intertwined the mandate law and other specific provisions as enacted in the 
Ordinances and Acts with Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995, as can be seen in Emanuel 
Chircop v Carmel sive Charles Busuttil.537 In this judgment, the Maltese Courts misapplied the 
law when referring to the fiduciary duty of directors because, although this particular case was 
filed before 2003, it was ultimately decided under Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995. 
This particular action became res judicata in 2013, but the Maltese Courts should have only 
made reference to the applicable law that was in force when it was filed. The case concerned 
the company Continental Postform Limited, which was registered as a limited liability 
company on 28th January 1992 and which stopped operating in 1997 to be eventually liquidated 
in 1999. The action was filed by the claimant in 1997 lamenting the maladministration that 
took place in the company by the defendant, Carmel sive Charles Busuttil, before 1997. 
Chircop claimed that the company was equally held and administered by the claimant and 
defendant,  in that they were equal shareholders and that they were also the sole directors. 
Although they were both vested with the administration of the company, as required by the 
memorandum and articles of association of the company, the claimant stated that only the 
defendant took care of the financial position of the company. The claimant suspected that the 
                                                 
537 12/11/2013 (First Hall Civil Court) Cit. Nru. 1223/1997/1 
198 
financial position of the company was not as good as it should have been, and he therefore 
appointed auditors to check for any cash discrepancies, which ultimately confirmed his 
suspicions. Chircop asked the Court to hold the defendant liable for any loss that was suffered 
by the company. The defendant refuted the claim asserting that the cash variances amounted to 
remuneration owed to the defendant for the work done by him for the company. The defendant 
also pointed out that the money was put in envelopes and handed over to the secretary and that 
the cheques were signed by both directors. The First Hall Civil Court pointed out that the cash 
variances that occurred between 1987 and 1991 could not be taken into consideration since the 
company was formed in 1992. It also appointed an expert, Kevin Mahoney, to help it better 
understand the management of the company. Mahoney drew up two reports, but could not come 
to a conclusion since he said that that he did not have enough documentation to which he could 
refer, even though attempts had been made to compile as much evidence as possible. He also 
referred to a report by Tony Cassar and Anthony Darmanin, who were jointly appointed by the 
claimant and the defendant to attempt to come to a reasonable conclusion on the management 
and financial position of the company. Cassar and Darmanin reported that the turnover was 
underrported, thus leading to the conclusion that mismanagement had taken place. While the 
Court acknowledged that there were cash discrepancies, it found that the claimant failed to 
bring clear evidence that the defendant was taking the company’s money for his own personal 
benefit. The Court further pointed out that the fact that the defendant bought several properties 
in a limited amount of time was not a sufficient proof that he took money from the company 
as he also had other business interests. Consequently, the First Hall Civil Court rejected the 
claim. However, what is even more interesting is to evaluate on what reasons the Court reached 
its decision. In fact, in this regard, it is important to understand what law was applied by the 
First Hall Civil Court in this particular case. In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged 
that the claimant’s action was filed in accordance with Article 136 A of the Companies Act 
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1995, which requires that a director shall act with honesty and in good faith in the best interest 
of the company. The Court nonetheless also said that a director shall be considered a mandatary 
of that particular company that they manage which creates a fiduciary relationship with that 
company. Regrettably, therefore, one problem that had arisen was that although the company 
was formed in 1992 and the cash variances had occurred from 1987 until 1997, reference to 
the new Article as enacted in 2003 was also made, rather than the law of mandate and any other 
provision that was in force before 1997. 
 
The same misinterpretation was again reached in Advocate Doctor Victor Emanuel Ragonesi v 
Albert Stagno Navarro and Architect Frank Giormaina Medici in their own name and also as 
directors of Heritage Estates Limited;538 in which judgment the Maltese Court of Appeal also 
made reference to Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995, even though this case 
was filed before 2003. The claimant filed an action with respect to a promise of sale dated 10th 
March, 2000, which was signed by the defendant Albert Stagno Navarra in the name of the 
company, Heritage Estates Limited, and by the claimant for the sale of property. The claimant 
paid the whole amount to the defendant on the promise of sale, but one of the conditions in the 
promise was that the defendant would have to repay the whole amount back to the claimant if 
the promise of sale did not solidify into a contract of sale due to any issue impugned to the 
defendant. In fact, it transpired that the promise of sale could not be materialised because the 
defendant had already sold the same property  to someone else. The First Hall Civil Court gave 
judgement on 14th November 2005, and ordered the defendants to repay the claimant the 
amount for the property. The defendants appealed. The Court made reference to Article 136 A 
(1) of the Companies Act 1995, which states that directors have a duty to act with loyalty and 
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in the best interest of the company.  However, although the First Hall Civil Court and also the 
Court of Appeal were of the opinion that the claimant has suffered damages, the Court of 
Appeal overturned the earlier decision because it was of the opinion that a third party has to 
first ask the Court for the company to be struck off to thereafter be in a position to receive 
damages when the third party alleges bad faith on the part of the directors for and on behalf of 
the company. The Court pointed out that the claimant had not asked for the striking off of the 
company, and so could not be awarded damages. 
 
5.3.2 Case law filed post-2003 
5.3.2.1 Applicability of Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 only 
For cases filed after the coming into force of Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act in 
2003, reference to mandate law should have been abolished and most Maltese judges and 
magistrates correctly decided to limit their interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors to 
Article 136 A. 
 
One of the first judgments that suitably applied the law was Oreste Cilia pro et noe v Daniel 
Cilia pro et noe et.539 In this case, the claimant filed the action on 1st October, 2004; the details 
of the case are given in Section 4.4.1. The First Hall Civil Court declared that a director has to 
abide by the duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company, as listed under 
Article 136 A of the 2003 Act. 
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Another judgment which correctly applied the law is Advocate Doctor Jean C Farrugia noe v 
Aqua Oasis Limited (C 41157) and Dorte Rickert as the shareholder and director of the 
company,540 the details of which can be found in Section 4.4. The First Hall Civil Court reached 
the conclusion that the defendant failed to abide by her duties under Article 136 A Companies 
Act 1995 and was found liable for the damages suffered by the defendant company. 
 
The correct application of the law was again applied in the Maltese judgment Architect 
Mariello Spiteri v Registry of Companies et541 (vide Section 4.4.2). Reference to Article 136 A 
of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 was made by the First Hall Civil Court, which held that 
every director is responsible for the general governance of the company, and so every director 
of every company was bound by this fiduciary duty without any exceptions. As a result, the 
Court accepted the Registry of Companies’ argument and found the claimant liable. 
 
Specific reference to Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 was again made by the 
Court of Appeal in Architect Raymond Vassallo pro et noe et v Anthony Parlato Trigona et542 
(vide Section 4.4.1) where the Court of Appeal held that the defendants, as directors, must act 
in good faith and the best interest of the company in accordance with Article 136 A. The Court 
of Appeal decided that the defendants made secret and personal profits from their position of 
directors without having sought the prior approval of the company. However, the defendants 
were then acquitted on the basis that the claimants had not filed the action properly.  
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Just one month later, the First Hall Civil Court, again, made reference to Article 136 A of the 
Companies Act 1995 to interpret the fiduciary duty of directors in the judgment Mark Hogg 
noe v Terra Sana Ltd et543 (vide Section 4.4.5). The First Hall Civil Court held that the directors 
were in breach of their fiduciary duty imposed under Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 
because the Court reached the conclusion that the claimant was not provided with all the 
information that the defendants had and also that whenever the directors’ interests were to 
conflict with those of the company, they were bound to seek prior approval in the general 
meeting or they had to ensure that their conflict of interest was approved as per the 
memorandum and articles of association. 
 
5.3.2.2 Applicability of Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 and the fiduciary 
provisions of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 
Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 are used when the person in question 
does not hold the exclusive title of a director, and thus Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies 
Act 2003 cannot apply. The Maltese Courts have rightly applied these provisions as will be 
analysed below.  
 
The correct application of the law was made by the Maltese Courts in Amadeo Balzan v Central 
Holidays (Travel and Tourism Ltd) and Alexandra Balzan Ruggier et544 (vide Section 4.5) In 
this case, reference only to Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 was made by the First 
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Hall Civil Court because it was an action filed after 2003 by a director of the company against 
another director of the same company. This claimant filed this action on 17th June 2011. The 
claimant based his case on Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 and on Articles 1124 A 
and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870. However, the First Hall Civil Court felt it necessary to 
draw a distinction between the statutory provision as enacted in the Companies Act 1995 and 
the statutory provisions as enacted in the Civil Code 1870. In this regard, the Court pointed out 
that article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 shall be considered as the lex specialis which 
can only be invoked by a director against another director of the company whereas articles 
1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 are referred to as the lex generalis and can only 
be applied when article 136 A cannot hold ground. In this regard, the Court reached the 
conclusion that the claimant’s claim cannot hold because he was not a director during the 
course of action.  
 
The new provisions of the Civil Code 1870 were, however, correctly applied in Anthony 
Caruana and Sons Limited et v Christopher Caruana545 since the defendant was employed as 
a general manager and did not expressly hold the title of a director (vide Section 4.5). The 
Court, therefore, felt compelled to make reference to Article 1124 A of the Civil Code 1870 
when passing judgement on the issues of confidentiality and the duty to act in the best interest 
of their appointer. The Court also referred to the English judgment University of Nottingham v 
Fishel546, incorrectly noting that the fiduciary obligations concept had been introduced into the 
Maltese legal system due to the English influences. This English judgment, nevertheless, 
concluded that an employment relationship is not fiduciary, and the fiduciary duty shall 
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therefore not apply to the employee. Reference was also made to the English judgment 
Korbond Industries Ltd v Jenkins,547 in which the Court decided that a distinction must be 
drawn between a person who is a decision maker and a person who only holds a senior position. 
Reference to old Maltese judgments548 that also assert that an employee may compete with the 
employer after terminating his contract was also made. As a result, the claimant’s action was 
deemed unsuccessful. Nonetheless, the claim was successful on appeal, whereby the Court of 
Appeal made specific reference to various legal scholars549 and a Maltese judgment550 and 
concluded that Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 did not introduce a new 
concept into the Maltese legal system, but rather clarified the previous situation as regulated 
by Roman Law of what this fiduciary entails and who shall be bound by it, in view of which 
the Court of Appeal decided that the defendant was bound by the fiduciary duty due to his 
position of general manager as any other director and was, therefore, liable for damages 
suffered by the claimant.  
 
5.3.2.3 Applicability of mandate law together with Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies 
Act 1995 and the fiduciary provisions of the Civil Code 1870 
For case law filed after the coming into force of Article 136 A in the Companies Act 1995 and 
Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870, reference to mandate law should not 
have been made by the Maltese Courts, since it had been replaced by these Articles. Yet, the 
Maltese Courts have, on occasion, continued to refer to it. This is surprising since the fiduciary 
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duty of directors is interpreted differently under the law of mandate and under Article 136 A 
of the Companies Act 1995, as we saw in Chapter 4. 
 
One judgment that referred to mandate law even though the action was filed after the coming 
into force of Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 was Enemalta Corporation v 
Vella Group Limited and John Mary Vella.551 The claimant filed this action for damages that 
were suffered when the defendants were carrying out road works and cut the electricity supply. 
The claimant company asserted that the damage was caused due to the negligence of the 
defendants, and that there was not even any prior consultation between the parties involved to 
fully understand where the electricity wires were laid. The defendant company pleaded that the 
action was time barred under Maltese law, and should this plea not subsist, it still cannot be 
held liable for the damage as it had done nothing wrong. The other defendant, John Mary sive 
Jimmy Vella, argued that he could not be held personally liable for the damages since these 
works were undertaken by the company in its own name. The Small Claims Tribunal cited 
Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 and decided that if a director acted beyond 
the powers provided to him by the memorandum and articles of association of the company, 
that director shall be held personally liable for any damage that may be incurred. It concluded 
that Jimmy Vella, as a director, had to personally answer for the damage caused to the claimant 
company because he had acted beyond the powers given to him by the company since he acted 
before the permits were issued and did not act in good faith in the best interest of the company. 
Jimmy Vella appealed the Tribunal’s decision and said that Article 136 A of the Maltese 
Companies Act 1995 should only apply with regards to relationships between the director and 
the company, and not between the director as representing the company and a third party. He 
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argued that he only undertook the works and gave the necessary instructions as a mandatary of 
the company. The Court of Appeal upheld the Tribunal’s decision and found him personally 
liable for the damages suffered by the claimant company. Regrettably, the Court did not 
specifically exclude the reference made by the defendant to mandate law. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeal seems to have accepted the concurrent reference to mandate law and Article 
136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995. 
 
In another instance, an undesirable result was also reached whereby albeit mention to Article 
136 A of the Companies Act 1995 was not made, reference to both the fiduciary provisions of 
the Maltese Civil Code 1870 and mandate law was made. This judgment is Vascas Enterprises 
Limited v Adrian Ellul552 (vide Section 4.5). In this case, the First Hall Civil Court established 
that the directors of a company shall be considered as the mandataries of the company and their 
duties governed by Article 1124 A of the Maltese Civil Code 1870, if that individual is not 
explicitly appointed as a director. The Court thus linked the fiduciary statute law provisions 
and mandate law together, and applied them interchangeably. The reason for linking these two 
statutory provisions was probably because Article 1124 A did not introduce a new concept into 
statute law, but rather clarified what the position had always been. Nevertheless, a fiduciary 
and a mandatary have different duties, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 4, with the consequence 
that the Court’s approach was erroneous in this case. 
 
The application of Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995, together with the law of 
mandate was again found in Jane Chircop et v Robert Mizzi pro et noe et553 (vide Section 4.4.1) 
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In its judgement, the Court made reference to the notion that the company is the mandator and 
the directors are, therefore, its mandataries. It also made reference to Article 136 A of the 
Companies Act 1995 which states that directors are duty bound to act in good faith and in the 
best interest of the company.  
 
5.3.2.4 Applicability of mandate law only 
In other instances, the Maltese Courts have completely misinterpreted the fiduciary duty of 
directors since 2003 by having applied only the law of mandate, as can be evidently seen in 
Sirap Limited v IT 2010 Limited et.554 This case was not filed by a director against another 
director of the same company, but reference to mandate law in the context of the fiduciary duty 
of directors was still made. The claimant company filed an action on 3rd June 2010, alleging 
that the claimant company requested the defendant company, among others, to pay a sum of 
money for goods sold to the defendant company. The Court made reference to the claimant’s 
observation that the directors are considered mandataries in their relationships with the 
company and as agents when representing the company with third parties, and also made 
reference to Advocate Doctor Anthony H Farrugia as a special mandatary of the minors 
Fabienne Carbone and Rowan Carbone v Vernie Carbone for and on behalf of various 
companies and Agostino sive Winston Carbone, together with Advocate Dr. Eric Mamo, for 
and on behalf of other companies,555 (vide Section 4.3.6) a judgment that was decided before 
2003. The Court of Magistrates should have pointed out that any observation made in terms of 
mandate law with respect to the interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors shall be 
disregarded in any action filed after 2003 due to the enactment and coming into force of Article 
                                                 
554 7/10/2013 (Court of Magistrates) Cit. Nru. 206/2010 
555 30/05/2001 (Court of Appeal) Cit. Nru. 82/1990/1 
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136 A in the Maltese Companies Act 1995. Ultimately, the Court found the defendant company 
liable for the damages, but did not find the director of the defendant company liable since it 
believed that the director shall be held personally liable only when the company is in 
liquidation. 
 
The same erroneous interpretation with respect to the applicable law to the fiduciary duty of 
directors was also applied in SRAM Limited v Geomike Limited et.556 As with the previous 
judgment, this case was not filed by a director against another director of the same company, 
but reference to mandate law in the context of the fiduciary duty of directors was still made. 
The claimant company filed an action against the defendant company and its director on 3rd 
May 2011 for damage suffered by poor building work. The defendant company asserted that it 
should not be held responsible for anything as it had never entered into any agreement with the 
claimant company. To understand whether the company alone or the other defendant should 
be held liable, the Court made reference to mandate law when referring to the fiduciary duty 
of directors. It held that directors shall be considered agents or mandataries of the company, 
and that the company enjoys a separate legal personality from its shareholders. Drawing on 
precedent and academic writing,557 it stated that: 
‘according to law, directors, in their dealings with the company are the 
mandataries of, and in their internal dealings with third parties are the agents of 
the company. In the former case the general principles of the law of mandate 
and in the latter case those of the law of agency would apply’.  
 
                                                 
556 18/11/2013 (Court of Magistrates) Cit. Nru 146/2011 
557 The courts cited F. Cremona, The Law on Commercial Partnerships in Malta, pp. 108, Advocate Doctor Ian 
Refalo noe v. David Boweck et, decided by the First Hall Civil Court on the 18th March, 1983 and Catherine Galea 
v. Milica Micovic noe, Cit. Nru.271/93 decided by the First Hall Civil Court on 13th November 1995 and confirmed 
on appeal on 19th November, 2001. All of these judgments were analysed above 
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The Court, therefore, held that the defendant, John Cauchi, shall not be held liable for the 
claimant’s actions, but the defendant company was found liable for the damages suffered by 
the claimant company as John Cauchi was acting for and on behalf of the company. 
 
The same inappropriate reasoning based on mandate law was once more reached in the Maltese 
judgment Central Holidays (Travel Agents and Organisers) Limited v Alexandra Balzan 
Ruggier et558 (vide Section 4.5). Reference to the law of mandate was, therefore, again applied 
with respect to the fiduciary duty of directors. The case concerned non-payment of an earlier 
debt and recovery of the value, but the key issue here is that Alexandra Balzan Ruggier, 
contended that the premises in question were given under lease to her and Amadeo Balzan, as 
directors of the company Central Travel Holidays & Tourism Ltd, to use as a travel agency. 
This lease was signed by Amadeo Balzan on behalf of the company of which he was . Amadeo 
Balzan was a director until 20th October, 2008. The same lease continued to appertain to both 
of them, even after the premises were transferred to another company. The First Hall Civil 
Court concluded that, since Amadeo Balzan was a director of the company in April 2008, he 
could enter into a lease agreement for and on behalf of the company with the claimant company. 
The Court pointed out that it is an indisputable principle that a director is considered a 
mandatary of the company with respect to his relationships with the company, whereas he is 
considered as the representative of that company for the relationships between the company 
and third parties.559 Consequently, the First Hall Civil Court once again decided that the 
defendants, as directors of the companies in question, were liable for the damages suffered by 
the claimant and have to pay accordingly. 
                                                 
558 23/3/2015 (First Hall Civil Court) Cit. Nru 116/2011 
559 The Court cited Farrugia v Carbone in this respect (30/03/2001), which was analysed above 
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 Conclusion 
Over the past century, only 25 judgments have been handed down by the Maltese Courts that I 
am aware of that specifically deal with the interpretation and application of the fiduciary duty 
of directors. As can be seen from these res judicata judgments, some judges and magistrates 
have correctly applied the law, but others have, unfortunately, misapplied it. Some persons of 
the judiciary applied Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 even to actions filed 
before the coming into force of the Article, while others applied mandate law for actions filed 
after the coming into force of Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
This dissertation has examined the fiduciary duty of company directors under the Maltese legal 
system as an example of legal transplantation as presented under statute law and by the 
judiciary from the 19th century until the present date. It culminated in a description of the 
detailed factors that have hindered the full effectiveness of legal transplantation in the Maltese 
context, as seen through the regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors. Chapter 1 presented 
several factors that have affected the smooth legal transplantation process in the Maltese 
context, both from a statutory perspective and also with respect to the Maltese judiciary. These 
factors included the historical, cultural, societal, prestige, economic and political factors, 
together with familiarity with the law, and the courts’ influence. 
 
These factors have led the Maltese statutory process to be influenced by the Italian and English 
legal systems. They led to the application of mandate law, as influenced by the Italian legal 
system, to be the first law to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors, but from the 1940s, the 
British influence grew in the Maltese legal system, with the result that until 2003, the Italian 
and English legal systems were concurrently applied. It also argued that since 2003, the English 
legal system was solely relied on by legislators to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors. The 
study also suggested that these factors have led to literal borrowing from the Italian legal 
system, but less so from the English legal system. There was also the enactment of two other 
provisions in which the Maltese legislators’ invention should be considered unique since 
Roman law was solely resorted to ensuring that any fiduciary relationship between two persons, 
irrespective of their title, is thoroughly regulated.   
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This thesis has also presented the notion that these factors have led the majority of the Maltese 
judiciary to depart from the statutory approach over time and to create their own unique 
interpretation of the applicable statute law. It observed that there was no smooth transition in 
the application of statute law by the majority of the Maltese judiciary. In fact, this study 
demonstrated that there were cases filed before 2003, but because the judgment was delivered 
after 2003, the presiding judge felt the need to make reference to the law as it was before 2003. 
However, there were other judges and magistrates who felt the desire to make reference to 
mandate law for an action filed after 2003. It was also shown that certain other judges and 
magistrates opined that the English influences had started to grow before the appointment of 
the 1954 Maltese Commission, which provided the basis for the enactment of the 1962 Maltese 
Commercial Ordinance.  
 
Consequently, this dissertation has advanced important technical comparisons through Maltese 
statute law and judicial practice to assess whether legal transplantation in the Maltese context 
can be deemed to have successfully taken place or not. Therefore, by using a comparative legal 
analysis, this study has examined the effectiveness of legal transplantation with respect to the 
regulation and interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors in the Maltese statutory and 
judicial legal system. 
 
In view of this, I can conclude that the thesis presents two observations. First, the factors 
presented under the legal transplant concept have led the Maltese statute law to not always be 
the result of literal borrowing from the two foreign legal systems, since different interpretation 
of the statutory provisions arose under each of the three legal systems (vide Chapter 4); thus 
leading to the conclusion that legal transplantation has only taken place limitedly by the factors 
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presented under Chapter 1. Second, the majority of the Maltese judiciary, especially from the 
1940s onwards, have not always interpreted the law in line with the statutory developments 
since most of the judiciary were interested in other factors than those factors that the Maltese 
legislators were interested in (vide Chapters 3 and 5); thus leading to judicial nihilism (vide 
Chapter 1). 
 
 Key findings 
At first glance, it might seem that the factors presented above have led the legal transplantation 
process to be fully adequate and applicable under the Maltese legal system, in which literal 
borrowing from the Italian and English legal systems might seem to have been nicely 
reproduced in the Maltese legal system. However, when one looks more closely at each of the 
three legal systems, divergences arise that ultimately prove that a legal rule is uniquely 
influenced by the factors mentioned above, which can be categorised among others, as the 
historical, societal, economic and political factors. I can, accordingly, conclude that the factors 
mentioned in Chapter 1 and discussed throughout this thesis have clearly influenced the 
application of the legal transplantation theory in the Maltese context. 
 
Four main findings can be observed. First, a substantial difference in the method of borrowing 
by the Maltese legal system can be observed when influenced by the Italian and English legal 
systems. Whereas literal borrowing can be seen when the Maltese statutory provisions of the 
mandate law were influenced by the Italian legal system, substantial changes to Article 136 A 
of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 were carried out when this provision was influenced by 
the English legal system. Accordingly, a partial and selective approach was applied by the 
Maltese legislators to the English influences as opposed to the Italian influences. Second, it is 
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seen that the fiduciary provisions in Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 
enacted in 2004 were not influenced by the Italian or English legal systems, but were entirely 
an idea of the Maltese legislators to ensure that any fiduciary relationship between persons is 
regulated. These provisions were influenced by Roman law and their introduction into the 
Maltese legal system clearly shows the country’s historical ties to the civil legal system, which 
have remained very strong. Such a unique Maltese approach was discussed in Anthony 
Caruana and Sons Limited et v Christopher Caruana560 (vide Chapters 4 and 5), when the 
Court of Appeal made specific reference to various Maltese judgments and legal scholars to 
determine that Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870 did not introduce a new 
concept into the Maltese legal system, but rather clarified the situation that has always applied 
under the Maltese legal system. Third, this study showed that the Court’s influence has led to 
its own conclusions, which have not always coincided with the path taken by the statutory 
developments, as influenced by the two foreign bodies, namely the Italian and English legal 
systems. Fourth, a brief examination shall be presented to demonstrate whether legal 
transplantation is observed under other areas of Maltese statute law as well and a discussion is 
presented to understand whether this transplantation process varies whether a civil or a 
common legal system is resorted to.  
 
6.1.1 Borrowing from the Italian and English legal systems  
With respect to the first deduction, and thus to the pattern observed under the Maltese legal 
system, a substantial difference between the influences exerted by the Italian and English legal 
systems is observed.  
                                                 
560 28/02/2014 (Court of Appeal) Cit Nru. 573/2005/1 
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Literal borrowing, or borrowing-transposition, is observed from the Italian legal system with 
the enactment of the mandate provisions under the Maltese Civil Code 1870. Certain legal 
scholars refer to this type of borrowing as legal translation wherein ‘the translator’s task is to 
reconstruct the form and substance of the source text as closely as possible’.561 Such exact 
borrowing could have taken place due to three reasons. First, as was already pointed out in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, Maltese legislators realised that the mandate provisions were perfectly 
working under the Italian legal system to regulate the fiduciary duty of directors and there was, 
thus, no need for any particular change. Second, such literal borrowing was possible because 
Maltese legislators at the time of the enactment of the mandate provisions under the Maltese 
Civil Code 1870 were very much interested in the historical, societal and cultural ties that the 
Maltese legal system enjoyed to the Italian legal system, together with the Maltese familiarity 
with the Italian legal system, as demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Accordingly, such 
legal borrowing resulted in the similarities exhibited between the Italian legal system, as the 
donor, and the Maltese legal system, as the recipient.562  Third, apart from the detailed 
differences outlined above, there might also be a more generic reason that can explain the 
differences between the type of adaptations when the Italian and English legal systems were 
resorted to. This third reason presents the notion that these discrepancies in the type of 
borrowing cannot only be attributed to the diverse country of origin with different economic 
backgrounds and different times when the provisions under the Maltese and English legal 
systems were enacted. In fact, this might be because the mandate law is looked upon as a 
                                                 
561 Susan Sarcevic, ‘Legal Translation and Translation Theory: a Receiver-oriented Approach’, University of 
Rijeka, Croatia <http://www.tradulex.com/Actes2000/sarcevic.pdf> accessed 20 September 2018 and Layachi 
Aissi, ‘An Analytical Study of the Process of Translation’, A Thesis Submitted To The University of Salford 
Faculty of Arts Department of Modern Languages in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 1987 <http://usir.salford.ac.uk/14673/1/DX184754.pdf> accessed 10 July 2018 
562 Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘Legal Transplant of Undue Influence: Lost in Translation or a Working 
Misunderstanding?’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 62(1) · April 2013 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256057447_Legal_Transplant_of_Undue_Influence_Lost_in_Transl
ation_or_a_Working_Misunderstanding> accessed 25 September 2018  
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general law applying to every relationship between two persons, and therefore, there was no 
need to provide for any specific changes when transposed into the Maltese legal system. 
Moreover, should there have been any changes, they would have been suitable for any dual 
relationship, thus leading to a situation in which Dingli’s Commission did not opt for any 
amendments so as not to complicate matters. By contrast, Article 136 A of the Maltese 
Companies Act 1995, which was influenced by the English legal system could only apply to 
directors, and accordingly substantive changes had to be made since Maltese legislators could 
envisage the relationship between the director and the company and understand how to better 
regulate it under the Maltese economic developments. Accordingly, legislators tried to enact a 
tailor made provision to regulate the relationship between directors and companies in 
accordance to the exigencies to the Maltese jurisdiction where many family-run companies are 
formed (vide Chapter 1). These companies lead the duties of directors, shareholders and of the 
company itself to be blurred because the director and the major shareholder is the same person 
and a more emphasis must be placed on the company as distinct from its directors and 
shareholders rather than including the company and the shareholder in one category, if the 
separate legal personality principle of the company is important under the Maltese company 
law.  
 
To fully understand such literal borrowing, the minor differences exhibited by the Maltese 
mandate provisions will be presented below. By contrast, as already pointed out above, 
substantive changes to the statutory provision in Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 
1995 can be observed when a general influence from the English legal system was resorted to. 
An analysis of the substantial differences carried out to the Maltese statute law, precisely to 
Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995, will be presented to fully understand how 
the Maltese statute law was changed. Similarities will also be presented to grasp the level of 
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legal transplantation that has taken place under the Maltese legal system in this respect. As a 
result, therefore, to better understand the level of legal transplantation that has taken place 
under the Maltese legal system, a more careful scrutiny to the similarities and differences 
between the three legal systems can identify the adequateness of legal transplantation. To better 
demonstrate the influences exhibited by the Maltese legal system, a triangle shall be presented 
in which the Italian legal system will be one side, the English legal system another, and the 
direct influences of Roman law shall be the third side.  
 
6.1.1.1 Comparison between the Maltese and Italian legal systems  
The discrepancies between the Maltese and Italian legal systems with respect to the enactment 
and interpretation of the mandate provisions are few and far between, and verbatim clauses 
were reproduced. In fact, only two differences exist.  
 
The first difference deals with the application of the mandate provisions in which the Maltese 
provisions provide that the mandatary does not possess the power to personally sue a third party 
if the mandator is physically present in the Maltese islands. This minor difference, however, 
does not change the substantial element of the action that might be brought against the third 
party under each legal system, but rather clarifies the application and meaning of mandate law.  
Accordingly, this provision strengthens more the principle that a binding relationship between 
the mandator and the third party is the keystone of the application of mandate law. Apart from 
this minor discrepancy, it is observed that with respect to the other mandate provisions, the 
Maltese legal system has simply reproduced the Italian provisions, both linguistically and also 
with respect to their interpretation. 
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The second difference is in the approach taken by the majority of the Maltese judiciary when 
interpreting the term ‘company’. Whereas both Maltese and Italian statute law apply the strict 
separate legal personality principle of the company (vide Chapter 4), the Maltese judiciary tried 
to enhance it to also include shareholders and other interested stakeholders. At the beginning 
of the 19th century, the Maltese judiciary decided to include the significant power the 
shareholders exert on the company, and whose interests must be protected, but which approach 
was not reflected in subsequent Maltese judgments delivered from the 1960s or in Italian statute 
law or in Maltese statute law at that time. Maltese legislators changed their approach in 2004 
wherein the shareholder and stakeholder influences have made a comeback when they decided 
to regulate listed companies through specific rules, and some Maltese judgments also took that 
approach, by which time the Italian legal influences had subsided. Consequently, it seems that 
both legal systems were applying the same principle of the company’s separate legal 
personality in a rigorous manner at times, but there were instances when the Maltese judiciary 
tried to deviate from the principle due to the majority of one-man companies formed in Malta 
(vide Chapter 1).  
 
Accordingly, because only minor differences are observed between these two legal systems, 
legal transplantation from the Italian legal system to the Maltese legal system must be deemed 
to be effective. Literal borrowing of adaption was applied in this particular instance in a very 
effective manner, and its scope might have been adopted because the historical, societal, 
cultural and familiarity with the law played a pivotal role for the Maltese legislators and most 
of the judiciary. 
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6.1.1.2 Comparison between the Maltese and English legal systems  
The same, however, is not seen when a comparison is drawn between the Maltese and English 
legal systems. When one compares the Maltese and English legal systems and makes a 
comparison between Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 and sections 170 et seq 
of the United Kingdom’s Companies Act 2006, various substantive discrepancies can be seen 
(vide Chapter 4). The first two duties are the duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of 
the company and the duty to take care of the general governance of the company. Here, the 
main noticeable difference is that the Maltese legal system has opted to enact the two duties 
under two different headings, whereas in the English system they are combined under one: the 
duty to act in good faith and best interests of the company. These two duties can be said to be 
overlapping because directors have to ensure that the company is managed by good governance 
for the directors to be considered fully compliant with their duty to act in good faith and in the 
best interest of the company. However, they are interpreted differently because the duty to act 
in good faith and in the best interest of the company goes beyond the simple duty to take care 
of the general governance of the company. This supposition is drawn on the basis that the duty 
to take care of the general governance of the company simply implies that the company’s 
accounts and any other form is duly filed with the Registry of Companies on time, and any 
penalty that is issued in the name of the company is promptly paid. By contrast, the duty to act 
in good faith and in the best interest of the company implies that directors have a duty to act 
reasonably in what they believe is just when they have to take a decision with respect to the 
company. Consequently, the duty to take care of the general governance of the company does 
not affect the financial position of the company, but can be only slightly affected if penalties 
are constantly issued and not paid on time. Yet, the same cannot be concluded with regards to 
the duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company, which implies that the 
financial position of the company is very much affected on the basis of what decision the 
220 
directors make. In this regard, the Maltese approach is more welcoming than the English 
general provision. 
 
The next discrepancy arises under the duty not to make a secret or personal profit without the 
consent of the company. Whereas the Maltese legal system precludes a director from making 
any secret or personal profit, be it from a third party or from the company, the English system 
is more liberal and only precludes secret or personal gain if it is gained by the director from a 
third party. The difference in this approach means that under the Maltese legal system, if for 
example a director earns a wage, they will still technically need the consent of the company, 
whereas the English legal system seems to automatically give such rights to the director. Under 
the Maltese statutory provision, any profit may also be accepted by the directors if approved 
by the company but, since they act on behalf of the company, how effective such a safeguard 
would be is questionable. Consequently, although at first glance the provision seems to cut 
down on abuse, the way it is worded does not help to protect the interests of the company, and 
the English statutory provision is more appropriate and should be more readily accepted. 
 
An additional difference arises under the duty not to let personal interests conflict with the 
interests of the company. The Maltese legal system provides for a generic approach, in which 
any conflict of interest is unacceptable and improper. However, the English statute provides 
for two situations in which conflicts of interest cannot arise, as opposed to the more stringent 
Maltese statutory provision. First, the English provision provides that such duty is not infringed 
in relation to those situations which cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest. This leads to problems because such interpretation can be highly subjective 
and thus lead to unnecessary complications. Second, this duty will also not be breached by the 
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director if the matter has been authorised by the company, but a different approach is taken for 
public and private companies. The constitution of a private company shall not in any manner 
invalidate such authorisation, whereas in the case of a public company, such authorisation must 
be specifically laid down in the company’s constitution. In view of that, the Maltese statutory 
provision is better than its English counterpart to better protect the interests of the company. 
 
The next major difference occurs with respect to the duty not to use any property, information 
or opportunity of the company for their own or anyone else’s benefit or obtain any benefit from 
their power, except with the consent of the company at the general meeting or as permitted by 
the memorandum and articles of the company. In essence, the Maltese legal system does not 
limit such authorisation only to the company’s constitution, but also gives the right to a general 
meeting. By contrast, the English position is limited to the company’s constitution. 
Accordingly, the Maltese legal system is slightly easier and less burdensome, but still achieves 
the desired result since the shareholders’ approval is always sought, as approval for a change 
in the company’s constitution. Therefore, at first glance, this statutory difference between the 
two legal systems might not seem a substantial divergence, but the Maltese statutory provision 
leads to the same results in a lesser time than the English provision, and the interests of the 
company can be more easily protected. 
 
The fifth difference arises under the two duties outlined above. The English legal system 
introduced the concept of liability of directors after retirement from the office, and that a 
director’s fiduciary duty does not end when the individual retires. Therefore, a director cannot 
act on the basis of any information which they gain during their appointment The strict 
interpretation of this duty is important as, if a director uses any information, property or 
222 
opportunity, this can affect the financial position of the company. Regrettably, this specific 
statutory provision was not transplanted into the Maltese legal system, but I am of the view 
that such prohibition would be taken into consideration if the Maltese judiciary were to be 
faced with such a situation because I believe that the Maltese judiciary is a firm believer that 
the company’s interests shall always be protected, and when the company’s interests are well 
protected, the interests of any stakeholder are also protected. 
 
The last difference arises with respect to the directors’ duty to act within the powers conferred 
upon them by the memorandum and articles of association of the company or by any other 
agreement entered into between the director and the company. Whereas the English legal 
system has recently opted to include the possibility not to enact an objects clause in the 
memorandum and articles of association, such progressive thinking is not reflected in the 
Maltese legal system yet. The Maltese Companies Act 1995 puts a duty on the subscribers to 
always include an objects clause in the memorandum and articles of association upon 
incorporation of the company with the Registry of Companies.563 Yet, to balance such a burden, 
the subscriber usually has an infinite objects clause to ensure that any action taken by the 
company will be within its powers. Consequently, the Maltese approach is more burdensome 
on the company and can lead to unnecessary complications, which the English approach has 
already envisaged and has decided to opt for the exclusion of the objects clause. 
 
Another considerable discrepancy lies in the scattered provisions that were enacted in the 1964 
Maltese Ordinance, the 1995 Maltese Act and the English legal system. The major difference 
                                                 
563 Vide Article 69 
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is the prohibition against the company giving loans to directors. The Maltese provision 
provides that a loan may be given to a director if approved by the company or if it is in the 
ordinary course of the company’s business to give out loans. However, as directors act on 
behalf of the company, approval by the company entails approval by the directors themselves. 
The Maltese approach is only limited to the directors themselves and specifically to loans. By 
contrast, the English statutory provision was stricter and included the prohibitions against 
quasi-loans and to persons connected to the director, even if the company does not object. As 
a result, the English statutory provision is better suited to protecting the interests of the 
company. 
 
Nevertheless, at the same time, it is observed under Chapter 4 that there were other detailed 
instances in which the English legal system was adequately and effectively transplanted into 
the Maltese legal system. This shows that literal borrowing has led in this instance to the 
acceptance of that legal transplantation may sometimes be effective. The no-conflict and the 
no-profit principles were, in fact, adopted literally in the 1962 Maltese Ordinance and retained 
in the Maltese Companies Act 1995. The Maltese legal system opted to incorporate these two 
principles with the same vigour as the English legal system, through the duty on the director to 
declare any interest in a proposed contract or in a contract of the company and to ensure that 
the personal interests do not conflict with those of the company. 
 
Another benefit is that both legal systems forbid the misuse of the company’s confidential 
information by a director in any circumstances. Misuse of information can take place by using 
the company’s information not only for one’s own personal interests in the course of 
employment as a director with the company, but also if it used for the benefit of a third party. 
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Chapter 4 presents another noticeable influence that is seen under both legal systems, which is 
with respect to the approach taken to the definition of the term ‘company’. Although a 
discrepancy used to exist, it was recently changed to reflect the English approach under the 
Maltese legal system in which one particular presiding judge has decided to link his thinking 
with the approach taken by the English legal system. This has , at the beginning, been limited 
under the Maltese legal system to include only the company per se as defined within the general 
corporate principle and, therefore, the Maltese legislators have limited such terms within the 
strict application of the separate legal personality concept of the company. The same rigorous 
interpretation was also applied by the majority of the Maltese judiciary. The English approach 
is very similar to the Maltese approach, in which the statute law and English judgments limit 
the term ‘company’ to the strict interpretation of the separate legal personality principle. 
Nevertheless, the English legal system has started interpreting the term ‘company’ widely, 
especially during the late 1990s and 2000s when discussions over the newly enacted 
Companies Act 2006 were under way. The English legal system has thus introduced the ESV  
and CSR principles to widen the interpretation of the term ‘company’, in which any stakeholder 
interest is also taken into consideration. These principles were not readily accepted under the 
Maltese legal system, and have only been cautiously introduced with respect to listed 
companies, although that is starting to change with a widening of the interpretation of the 
company for the general common good of any involved person, even though a director always 
has to ensure that the interests of the company are never undermined. 
 
Two more influential necessities that were also literally reproduced into the Maltese legal 
system from the English system are the inclusion of the principles of ratification and personal 
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liability, which come into play when the director acts beyond the powers conferred by the 
memorandum and articles of association, or by any other agreement entered into between the 
director and the company. Both systems require that a company shall ratify any contract if the 
directors acts beyond his powers and the company shall be bound by such action. Both systems 
also point out that when a director acts in his own name, he is personally liable and such action 
cannot then be impugned to the company. 
 
Accordingly, the above analysis shows that the Maltese legal system has not always allowed 
the literal borrowing to take place, as when the Maltese legal system was influenced by the 
Italian legal system. Yet, there were instances of literal borrowing when Maltese legislators 
opted to change the substantive element of certain provisions transplanted from the English 
legal system, or when most of the Maltese judiciary came to the conclusion that the English 
legal system is more attractive. This shows that certain notions were borrowed from the English 
legal system, but the examples also show that certain principles have been influenced by the 
factors identified in Chapter 1, especially the economic and prestige factors, closely linked with 
the historical, societal, cultural and familiarity with the law factors, which led to the enactment 
of distinctive laws that seem to accommodate the Maltese legal system. 
 
6.1.2 Influence exerted by Roman law on the Maltese Civil Code 1870 provisions  
The second observation emanating from this thesis demonstrates that the fiduciary provisions 
as enacted under the Maltese Civil Code 1870 were not transplanted at all. In this particular 
instance, it is deduced that the factors identified in Chapter 1 which form the concept of the 
legal transplantation have been very influential. In fact, it is observed that the two fiduciary 
provisions were something that the Maltese legislators felt the need to enact to ensure that any 
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person exercising potential influence on the company is regulated due to the influence exerted 
by the unique Maltese economy and way of living. Therefore, the substantive law was totally 
not adapted from any foreign legal system, but was original to Malta and these provisions, 
codified in Articles 1124 A and B of the Maltese Civil Code 1870, were not influenced by the 
Italian or English legal system, but were influenced by the Roman system. The general concept 
of fiduciary duty has been influenced by the English legal system, but the English legal system 
has never opted for the statutory introduction of a general provision that regulates any fiduciary 
relationship that might arise between two persons. Consequently, it does not regulate persons 
not holding the title of a director so rigorously, even though it provides for a wide definition of 
director as the Maltese legal system. Likewise, the Italian legal system does not put any person 
holding a fiduciary position under the same heading of director, and the Italian system has 
never readily accepted the fiduciary concept (vide Chapter 2). By contrast, the Maltese legal 
system has taken the stance that any person, even if that individual does not hold the official 
title of director, has a fiduciary relationship with the company, the same fiduciary duty and its 
interpretation shall apply to that individual as to a director. 
 
6.1.3 The approach taken by the majority of the Maltese judiciary distinct from statute 
law; thus leading to judicial nihilism  
The third remark observed from this thesis is that although the Maltese legislators took a certain 
path in their regulation of the fiduciary duty of directors, the majority of the judiciary have 
departed from this approach and applied the law as they deemed appropriate. It started to refer 
to the English influence in the 1940s, long before it was acknowledged by the Maltese statute 
law (vide Chapter 5). As a result, it has applied the law differently, which should be 
discouraged because the law cannot be bent in such a way that the involved parties are 
prejudiced. Whenever a judge or magistrate applies the law inappropriately, the involved 
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parties have not been protected by the law as they should have been. The study shows that, 
although the Maltese statute law has applied both the Italian and English legal systems over 
time, the majority of the Maltese judiciary did not observe such smooth development. Statutory 
transitioning was, as a result, not applied by most of the Maltese judiciary In fact, there were 
judgments decided on Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 even if they were filed before 
2003 whereas there were others decided on mandate law even if they were filed after 2003. The 
Maltese judiciary can be regarded as guilty of judicial nihilism due to its inconsistency in 
applying the law, not as it was written, but as they deemed appropriate. Judicial nihilism, 
therefore, shall be defined as those instances whereby most of the judiciary were not applying 
the law as it was enacted by the legislators but were departing from such definitions of the law 
to apply the law they deemed appropriate (vide Chapter 1). 
 
6.1.4 A general approach to legal transplantation in the Maltese legal system  
Although this thesis presents the study of the fiduciary duty of directors as presented under 
Maltese statute law and its interpretation of this duty by the Maltese judiciary, it would have 
been interesting to look at other areas of Maltese law to fully comprehend the type and level of 
borrowing reflected in the Maltese legal system. As a general rule, shipping564 and aviation 
laws565 are very much modelled on the English legal system wherein literal borrowing seems 
to have taken place. Private law, by contrast, seems to have been more influenced by the civil 
legal system,566 even though property law, which also forms part of private law, was surely 
                                                 
564 The Law Review, The Shipping Law Review Edition 5, (2018) <https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-
shipping-law-review-edition-5/1171085/malta> accessed 17 August 2018 
565 Reference to the influence of the English legal system was made during the law course at the University of 
Malta  
566 Ivan Sammut, ‘the EU and Maltese Legal Orders: What Kind of Marriage Between Them?’ 97 
<http://www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudies/books/CD_CSP5/pdf/isammut.pdf> accessed 3 October 2018 
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influenced by the uniquely congested real estate situation in Malta.567 Hence, as a result, it may 
be concluded that the factors defined in Chapter 1 and applied with respect to the regulation of 
the fiduciary duty of directors may well be reflected in other parts of Maltese law, depending 
which area of law is being examined. Accordingly, such approach reinforces once again that 
while legal transplantation in Malta cannot be undermined, the historical, cultural, societal, 
familiarity with the law, judicial, economic, prestige and political factors have uniquely shaped 
the Maltese legal system, in every aspect of the law. It is also observed that whenever legal 
transplantation takes place in any area of the Maltese law, such borrowing does not depend if 
it was due to the civil or common law influences, but every borrowing depends on the Maltese 
context as influenced by the various factors mentioned herein and defined in Chapter 1. 
Therefore, there may be literal borrowing from the English legal system, as in the case of 
shipping and aviation, as much as the literal borrowing from the Italian system.  
 
 Explanatory factors 
This thesis presents my understanding that there is a real need for transplanting law into the 
Maltese legal system because legal transplantation addresses defects, which arise from 
concerns about the inadequacy of legal interpretation, the problem of uncertainty in law and 
deficiency in legislation. Nevertheless, legal transplantation is influenced by the application of 
the diverse factors presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
 
                                                 
567 Two major provisions include the regulation of the common wall between two properties and the excavation 
rules when two properties share a common wall  
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In this regard, indeed, first and foremost, I have presented the Maltese legislators’ behaviour 
with respect to the trajectory of the law. I have demonstrates that Maltese legislators opted for 
legal transplantation as influenced by the language and historical preferences, which have led 
to the application of the Italian legal system and later superseded by the English legal system.  
I have, however, also demonstrated that over time, Maltese legislators have shown another 
reason for the application of legal transplantation, which is due to the prestige and market 
practice that the Italian and English legal systems have enjoyed throughout the years, especially 
the English legal system as London has gained prominence in the financial sector. I also reckon 
that another most obvious reason, and one which seems to be readily accepted Maltese legal 
scholars, is that legal transplantation from the Italian and English legal systems was also 
effective in Malta because the Maltese legislators have always tried to enact laws based on the 
legal system whose laws are considered to be influential at that time. The Italian legal system 
was influential during the time when the various factors mentioned in Chapter 1 required them 
to take into consideration the mandate provisions as enacted under the Italian legal system. The 
Italian influence was very strong in Malta for quite a long time, both from a statutory point of 
view and also from the majority of the judiciary’s approach. This changed after the 1940s 
whereby Maltese legislators and most of the judiciary began to look up to the English legal 
system. This sentiment was influenced by the historical, economic and prestige factors 
mentioned and became entrenched as London became the major hub in the field of finance and 
corporate law. Consequently, it was deemed that the English laws would be effective in 
regulating any aspect of finance and corporate law since Malta greatly depends on foreign 
investments for success. Accordingly, various specific provisions were enacted in the Maltese 
Commercial Ordinance 1964 and in the Maltese Companies Act 1995, including the duty of 
directors. 
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Second, I have also established that legal transplantation was also effective when it was 
resorted to by the judiciary to fill gaps where the law was silent or ambiguous. In this case, 
most of the Maltese judiciary opted to look at that foreign legal system that enjoys a certain 
degree of prestige and one, which enjoys a strong economy. As a result, it may be presented 
that legal transplantation can be an effective solution to address the gaps in legislation, and 
Maltese statute law is sometimes silent on certain notions, but due to the influences exerted by 
the Italian and English legal systems as applied through the various factors presented in Chapter 
1 of this thesis, references to these systems shall be made when necessary. Chapter 5 shows 
even more clearly that most of the Maltese judiciary have demonstrated that reference to 
foreign legal systems, especially to the English legal system, can be made when the Maltese 
statute law is silent on a certain notion. 
 
However, I have also shown throughout this study that although legal transplantation is 
significant and cannot be undermined, any rule transplanted into the Maltese statute law or 
delivered through judgments may not be as effective as they are in their countries of origin for 
two reasons: first, the factors identified in Chapter 1 and the nature of the Maltese economy 
provide a different environment to that which the foreign legislation was designed to fit; and 
second, the application of the concept of judicial nihilism cannot be undermined. This judicial 
nihilism, indeed, shall be defined as those instances whereby most of the judiciary were not 
applying the law as it was enacted by the Maltese legislators but were departing from such 
definitions of the law to apply the law they deemed appropriate, as also discussed in section 
1.2.3 of this thesis.  
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With regards to the first limb identified above, it is true to note that foreign norms and 
institutions are diffused into the Maltese legal context during the legislative process, which are, 
however,  influenced by the identified factors in Chapter 1. Moreover, if none of the foreign 
systems available seems to be suitable for the particular case of Malta, these rules need to be 
changed in their entirety, perhaps into something that departs greatly from the original. For 
example, I theorize that Maltese statute law had to undergo certain changes due to the 
commercial implications in Malta such as always using the term ‘company’ to try and present 
a situation where the company is not a sham invention with a wider definition presented by 
some of the Maltese judiciary by applying the not-so-readily accepted ESV and CSR principles 
as much as possible to ensure that any interests are protected; but which two principles are 
being rigorously applied for listed companies through the enactment of the listing rules with 
no exceptions. The reason for the statutory resistance to these two principles, as presented by 
some of the Maltese judiciary, may have been that many companies are family run businesses 
in Malta with the shareholder and the director one and the same person, as delineated in Chapter 
1. These principles, however, are being rigorously applied to listed companies because these 
companies are made up of different shareholders who are separate from the directors and the 
creditors’ protection is also not undermined. This reason, through the presentation of the unique 
Maltese business context, has, accordingly, also provided an answer to the notion why few 
judgments were ever filed in the Maltese Courts challenging the fiduciary duty of directors 
since the fiduciary duty can only be challenged by one director in the name of the company 
against another director.   
 
As to the second problem of judicial nihilism, and therefore, the application of the law by 
various judges and magistrates inconsistent with how the law was enacted, can be observed 
through the challenge presented by the level of judicial education. One can observe from this 
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study that legal transplantation in Malta might not have been fully effective because the 
majority of the Maltese judiciary did not interpret the statute law correctly. Such 
misinterpretation of statute law may have arisen due to three distinctive facts. First, every judge 
might have had other definitions in mind, influenced by the distinctive social background 
which that judge lives in. Moreover, the fact that the law of precedent is not enforced in Malta 
and dissenting opinions by the judiciary are not written are two further factors that also lead to 
a situation in which any judge can decide on their own social norms. Second, whereas it is true 
that every judge attends the same course in Malta, postgraduate studies and the importance of 
speaking Italian well are not enforced. Accordingly, a judge might not be able to fully 
understand and interpret the statute law and foreign judgments correctly. Third, every judge or 
magistrate can sit on every court and can hear any case, thus they lack specialisation. 
 
 Wider implications and the relevance of studying the complexities of Malta 
As a first point, this study adds to the general study of legal transplantation by having presented 
the complex dynamics presented by the Maltese legal system through the application and 
interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors as presented by the Maltese statute law and 
judiciary from the 19th century to the present day. In fact, more precisely, I present, for the first 
time, that legal transplantation in the Maltese legal system in the fiduciary duty of company 
directors is not straightforward as Watson believes, but neither can it be totally ignored and 
overlooked, as Montesquieu, Legrand and Siedmans believe. As a result, I shall conclude that 
such legal transplantation can take place within the limits imposed by the various factors 
presented in Chapter 1.  
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I have presented that these factors, namely the historical, cultural, societal and familiarity with 
the law, led to the Italian legal system to be closely imitated and literal borrowing was, 
therefore, adopted by the legislators in Malta from the 1800s. These same factors, nevertheless, 
contributed to  substantial modifications, which were considered necessary when the influence 
of the English legal system started to increase from the 1940s until the enactment of Article 
136 A in the Maltese Companies Act 1995 in 2003 because not all aspects of the application 
of this foreign legal system were considered to complement the legislative rules of the Maltese 
legal system and its custom. However, I have shown in this thesis, especially in Chapter 4, that 
further changes to the Maltese statutory provisions should be considered appropriate and 
necessary. I thus propose four amendments, which will be outlined herein, and which are 
characterised as suitable and proper. The first example of a much-needed change to Maltese 
statute law is to include a provision to require directors to continue abiding by their fiduciary 
duty even after their retirement or resignation from office. This amendment would ensure that 
any director cannot use any acquired knowledge to gain money out of it to the detriment of the 
company that they used to work for. The second amendment that would surely be very 
welcoming is to include under the Maltese law the prohibition of giving out also quasi-loans to 
directors, and not only loans. The reason for such inclusion is that in a quasi-loan, the 
requirement of a debtor, in which case is the director, to repay the amount back to the principal, 
being the company, would not necessarily be included in the terms and conditions. Therefore, 
the fact that a repayment date is not included can work very much against the best interest of 
the company because the company may end up without that amount of money owed to it. One 
might argue that the providing of quasi-loans or loans to directors would not result in a 
detriment to the company in a one-man company where the shareholder and the director of the 
company is the same persona since if a company makes any profit or otherwise would still be 
for the benefit of the director. However, allowing the providing of quasi-loans and loans would 
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inhibit the application of the separate legal personality of the company. This is because 
whatever structure of the company is, including a one-man company, the company shall always 
enjoy a separate legal entity from its shareholders and it shall, therefore, always be paid back 
any amount owed to it, whatever the circumstance. Should the company not be paid back any 
amount loaned, such approach would mean that the best interest of the company is not taken 
into consideration. The providing of loans and quasi-loans to directors by companies also 
works against the enlightened shareholder value (ESV) principle when there is not a one-man 
company. The corporate social responsibility (CSR) principle shall also be taken into 
consideration wherein the providing of loans or quasi-loans by the company to directors would 
always be seen as working against the interest of stakeholders because should the company go 
into liquidation to the amounts owed, its employees and creditors would be left in a 
disadvantageous position. The third change is to include any person associated with a director; 
therefore the prohibition to give out loans and quasi-loans shall not only be limited to directors 
but also to family member and to any other person, whether legal or natural, which is linked to 
the director, either directly or indirectly. The reason for such prohibition is because approval 
to any loan is sought for by the company only under Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995 
which would mean that the directors only need to give their consent who would surely consent 
to the giving out to loans to any person linked to themselves. Also, such prohibition shall be 
included under Article 144 of the Companies Act 1995 since consent under this Article is only 
sought for at a general meeting, which would be tainted if the director is the major shareholder 
who would, once again, consent to the providing of the loan to any person linked to themselves. 
One final amendment that needs to be taken into consideration is the abolishing of including 
an objects clause in the memorandum and articles of association upon company formation 
because a very wide objects clause is still being included by promoters upon company 
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formation and ratification can also take place; both instances defeat the purpose of having an 
objects clause included.  
 
Nonetheless, at the same time, I am of the opinion that this study has also demonstrated that 
the manner in which statute law is being defined takes into consideration the fact that the 
majority of companies in Malta are family run businesses and are, therefore, categorized as 
small and medium enterprises, as demonstrated in Chapter 1. I demonstrated through this study 
that cultural and social norms have shaped the Maltese legal system in a unique manner. In this 
respect, I demonstrated that these norms have led to the ESV and CSR principles to never be 
explicitly included under Article 136 A of the Companies Act 1995, but were introduced in the 
listing rules and shall, accordingly, apply with respect to listed companies and also applied by 
some members of the judiciary. The reason for such approach is because as I have demonstrated 
throughout, the majority of companies in Malta are one-man companies; therefore the ESV and 
CSR principles were already indirectly included because a director of a company would surely 
work for the benefit of the shareholder, who would be the sole or major shareholders 
themselves. They would also work in favour of other stakeholders, as they are aware that should 
they maximize profits they can declare more profits for themselves, which profits can be 
increased when creditors and employees are respected and work closely with the director who 
acts for and on behalf of the company.  
 
I have also shown throughout this study that a difference arises between the trajectory of the 
legal transplantation concept in statute law and its interpretation by the majority of the judiciary 
who have not always correctly applied the law in line as it was transplanted, thus leading to the 
application of the concept of judicial nihilism, which is defined in Chapter 1. In fact, it is 
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demonstrated that most of the judiciary were more interested in the economic and prestige 
factors from the 1940s, which have thus departing from the historical, societal and cultural 
factors, together with the familiarity with the law. This judicial approach led to the need and 
desire to make reference to the English system, way before the legislators in Malta opted to 
start to look at this foreign legal system. I have also shown and discussed the notion that the 
majority of the judiciary could apply the economic and prestige factors since all of the judiciary 
enjoy judicial independence who cannot be removed, as explained in Chapter 1. In fact, 
scholars believe that judicial independence is very important to economic and financial 
development.568 Nonetheless, I have also provided for a new insight on the importance of 
judicial training and education. I strongly believe that judicial training and education are 
important and cannot be undermined, as the judiciary needs to be aware of all the changes and 
developments that take place in statute law so that they can fully interpret and apply the law. 
Judges and magistrates must also educate themselves about the diverse factors that have led to 
any amendments in statute law to be in a position to fully comprehend the amended law. In 
view of this, three changes to the judicial system should be considered. First, changes to the 
appointment of the judiciary shall be made where judges and magistrates shall be appointed 
according to their specialisation, in view of which a judge or a magistrate who has specialized 
in company law shall only have competence to decide on such cases. Therefore, judges and 
magistrates should not enjoy the right to sit on any case, as happens in Malta today. Second, 
the whole judiciary must ensure that all of its judges and magistrates are applying the correct 
law to eliminate any ambiguities that may arise, as was demonstrated in Chapter 5. The correct 
application of the law can only be achieved if the judiciary informs itself of any amendments 
carried out to statute law and must also be trained in better understanding the origin of these 
                                                 
568Kim (n 88) 
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amendments so they would be in a position to fully comprehend the true meaning of the 
wording used, especially when a particular law is literal borrowed from a foreign system. 
Therefore, the legal transplantation notion and its influence on a certain part of the law needs 
to be very well understood so that every judge and magistrate is in a position to fully 
comprehend and interpret statute law effectively. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the 
judiciary shall start to apply the law of precedent, but such law shall continue not to be applied 
in the Maltese context and both judges and magistrates shall continue to enjoy the right to 
interpret the law, as they deem fit and appropriate. However, all of the judiciary shall the least 
apply the same law; therefore, as a result, by way of example, should a case is raised before 
the Maltese Courts about the fiduciary duty of directors, any judge or magistrate shall apply 
Article 136 A of the Maltese Companies Act 1995 while reference to mandate law and to the 
old judgments that have applied mandate law shall not be made. This study has also provided 
for the importance of having the Maltese judiciary enjoying the opportunity to write dissenting 
opinions without fear of being reprimanded, which dissenting opinions can ultimately lead to 
alternative interpretations of the law, which can result in a better understanding of the law. 
 
Accordingly, I have demonstrated, for the first time, how the fiduciary duty of company 
directors in Malta is applied and interpreted under the Maltese statute law and by the Maltese 
judiciary through the legal transplantation concept. More precisely, I have shown the 
importance of applying the legal transplantation concept in the Maltese legal system, subject 
to the factors presented under Chapter 1. I have, more accurately, presented, for the first time 
until to date the dynamic complexity of the Maltese legal system, which could be presented 
and analysed through the Maltese statute law and the unique Maltese judicial interpretation of 
the fiduciary duty of directors through the application of the legal transplantation concept. 
Hence, although it is true to assert that most of the Maltese legal scholars are aware that the 
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interpretation of the fiduciary duty of directors was influenced first by the Italian legal system 
and thereafter by the English legal system, none of them has ever taken the time to fully analyse 
the extent of legal transplantation with regard to this fiduciary duty in the Maltese context and 
the Maltese judiciary’s approach to this duty of directors until to date.  
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Appendix 
Articles and sections mentioned in the thesis are reproduced in this Appendix for ease of 
reference. 
Maltese Statute Law 
Constitution of Malta  
Article 96 states that (1) The judges of the Superior Courts shall be appointed by the President 
acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. 
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed a judge of the Superior Courts unless for a 
period of, or periods amounting in the aggregate to, not less than twelve years he has either 
practised as an advocate in Malta or served as a magistrate in Malta, or has partly so practised 
and partly so served. 
(3) Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  sub-article  (4), before the Prime Minister gives 
his advice in accordance with sub-article (1) in respect of the appointment of a judge of the 
Superior Courts, (other than the Chief Justice) the evaluation by the Judicial Appointments 
Committee established by article 96A of this Constitution as provided in paragraphs (c), (d) or 
(e) of sub-article (6) of the said article 96A shall have been made. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-article (3), the Prime Minister shall be entitled to 
elect not to comply with the result of the evaluation referred to in sub-article (3): Provided that 
after the Prime Minister shall have availed himself of the power conferred upon him by this 
sub-article, the Prime Minister or the Minister responsible for justice shall:  
(a) publish within five days a declaration in the Gazette announcing the  decision  to  use  the  
said  power  and giving the reasons which led to the said decision; and  
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(b)  make  a  statement  in  the  House  of  Representatives about the said decision explaining 
the reasons upon which  the decision was  based  by  not  later than  the second sitting of the 
House to be held after the advice was  given  to  the  President  in  accordance  with  sub- 
article (1): Provided further that the provisions of the first proviso to this sub-article shall not 
apply in the case of appointment to the office of Chief Justice.  
 
Article 100 states that (1) Magistrates of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the President 
acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. 
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed to or to acting the office of magistrate of the 
inferior courts unless he has practised as an advocate in Malta for a period of, or periods 
amounting in the aggregate to, not less than seven years. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-article (4) of this article, a magistrate of the inferior courts 
shall vacate his office when he attains the age of sixty-five years. 
(4) The provisions of sub-articles (2) and (3) of article 97 of this Constitution shall apply to 
magistrates of the inferior courts.  
(5) Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  sub-article (6), before the Prime Minister gives 
his advice in accordance with sub-article (1) in respect of the appointment of a magistrate of 
the Inferior Courts the evaluation by the Judicial Appointments Committee established by 
article 96A of this Constitution as provided in paragraphs (c), (d) or (e) of sub-article (6) of the 
said article 96A shall have been made. 
(6)  Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-article (5), the Prime Minister shall be entitled to 
elect not to comply with the result of the evaluation referred to in sub-article (5):Provided that 
after the Prime Minister shall have availed himself of the power conferred upon him by this 
sub-article, the Prime Minister or the Minister responsible for justice shall:(a)  publish within 
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five days a declaration in the Gazette announcing  the  decision  to  use  the  said  power  and 
giving the reasons which led to the said decision; and(b)  make  a  statement  in  the  House  of  
Representatives about the said decision explaining the reasons upon which  the decision was  
based  by  not  later than  the second sitting of the House to be held after the advice was  given  
to  the  President  in  accordance  with  sub-article (1).  
 
Ordinance XIII 1857 
Article 62 states that an anonymous partnership can be managed by agents or by directors 
appointed for a time, or by agents and directors conjointly, being liable to removal, whether 
partners or not, whether receiving a salary or acting gratuitously. 
 
Article 63 states that the managing partners are under no obligation that that of fulfilling the 
charge received. They contract by reason of such management no obligation, either personal 
or in solidum, in reference to the engagements of the partnership. 
 
Article 69 states that previously to the making of any such enrolment, exhibition, or 
publication, the parties acting as managers of an anonymous partnership shall be liable, both 
personally and in solidum, for their operations to third parties. 
 
Act XXX of 1927 
Article 3 states that in commercial matters, the commercial laws shall apply, if no provision 
exists in such laws, the mercantile custom shall be applied, and in the absence, the civil law. 
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Commercial Code 1942 
Article 3 states that in the absence of commercial law and custom usages, the fiduciary duty 
of directors shall be governed by the Maltese civil code. 
 
Article 153 states that a partnerships anonyme or limited liability company is formed by means 
of a capital divided into a certain number of shares; it does not take its name from any one of 
its partners; but it may take its name from the object of the undertaking, or may even be 
designated by a title. 
 
Article 155 states that a limited liability company shall be administered by one or more agents 
or directors appointed for a certain time, or by one or more agents and directors conjointly, 
subject to removal, whether chosen from amongst the partners or not, whether salaried or 
otherwise. 
 
Article 156 (1) states that the administrators are only responsible for the due execution of their 
mandate. They do not incur by reason of their management any liability, either personally or 
jointly and severally, with respect to the engagements of the partnership. 
 
Article 156 (2) states that nevertheless, in case of breach of any of the provisions contained in 
the deed of partnership, or in case of non-fulfilment of their duties, the administrators become 
personally liable to third parties for any damage occasioned to them. 
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Article 162 states that until such enrolment, production and publication, as prescribed in 
sections 158, 160 and 161are made, the parties acting as administrators of a limited liability 
company shall be personally and jointly and severally liable for their dealing towards third 
parties. 
 
Commercial Partnerships Ordinance 1962 
Article 2 states that a ‘director’ includes any person occupying the position of director by 
whatever name called. 
 
Article 3 states that commercial partnerships shall be governed by this Act:- Provided that 
where no provision is made in this Act, the usages of trade or, in the absence of such usages, 
the Civil Law shall apply. 
 
Article 121 (1) states that the business of a company shall be managed by one or more directors, 
who may exercise all such powers of the company as are not, by this Ordinance or by the 
memorandum or Articles of the company, required to be exercised by the company in general 
meeting. 
 
Article 126 (1) states that a director may not, in competition with the company and without the 
approval of the company given at a general meeting, carry on business on his own account or 
on account of others or be a partner with unlimited liability in another partnership.(2) Where a 
director acts in violation of the prohibition contained in this section, the company may, at its 
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option, either take action for damages and interest against him or demand payment of any 
profits made by him in contravention of this section. 
 
Article 127 states that it shall not be lawful for a company 
(a) to make a loan to any person who is its director or a director of its holding company, 
or to enter into any guarantee or provide any security in connection with a loan made 
to such a person as aforesaid by any other person: Provided that nothing in this section 
shall apply either 
(i) to anything done, with the approval of the company given at a general 
meeting, to provide any such person as aforesaid with funds to meet expenditure 
incurred or to be incurred by him for the purposes of the company or for the 
purpose of enabling him properly to perform his duties as an officer of the 
company; or 
(ii) in the case of a company whose ordinary business includes the lending of 
money or the giving of guarantees in connection with loans made by other 
persons, to anything done by the company in the ordinary course of that 
business; 
(b) to make to any director of the company any payment by way of compensation for 
loss of office, or as consideration for or in connection with his retirement from office, 
without particulars with respect to the proposed payment(including the amount thereof) 
being disclosed to members of the company and the proposal being approved by the 
company in general meeting. 
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Article 128 (1) states that it shall be the duty of a director of a company who is in any way, 
whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contractor proposed contract with the company to 
declare the nature of his interest to the other directors either at the meeting of the directors at 
which the question of entering into the contract is first taken into consideration, or, if the 
director was not at the date of that meeting interested in the contract or proposed contract, at 
the next meeting of the directors held after he became so interested. 
(2) Any director who fails to comply with the provisions of this section shall be liable to a 
penalty not exceeding one thousand and one hundred and sixty-four euro and sixty-nine cents 
(1,164.69). 
 
Companies Act, Chapter 386 of the Laws of Malta 
Article 4 (4) states that a commercial partnership as a legal personality distinct from that of its 
member or members and such legal personality shall continue until the name of the commercial 
partnership is struck off the register, whereupon the commercial partnership shall cease to exist. 
 
Article 127 states that it shall not be lawful for a company 
(a) to make a loan to any person who is its director or a director of its holding company, 
or to enter into any guarantee or provide any security in connection with a loan made 
to such a person as aforesaid by any other person: Provided that nothing in this section 
shall apply either  
(i) to anything done, with the approval of the company given at a general 
meeting, to provide any such person as aforesaid with funds to meet expenditure 
incurred or to be incurred by him for the purposes of the company or for the 
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purpose of enabling him properly to perform his duties as an officer of the 
company; or 
(ii) in the case of a company whose ordinary business includes the lending of 
money or the giving of guarantees in connection with loans made by other 
persons, to anything done by the company in the ordinary course of that 
business; 
(b) to make to any director of the company any payment by way of compensation for 
loss of office, or as consideration for or in connection with his retirement from office, 
without particulars with respect to the proposed payment(including the amount thereof) 
being disclosed to members of the company and the proposal being approved by the 
company in general meeting. 
 
Article 136 A states that: (1) A director of a company shall be bound to act honestly and in 
good faith in the best interests of the company. 
(2) The directors of a company shall promote the well-being of the company and shall be 
responsible for: 
(a) the general governance of the company and its proper administration and 
management; and 
(b) the general supervision of its affairs. 
(3) In particular, but without prejudice to any other duty assigned to the directors of a company, 
or to any one of them, by the memorandum or articles of association or by this Act or any other 
law, the directors of a company shall: 
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(a) be obliged to exercise the degree of care, diligence and skill which would be 
exercised by a reasonably diligent person having both 
(i) the knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a 
person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by or entrusted to that 
director in relation to the company; and 
(ii) the knowledge, skill and experience that the director has; 
(b) not make secret or personal profits from their position without the consent of the 
company, nor make personal gain from confidential company information; 
(c) ensure that their personal interests do not conflict with the interests of the company; 
(d) not use any property, information or opportunity of the company for their own or 
anyone else’s benefit, nor obtain benefit in any other way in connection with the 
exercise of their powers, except with the consent of the company in general meeting or 
except as permitted by the company’s memorandum or articles of association; 
(e) exercise the powers they have for the purposes for which the powers were conferred 
and shall not misuse such powers. 
 
Article 137 (2) states that the business of a company shall be managed by the directors who 
may exercise all such powers of the company, including those specified in Article 136, as are 
not by this Act or by the memorandum or Articles of the company, required to be exercised by 
the company in general meeting. 
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Article 137 (3) states that the business of a company shall be managed by the directors who 
may exercise all such powers of the company, including those specified in Section 136 of this 
Act as are not by this Act or by the memorandum or Articles of the company, required to be 
exercised by the company in general meeting’. 
 
Article 143 (1) states that a director of a company may not, in competition with the company 
and without the approval of the same company given at a general meeting, carry on business 
on his own account or on account of others, nor may he be a partner with unlimited liability in 
another partnership or a director of a company which is in competition with that company. 
 
Article 144 (1) states that it shall not be lawful for a company 
(a) to make a loan to any person who is its director or a director of its parent company, 
or to enter into any guarantee or provide any security in connection with a loan made 
to such a person as aforesaid by any other person: Provided that nothing in this 
paragraph shall apply either 
(i) to anything done, with the approval of the company given at a general 
meeting, to provide any such person as aforesaid with funds to meet expenditure 
incurred or to be incurred by him for the purposes of the company or for the 
purpose of enabling him properly to perform his duties as an officer of the 
company; or 
(ii) in the case of a company whose ordinary business includes the lending of 
money or the giving of guarantees in connection with loans made by other 
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persons, to anything done by the company in the ordinary course of that 
business;  
(b) to make to any director of the company any payment by way of compensation for 
loss of office, or as consideration for or in connection with his retirement from office, 
without particulars with respect to the proposed payment, including the amount thereof, 
being disclosed to members of the company and the proposal being approved by the 
company in general meeting. 
(2) For the purposes of this Article, the expression ‘director’ shall include any person in 
accordance with whose directives or instructions the directors of a company are accustomed to 
act. 
 
Article 145 (1) states that it shall be the duty of a director of a company who is in any way, 
whether directly or indirectly. Interested in a contract or proposed contract with the company 
to declare the nature of his interest to the other directors either at the meeting of the directors 
at which the question of entering into the contract is first taken into consideration or, if the 
director was not at the date of that meeting interested in the contract or proposed contract at 
the next meeting of the directors held after he became so interested. 
(2) Any director who fails to comply with the provisions of this section shall be liable to a 
penalty. 
 
Civil Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta 
Article 1124 A states that: (1) Fiduciary obligations arise in virtue of law, contract, quasi-
contract, trusts, assumption of office or behaviour whenever a person (the ‘‘fiduciary’’) 
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(a) owes a duty to protect the interests of another person; or 
(b) holds, exercises control or powers of disposition over property for the benefit of 
other persons, including when he is vested with ownership of such property for such 
purpose; or 
(c) receives information from another person subject to a duty of confidentiality and 
such person is aware or ought, in the circumstances, reasonably to have been aware, 
that the use of such information is intended to be restricted. 
(2) A person who is delegated any function by a fiduciary and is aware, or should, from the 
circumstances, be aware, of the fiduciary obligations shall also be treated to be subject to 
fiduciary obligations. 
(3) Fiduciary obligations arise from behaviour when a person – 
(a) without being entitled, appropriates or makes use of property or information 
belonging to another, whether for his benefit or otherwise; or 
(b) being a third party, acts, being aware, or where he reasonably ought to be aware 
from the circumstances, of the breach of fiduciary obligations by a fiduciary, and 
receives or otherwise acquires property or makes other gains from or through the acts 
of the fiduciary. 
(4) Without prejudice to the duty of a fiduciary to carry out his obligations with utmost good 
faith and to act honestly in all cases, a fiduciary is bound, subject to express provision of law 
or express terms of any instrument in writing excluding or modifying such duty, as the case 
may be – 
(a) to exercise the diligence of a bonus pater familias in the performance of his 
obligations; 
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(b) to avoid any conflict of interest; 
(c) not to receive undisclosed or unauthorised profit from his position or functions; 
(d) to act impartially when the fiduciary duties are owed to more than one person; 
(e) to keep any property as may be acquired or held as a fiduciary segregated from his 
personal property and that of other persons towards whom he may have similar 
obligations; 
(f) to maintain suitable records in writing of the interest of the person to whom such 
fiduciary obligations are owed; 
(g) to render account in relation to the property subject to such fiduciary obligations; 
and 
(h) to return on demand any property held under fiduciary obligations to the person 
lawfully entitled thereto or as instructed by him or as otherwise required by applicable 
law. 
(5) In addition to any other remedy available under law, a person subject to a fiduciary 
obligation who acts in breach of such obligation shall be bound to return any property together 
with all other benefits derived by him, whether directly or indirectly, to the person to whom 
the duty is owed. 
(6) The obligation to return property derived from a breach of a fiduciary duty shall apply also 
to all property into which the original property has been converted or for which it has been 
substituted. 
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Article 1124 B states that: (1) When the ownership of property is vested in a person who holds 
it subject to fiduciary obligations, third parties may act in relation to such person as though he 
were the absolute owner thereof. 
(2) When a person holds property subject to fiduciary obligations, such property is not subject 
to the claims or rights of action of his personal creditors, nor of his spouse or heirs at law. 
(3) A person dealing with a fiduciary in relation to property subject to fiduciary obligations 
need not -(a) enquire into the terms of his authority; or(b) obtain the consent of the person to 
whom the fiduciary duties are owed or any other person, and shall, subject to being in good 
faith, be entitled to rely on declarations made by the fiduciary with regard to his authority. 
(4) The fiduciary may furnish to any person dealing with him a certificate containing the 
following information without being in breach of any confidentiality obligations:(a) that the 
authority exists, the date the relevant instrument was executed and that the authority has not 
been revoked;(b) a declaration that he is authorised to carry out the transactions being entered 
into; and(c) the identity and address of the fiduciary. 
(5) Any fiduciary who issues any certificate containing any statement which he knows or ought 
to know is false shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to the punishment 
of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine(multa). 
 
Article 1856 states that: (1) Mandate or procuration is a contract in which a person gives to 
another the power to do something for him. 
(2) The contract is not perfected until the mandatary has accepted the mandate. 
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Article 1857 states that: (1) Every mandate must have for its object something lawful which 
the mandator might have done himself. 
(2) Subject to any other special provision of the law, a mandate can be granted by a public 
deed, by a private writing, by letter, or verbally, or even tacitly. 
(3) An irrevocable mandate granted by way of security as specified in Article 1887(1) shall be 
granted in writing on pain of nullity. 
 
Article 1858 states that the acceptance on the part of the mandatary may also be tacit, and may 
be inferred from acts. 
 
Article 1859 states that any person carrying on trade or exercising a profession who, without 
just cause, fails to give notice to the mandator, without delay, of his refusal to accept a mandate 
relating to commercial or to professional business, as the case may be, is answerable to the 
mandator for damages occasioned by the delay. 
 
Article 1860 states that if a mandate is granted by a private writing, the name of the mandatary 
may be left in blank; in which case, so long as the name is not written, the bearer of the writing 
or of the instrument or procuration shall be deemed to be the mandatary. 
 
Article 1861 states that a mandate is gratuitous, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. 
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Article 1862 states that a mandate is either special, if it is for one matter or for certain matters, 
only; or general, if it is for all the affairs of the mandator. 
 
Article 1863 states that: (1) A mandate made out in general terms applies only to acts of 
administration. 
(2) The power to make alienations of property, except such alienations as fall within the limits 
of the administration, or to hypothecate property or to perform other acts of ownership, must 
be expressed. 
 
Article 1864 states that a mandatary cannot do anything beyond the limits of the mandate. 
 
Articles 1864 A states that: (1) A mandate given by a person of full age in anticipation of his 
incapacity to a mandatary, for the latter to take care of the mandator or to administer his 
property shall be drawn, under pain of nullity by a notary public in the presence of two 
witnesses in accordance with the requirements of Article 655(1) of this Code, after having 
obtained a medical declaration that circumstances so require in the best interests of that person. 
This mandate shall be registered in the same manner as any one of the acts mentioned in Article 
50 of the Notarial Profession and Notarial Archives Act. 
(2) In the case of a person of full age, performance of the mandate shall be conditional upon 
the occurrence of the incapacity and after obtaining the necessary approval from the court of 
voluntary jurisdiction upon application by the mandatary designated in the act. The court of 
voluntary jurisdiction may impose those conditions that it may deem necessary. 
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(3)(a) For the purpose of termination of the mandate, that termination has to be drawn 
by a notary public in the same manner as the mandate was constituted and the 
termination shall be accompanied by a sworn medical certificate which confirms that 
the incapacity has ceased and that termination has to be approved by the court of 
voluntary jurisdiction. That termination shall be registered in the same manner as any 
one act mentioned in Article 50 of the Notarial Profession and Notarial Archives Act. 
(b) Such termination shall be communicated or notified, as the case may be, to the 
mandatary who shall be bound to cease from representing the mandator with immediate 
effect. The registrar of the court of voluntary jurisdiction shall send a copy of the 
termination approved by the court of voluntary jurisdiction to the Chief Notary to 
Government who shall enter the particulars of such termination in a register held by 
him for the purpose and which shall be accessible to the public during office hours. 
(c) If the mandatary continues to represent the mandatory after the termination has been 
communicated or notified to him, the mandatary shall be held personally responsible 
for damages and shall be considered as acting in contravention of this Article. 
(4) The provisions of sub-title II of Title XVIII of Part II of Book Second of the Code shall, 
mutatis mutandis, apply to a mandatary appointed in terms of this Article. 
 
Articles 1865 states that: (1) For the carrying out of the mandate, the mandatary may institute 
legal proceedings; make and prosecute appeals; make proof by reference to the oath of his 
adversary; take the oath in litem or the suppletory oath; enforce judgments both on movable 
and immovable property; make demand for the issue of precautionary acts including those for 
the issue of which an application or declaration on oath is required; make demand for the 
personal arrest of the debtor of the mandator, where such demand is competent; and do any 
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other thing which the mandator might do personally, notwithstanding that such powers have 
not been expressly given in the mandate. 
(2) The mandatary may also, in virtue of the said powers, be a defendant on behalf of the 
mandator, in any law-suit concerning the matter included in the mandate. 
 
Article 1866 states that a mandatary, however, may not sue or be sued, on behalf of the 
mandator, although the latter shall have given him authority to do so, when the mandator 
himself is not absent from the Island in which the action is to be tried, saving the provisions of 
Article 786 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure: provided that a mandatary under 
an irrevocable mandate granted by way of security may sue on behalf of the mandator 
irrespective of this provision to protect or enforce the interests secured by the mandate. 
 
Article 1867 states that: (1) The express power to compromise does not include the power to 
submit to arbitration or vice versa. 
(2) The power to receive includes the power to give acquittance. 
(3) The power to sell includes the power to receive the price. 
 
Article 1868 states that where a person has been employed to do something in the ordinary 
course of his profession or calling, without any express limitation of power, such person shall 
be presumed to have been given power to do all that which he thinks to be necessary for the 
carrying out of the mandate, and which, according to the nature of the profession or calling 
aforesaid, may be done by him. 
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Article 1869 states that minors may be appointed mandataries; but in any such case the 
mandator cannot maintain an action against the mandatary except in accordance with the 
general rules relating to the obligations of minors. 
 
Article 1870 states that: (1) The mandator can, for the execution of a contract, act directly 
against the person with whom the mandatary in his capacity as such has contracted. 
(2) The powers of the mandator in relation to the subject matter of the irrevocable mandate by 
way of security may be suspended by express agreement for the duration of the mandate. 
(3) Such mandates may be registered in a public register. In this Article ‘public register’ means: 
(a) where the subject matter of the mandate is a ship or rights related or connected 
therewith, the Register of Maltese Ships and by means of an annotation; 
(b) where the subject matter of the mandate is an aircraft or an aircraft engine or rights 
related or connected therewith, the National Aircraft Register and by means of an 
annotation; and 
(c) in all other cases, the Public Registry by means of a note, and in such case it shall 
have effect in relation to third parties and any exercise of any such powers by the 
mandatary as are suspended shall not have any effect except when done with the written 
consent of the mandatary. 
 
Articles 1871 states that: (1) When the mandatary has acted in his own name, the mandator 
cannot maintain an action against those with whom the mandatary has contracted, nor the latter 
against the mandator. 
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(2) In any such case, however, the mandatary is directly bound towards the person with whom 
he has contracted as if the matter were his own. 
 
Article 1871 A states that: (1) Any person holding property for another holds property subject 
to fiduciary obligations to the person engaging him for such purpose and shall be regulated by 
the provisions of this title and by the provisions of this Code relating to fiduciary obligations. 
(2) Where such person acquires property in his own name but on behalf of a mandator, the 
mandator shall at all times be entitled to demand the immediate and unconditional transfer 
thereof from the mandatory. The mandatory shall on such demand or, in any case, on the 
expiration of the time during which the mandate was to continue, immediately render account 
of his mandate in terms of Article 1875 and transfer the property to the mandator by such means 
as may be appropriate, saving any special terms of the mandate relating to fees and expenses 
and rights of any third party in good faith. 
(3) Notwithstanding Article 1886, a mandate in favour of a person acting in terms of this Article 
shall not lapse - 
(a) on the death of the mandator and shall continue to bind the mandatory to preserve 
the property and all rights related thereto until such time as the property held by him is 
validly transferred to the heirs or legatees of the mandator; and 
(b) on the bankruptcy of the mandator or the mandatory and shall continue to bind the 
mandatory to preserve the property and all rights related thereto until such time as the 
property held by him is validly transferred as directed by the competent court for the 
benefit of the mandator or of the creditors of the mandator, as the case may be. 
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(4) A term of the mandate purporting to bind a mandatory as referred to above to transfer the 
property held by him to a third party after the death of the mandator shall not be valid unless 
such bequest be made by means of a will in accordance with the formalities required by law. 
(5) In the event of the death of the mandatory, the heirs at law or the executor, if any, of the 
will of the mandatory shall be bound by the same obligations to preserve the property held for 
the mandator and to immediately transfer it to him or as he may instruct, saving such rights to 
the payment of outstanding dues and expenses according to law. 
(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1871 (1), in cases where a mandatory, as referred 
to above, brings, by any means, to the attention of any third party that he is acting in such 
capacity, the mandatory shall not be personally liable for the obligations entered into other than 
with and to the extent of the property held by him. 
 
Article 1872 states that the provisions of this Code shall not affect the provisions of the 
Commercial Code, or of any other special law or other usages of trade. 
 
Article 1873 states that: (1) A mandatary is bound to carry out the mandate so long as he is 
vested therewith, and in case of non-performance he is answerable for damages and interest. 
(2) He is also bound to conclude any matter, which he may have commenced before the death 
of the mandator, if delay might be prejudicial. 
 
Article 1874 states that: (1) A mandatary is answerable not only for fraud, but also for 
negligence in carrying out the mandate. 
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(2) Nevertheless, such liability in respect of negligence is enforced less rigorously against a 
person whose mandate is gratuitous than against one receiving a remuneration. 
 
Article 1875 states that the mandatary, unless expressly exempted by the mandator, is bound 
to render to the latter an account of his management and of everything he has received by virtue 
of the mandate, even if what he has received was not due to the mandator. 
 
Article 1876 states that: (1) The mandatary cannot substitute another person for himself, if he 
has not been empowered to do so by the mandator. 
(2) If such power has been conferred upon him but without naming the person to be substituted, 
the mandatary is answerable for the person he has substituted if he has selected a person 
notoriously incompetent or insolvent or whom he otherwise knew to be such. 
(3) In all cases, the mandator may act directly against the person whom the mandatary has 
substituted. 
 
Article 1877 states that: (1) Where there are several attorneys or mandataries appointed by the 
same instrument, there is no joint and several liability between them, unless it be expressly so 
agreed. 
(2) Each of such mandataries may validly carry out the mandate independently of the consent 
of the other mandataries or notwithstanding their opposition, unless the mandator has expressly 
ordered that one shall not act without the other, or has otherwise expressly specified their 
duties. 
290 
(3) The limitation of powers of each of the aforesaid mandataries may not be set up against 
third parties, unless such limitation appears from the instrument of procuration, or unless it is 
shown that such third parties have otherwise had sufficient knowledge of such limitation. 
 
Article 1878 states that a mandatary owes interest on the sums which, without the authority of 
the mandator, he has applied to his own use, from the day on which he has made such use, and 
on any other sum in which he shall remain debtor, from the day on which he is put in default, 
saving, in both the aforesaid cases, the usages of trade. 
 
Article 1879 states that a mandatary who has given to the party with whom he has contracted 
in such capacity sufficient information as to his powers, is not liable for any warranty in respect 
of what he has done beyond such powers, unless he has personally bound himself thereto. 
 
Article 1880 states that: (1) A mandator is bound to carry out the obligations contracted by the 
mandatary in accordance with the powers which he has given him. 
(2) He is not liable for what the mandatary has done beyond such powers, unless he has 
expressly or tacitly ratified it. 
 
Article 1881 states that: (1) The mandator must repay to the mandatary the advances and 
expenses made or incurred by him in carrying out the mandate; and he must pay him the 
remuneration if promised to him, or if it is presumed to have been tacitly agreed upon, regard 
being had to the profession of the mandatary and to other circumstances. 
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(2) If no negligence be imputable to the mandatary, the mandator cannot refuse to make such 
reimbursement and payment, even though the matter has not been successful; nor can he have 
the amount of such expenses and advances bona fide incurred or made, reduced, on the ground 
that they might have been less. 
 
Article 1882 states that the mandator must also indemnify the mandatary for the losses he has 
sustained by reason of the mandate, where no negligence is imputable to him. 
 
Article 1883 states that interest is due by the mandator to the mandatary on the advances and 
expenses mentioned in Article 1881 from the day of the payment of such sums. 
 
Article 1884 states that where the mandatary has been appointed by several persons for a 
common business, each of them is jointly and severally liable towards him for all the 
consequences resulting from the mandate. 
 
Article 1885 states that the mandatary shall have the right of retention, so long as he is not paid 
what is due to him in consequence of the mandate 
 
Article 1886 states that: (1) Mandate is terminated - 
(a) by the revocation of the procuration; 
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(b) by the death, the interdiction or the incapacitation, whether general or special, from 
entering into contracts, the declaration of bankruptcy, or the cession bonorum either of 
the mandator or of the mandatary; 
(c) by the termination of the powers of the mandator; 
(d) by the expiration of the time during which the mandate was to continue; 
(e) by the renunciation on the part of the mandatary: 
Provided that: 
(i) in the case of the termination of a mandate in which the mandatory, being a physical 
person, has been empowered to transfer immovable property on behalf of the mandator 
or where the mandate is one of a general nature given between physical persons, such 
termination may be notified by the mandator or by any other person having an interest 
in the mandate to the Chief Notary to Government who will enter the particulars of such 
termination in a register held by him for the purpose and which shall be accessible to 
the public during office hours; and 
(ii) the Minister responsible for Justice shall have the power to issue regulations to 
establish an electronic register where the registration of mandates and their termination 
may be made and to establish such formalities, fees and applicable procedures for 
registration in the said electronic register and to regulate access to the said register. 
(2) An irrevocable mandate by way of security shall not terminate upon the events stated in 
sub-Article (1) and shall continue to be binding on, or continue for the benefit of, the heirs or 
liquidator (or similar officer) of the mandator, or of the mandatary, or the creditor if a different 
person, in accordance with its terms. Neither shall such an irrevocable mandate terminate on 
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such events when they occur in relation to a mandatary who is a different person than the 
creditor in whose favour the mandate has been granted. 
(3) The creditor whose interests are secured through the mandate, or his heirs, or liquidator(or 
similar officer), may appoint a substitute to act as mandatary, including himself, or may apply 
to the Court of voluntary jurisdiction to make such appointment. 
 
Article 1887 states that: (1) The mandator may revoke the mandate whenever he chooses, 
unless the mandate is expressly stated to be granted by way of security in favour of the 
mandatary or of any other person, and that it is irrevocable, in which case it may only be 
revoked with the consent of the person whose interest is secured thereby. The mandatary under 
such an irrevocable mandate granted by way of security, shall be bound to act in a fair and 
reasonable manner when exercising the powers granted thereunder, provided that a mandate 
by way of security which is irrevocable may only be granted when the object to which it relates 
is property which is movable, by nature or by operation of law, and it shall not be permissible 
for such a mandate to be issued with reference to immovable property or rights therein. 
(2) Where powers are exercised under an irrevocable mandate granted as stated above and form 
part of or are granted pursuant to or in the context of a written agreement governing a broader 
relationship, the mandatary shall furthermore be bound to exercise such powers in accordance 
with the terms and subject to the conditions of such agreement. 
(3) Except as provided in the preceding sub-Article, the appointment of a new mandatary for 
the same business is equivalent to a revocation of the mandate given to the previous one, even 
though the new mandatary does not accept the mandate. 
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(4) A general mandate does not produce the revocation of a special mandate previously given, 
unless the business contemplated in the special mandate is expressly included in the general 
mandate. 
 
Article 1888 states that: (1) The existence of any of the causes for which a mandate is 
terminated cannot be set up against third parties who, having no knowledge of such cause, have 
contracted with the mandatary; saving the right of the mandator to seek relief against the 
mandatary, where competent. 
(2) Nor may the existence of any such cause be set up against the mandatary, if at the time of 
acting he also had no knowledge thereof. 
 
Article 1889 states that: (1) A mandatary may renounce the mandate by giving notice of his 
renunciation to the mandator. 
(2) Nevertheless, if the renunciation is prejudicial to the mandator, he must be compensated by 
the mandatary, unless it is impossible for the latter to continue to carry out the mandate without 
suffering himself considerable prejudice. 
 
Article 1890 states that in case of the death of the mandatary, his heirs must, if they know that 
he was a mandatary, give notice thereof to the mandator, and attend, in the meantime, to what 
is required in the interest of the latter, as circumstances may demand. 
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Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta 
Article 2 states that: 
(1) The courts of justice of civil jurisdiction for Malta are either superior or inferior. Each court 
may be divided into different sections. 
(2) Unless otherwise established by law, the President of Malta may by Order establish the 
sections of each Court, and designate the categories of cases assigned to each section; and may 
by subsequent Order amend, revoke or substitute such Order. 
(3) Saving any other provision of law, the courts of justice of civil jurisdiction are exclusively 
vested with the judicial authority in civil matters within the jurisdiction of the tribunals of 
Malta. 
 
Small Claims Tribunal Act, Chapter 380 of the Laws of Malta 
Article 3 (2) states that:  
(2) Subject to subarticle (5), the Small Claims Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and 
determine only all money claims of an amount not exceeding five thousand euro (€5,000): 
Provided  that,  in  determining  the  sum  referred  to  in  this  subarticle, no account shall 
be taken of fees and costs relative to the same claim.  
 
English Statute Law 
Companies Act 1948 
Article 124 (4) states that a director and officer shall include any person in accordance with 
those directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act. 
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Article l90 states that: (i) It shall not be lawful for a company to make a Prohibition loan to any 
person who is its director or a director of its holding company, or to enter into any guarantee 
or provide any security in connection with a loan made to such a person as aforesaid by any 
other person: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply either –  
(a) to anything done by a company which is for the time being an exempt private 
company; or 
(b) to anything done by a subsidiary, where the director is its holding company; or 
(c) subject to the next following subsection, to anything done to provide any such 
person as aforesaid with funds to meet expenditure incurred or to be incurred by him 
for the purposes of the company or for the purpose of enabling him properly to perform 
his duties as an officer of the company; or 
(d) in the case of a company whose ordinary business includes the lending of money or 
the giving of guarantees in connection with loans made by other persons, to anything 
done by the company in the ordinary course of that business. 
(2) Proviso(c) to the foregoing subsection shall not authorise the making of any loan, or the 
entering into any guarantee, or the provision of any security, except either –  
(a) with the prior approval of the company given at a general meeting at which the 
purposes of the expenditure and the amount of the loan or the extent of the guarantee 
or security, as the case may be, are disclosed; or 
(b) on condition that, if the approval of the company is not given as aforesaid at or 
before the next following annual general meeting, the loan shall be repaid or the liability 
under the guarantee or security shall be discharged, as the case may be, within six 
months from the conclusion of that meeting. 
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(3) Where the approval of the company is not given as required by any such condition, the 
directors authorising the making of the loan, or the entering into the guarantee, or the provision 
of the security, shall be jointly and severally liable to indemnify the company against any loss 
arising therefrom. 
 
Section 199 (i) states that subject to the provisions of this section, it shall be the duty of a 
director of a company who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract 
or proposed contract with the company to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the 
directors of the company. 
 
Companies Act 1985 
Section 1 (2) (a) states that a company having the liability of its members limited by the 
memorandum to the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares respectively held by them (‘a 
company limited by shares’). 
 
Section 317 (1) states that it is the duty of a director of a company who is in any way, whether 
directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with the company to declare 
the nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the company’. 
 
Section 330 states that: (1) The prohibitions listed below in this section are subject to the 
exceptions in sections 332 to 338. 
(2) A company shall not- 
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(a) make a loan to a director of the company or of its holding company; 
(b) enter into any guarantee or provide any security in connection with a loan made by 
any person to such a director. 
(3) A relevant company shall not- 
(a) make a quasi-loan to a director of the company or of its holding company; 
(b) make a loan or a quasi-loan to a person connected with such a director; 
(c) enter into a guarantee or provide any security in connection with a loan or quasi-
loan made by any other person such a director or a person so connected. 
(4) A relevant company shall not- 
(a) enter into a credit transaction as creditor for such a director or a person so connected; 
(b) enter into any guarantee or provide any security in connection with a credit 
transaction made by any other person for such a director or a person so connected. 
(5) For purposes of sections 330 to 346, a shadow director is treated as a director. 
(6) A company shall not arrange for its assignment to it, or the assumption by it, of any rights, 
obligations or liabilities under a transaction which, if it had been entered into by the company, 
would have contravened subsections(2),(3), or(4); but for the purposes of sections 330 to 347 
the transaction is to be treated as having been entered into on the date of the arrangement. 
(7) A company shall not take part in any arrangement in which- 
(a) another person enters into a transaction which, if it had been entered into by the 
company, would have contravened any of subsections(2),(3),(4), or(6); and 
299 
(b) that other person, in pursuance of the arrangement, has obtained or is to obtain any 
benefit from the company or its holding company or a subsidiary of its company or its 
holding company. 
 
Companies Act 2006 
Section 170 states that: (1) The general duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are owed by a 
director of a company to the company. 
(2) A person who ceases to be a director continues to be subject –(a) to the duty in Section 
175(duty to avoid conflicts of interest) as regards the exploitation of any property, information 
or opportunity of which he became aware at a time when he was a director, and(b) to the duty 
in Section 176(duty not to accept benefits from third parties) as regards things done or omitted 
by him before he ceased to be a director. To that extent those duties apply to a former director 
as to a director, subject to any necessary adaptations. 
(3) The general duties are based on certain common law rules and equitable principles as they 
apply in relation to directors and have effect in place of those rules and principles as regards 
the duties owed to a company by a director. 
(4) The general duties shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as common law rules 
or equitable principles, and regard shall be had to the corresponding common law rules and 
equitable principles in interpreting and applying the general duties. 
(5) The general duties apply to shadow directors where, and to the extent that, the 
corresponding common law rules or equitable principles so apply. 
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Section 171 states that a director of a company must –(a) act in accordance with the company’s 
constitution, and(b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are conferred. 
 
Section 172 states that: (1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole, and in doing so have regard(amongst other matters) to –  
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers 
and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other 
than the benefit of its members, subsection(1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes. 
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring 
directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the 
company. 
 
Section 173 states that: (1) A director of a company must exercise independent judgment. 
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(2) This duty is not infringed by his acting –(a) in accordance with an agreement duly entered 
into by the company that restricts the future exercise of discretion by its directors, or(b) in a 
way authorised by the company’s constitution. 
 
Section 174 states that: (1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and 
diligence. 
(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent 
person with –(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected 
of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company, 
and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has. 
 
Section 175 states that: (1) A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or 
can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests 
of the company. 
(2) This applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity(and 
it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or 
opportunity). 
(3) This duty does not apply to a conflict of interest arising in relation to a transaction or 
arrangement with the company. 
(4) This duty is not infringed –(a) if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to 
give rise to a conflict of interest; or(b) if the matter has been authorised by the directors. 
302 
(5) Authorisation may be given by the directors –(a) where the company is a private company 
and nothing in the company’s constitution invalidates such authorisation, by the matter being 
proposed to and authorised by the directors; or(b) where the company is a public company and 
its constitution includes provision enabling the directors to authorise the matter, by the matter 
being proposed to and authorised by them in accordance with the constitution. 
(6) The authorisation is effective only if –(a) any requirement as to the quorum at the meeting 
at which the matter is considered is met without counting the director in question or any other 
interested director, and(b) the matter was agreed to without their voting or would have been 
agreed to if their votes had not been counted. 
(7) Any reference in this section to a conflict of interest includes a conflict of interest and duty 
and a conflict of duties. 
 
Section 176 states that: (1) A director of a company must not accept a benefit from a third party 
conferred by reason of –(a) his being a director, or(b) his doing(or not doing) anything as 
director. 
(2) A ‘third party’ means a person other than the company, an associated body corporate or a 
person acting on behalf of the company or an associated body corporate. 
(3) Benefits received by a director from a person by whom his services(as a director or 
otherwise) are provided to the company are not regarded as conferred by a third party. 
(4) This duty is not infringed if the acceptance of the benefit cannot reasonably be regarded as 
likely to give rise to a conflict of interest. 
(5) Any reference in this section to a conflict of interest includes a conflict of interest and duty 
and a conflict of duties. 
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Section 177 states that: (1) If a director of a company is in any way, directly or indirectly, 
interested in a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company, he must declare the 
nature and extent of that interest to the other directors. 
(2) The declaration may(but need not) be made –(a) at a meeting of the directors, or(b) by 
notice to the directors in accordance with –(i) Section 184(notice in writing), or(ii) Section 
185(general notice). 
(3) If a declaration of interest under this section proves to be, or becomes, inaccurate or 
incomplete, a further declaration must be made. 
(4) Any declaration required by this section must be made before the company enters into the 
transaction or arrangement. 
(5) This section does not require a declaration of an interest of which the director is not aware 
or where the director is not aware of the transaction or arrangement in question. For this 
purpose a director is treated as being aware of matters of which he ought reasonably to be 
aware. 
(6) A director need not declare an interest –(a) if it cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to 
give rise to a conflict of interest;(b) if, or to the extent that, the other directors are already aware 
of it(and for this purpose the other directors are treated as aware of anything of which they 
ought reasonably to be aware); or(c) if, or to the extent that, it concerns terms of his service 
contract that have been or are to be considered –(i) by a meeting of the directors, or(ii) by a 
committee of the directors appointed for the purpose under the company’s constitution. 
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Italian Statute Law 
Codice di Commercio 1865 
Article 122 states that the administrators are responsible for the execution of the mandate and 
for any other obligation that the law imposes upon them, but cannot do any other thing that 
goes beyond what is mentioned in the contract of formation, and in which case they shall be 
personally liable towards the company and third parties.  
Article 129 states that a company shall be managed by directors who shall be appointed for a 
definite period of time and whose position may be revoked and who may be even shareholders, 
at a payment or gratuitously.  
 
Article 130 states that that the directors shall not be held liable for the acts done in the name 
of the company. 
 
Codice di Commercio 1882 
Article 121 states that a company shall be managed by one or more mandataries who may also 
be shareholders and who shall be appointed for a temporary period of time and shall be revoked. 
 
Article 122 states that the administrators cannot be held liable for any acts done in the name 
of the company. 
 
Article 130 asserts that the directors are responsible for the execution of the mandate that they 
are entrusted with, and for any other obligation that is imposed upon them by law. 
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Codice Civile 1865 
Articles 1737 up to 1763, in essence, are reproduced in the Maltese civil code under the 
mandate section. Accordingly, the French mandate provisions are not again reproduced in 
English. The Maltese mandate provisions which however include more liabilities or duties than 
their Italian counterparts do arise under Articles 1859, 1860, 1862, 1863, 1864A, 1866, 1871A 
and there are also some differences carried out to 1886. 
 
Codice Civile 1942 
Article 2392 states that directors are responsible towards the company as its mandataries. 
 
Article 2476 lays down that directors are responsible towards the company for any damages 
that arise out of their inobservance of duties imposed by law and by the memorandum and 
articles of association of the company. 
 
French Statute Law 
Code Civil 1804 
Articles 1984 up to 2010, in essence, are reproduced in the Maltese civil code under the 
mandate section. Accordingly, the French mandate provisions are not again reproduced in 
English. The Maltese mandate provisions which however include more liabilities or duties than 
their French counterparts do arise under Articles 1859, 1860, 1864A, 1866, 1871A and some 
changes to 1886. 
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Code de Commerce 1807 
Article 18 states that contracts that regulate companies shall be governed by the civil law, by 
the commercial law and by any agreement between the parties. 
Article 29 states that an anonymous company enjoys a separate legal personality from its 
shareholders. 
 
Article 30 states that an anonymous company is designed to carry out an object. 
 
Article 31 that a company shall be administered by mandataries, who shall be elected for a 
definite period of time, who may also be shareholders, either for payment or gratuitously.  
 
Article 32 that the directors are only responsible for the execution of the mandate that they are 
trusted with. 
 
